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THE HUMAN FALLIBILITY OF SCIENTISTS
Just like any other professional endeavor involving human beings, science is 
prone to human fallibility. Obvious and extreme examples of fallibility, such as the 
tendency to commit scientific fraud, have received considerable attention (e.g. 
Bouter, 2015; Buyse et al., 1999; Carlisle, 2012; Diekmann, 2007; Kornfeld, 2012; 
Marusic, Wager, Utrobicic, Rothstein, & Sambunjak, 2015; Mosimann, Dahlberg, 
Davidian, & Krueger, 2002; Mosimann, Wiseman, & Edelman, 1995; Simonsohn, 
2013; Tijdink et al., 2016; Tijdink, Verbeke, & Smulders, 2014). However, the kind 
of frailties to which all scientists fall prey, such as proneness to error, confirmation 
bias, hindsight bias, and motivated reasoning have largely been ignored. While a 
small number of scholars have been pointing to the hazards of errors and bias in 
science for over 75 years (Bacon, 1621/2000; Feist, 1998; Mahoney, 1976, 1979; 
Merton, 1942; Mitroff, 1974; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971; Watson, 1938), empir-
ical research on the effects of human fallibility in science and on how to reduce 
these effects has been relatively scarce. 
The reason for this dearth of empirical research may lie in a lack of acknowl-
edgement of the fallibility of scientists. According to Mahoney, the scientist is 
“viewed as the paragon of reason and objectivity, an impartial genius whose vi-
sionary insights are matched only by his quiet humility” (Mahoney, 1976, p. 3). 
He argued that not only lay people have this image, but also that “the scientist 
tends to paint himself generously in hues of objectivity, humility, and rationality”, 
and that “the average scientist tends to be complacently confident about his ra-
tionality and his expertise, his objectivity and his insight”(Mahoney, 1976, p. 4). 
Although Mahoney did not provide a lot of empirical evidence himself to support 
these claims, he avidly called for studies of the psychology of the scientist. 
Recently, problems with the reliability and reproducibility of research results 
in various fields have led to widespread debate (e.g. Baker, 2016; Begley & Ioan-
nidis, 2015; Chang & Li, 2015; Ioannidis, 2005b, 2007; Open Science Collaboration, 
2015) concerning many of the problems in scientific research that Mahoney point-
ed out. A field of research addressing these problems in science has been emerg-
ing quickly, and has been dubbed ‘meta-research’ (Ioannidis, Fanelli, Dunne, & 
Goodman, 2015; Poldrack et al., 2016). In this young, still rather fragmented field, 
scientists from different scientific backgrounds strive for improvements in the way 
we perform, communicate, verify, evaluate, and reward research (Ioannidis et al., 
2015; Munafò et al., 2017).  In psychology, which has been said to suffer from a 
so-called ‘reproducibility crisis’ (Maxwell, Lau, & Howard, 2015; Pashler & Harris, 
2012; Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012; Spellman, 2015) several scholars have been 
pointing out that the way psychologists conduct their research and analyze their 
data is often problematic and in need of improvement (e.g. Agnoli, Wicherts, Veld-
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kamp, Albiero, & Cubelli, 2017; Asendorpf et al., 2013; Bakker, van Dijk, & Wicherts, 
2012; Bakker & Wicherts, 2011; Cumming, 2014; Eich, 2014; Funder et al., 2014; 
John, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012; LeBel, Borsboom, Giner-Sorolla, Hasselman, 
Peters, Ratliff, & Tucker Smith, 2013; Lindsay, 2015; Morey et al., 2016; Nosek et 
al., 2015; Nosek & Bar-Anan, 2012; Nosek, Spies, & Motyl, 2012; Simmons, Nel-
son, & Simonsohn, 2011; Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 2014b; Spellman, 2015; 
Vazire, 2015, 2017; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, & van der Maas, 2011; 
Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, van der Maas, & Kievit, 2012; Wicherts, 2011, 
2013; Wicherts & Bakker, 2012).  Proposed solutions include systemic changes, 
such as study pre-registration, open peer review, and stricter requirements for 
documenting, archiving and sharing data (Morey et al., 2016; Nosek et al., 2015; 
Nosek & Bar-Anan, 2012; Nosek et al., 2012; Wicherts & Bakker, 2012).
As a psychologist trained in social and developmental psychology, I joined 
the meta-research group at Tilburg University that focuses on potential solutions 
for error and bias in psychological science.  Before I started examining potential 
solutions myself, I aimed to answer a more fundamental question: are scientists 
likely to acknowledge the need for such solutions? I addressed this question by ex-
amining to what extent scientists recognize their own fallibility (Chapter 2). Then 
I focused on psychological science, and examined potential solutions to reduce 
the probability of error (Chapters 3 and 4) and bias (Chapters 5 and 6) in the use 
of the most widely employed statistical framework in psychology, null hypothesis 
significance testing (NHST). 
In Chapter 2, we investigated recognition of the human fallibility of scien-
tists by examining lay people’s and scientists’ belief in the ‘storybook image’ of 
the scientist; the image that a scientist is a person who embodies the virtues of 
objectivity, rationality, intelligence, open-mindedness, integrity, and communality 
(Mahoney, 1976, 1979). We examined this in four studies. Studies 1 and 2 tested 
whether highly-educated lay people and scientists believed the storybook char-
acteristics of the scientist to apply more strongly to scientists than to other high-
ly-educated people.  Studies 3 and 4 zoomed in on whether scientists attributed 
higher levels of the storybook characteristics to scientists of their own social group 
(i.e. scientists of the same academic level or gender) than to other scientists.
Chapters 3 and 4 concern errors in psychological science. In the studies re-
ported in these chapters, we examined a particular type of error that scientists can 
fall prey to: errors in the reporting of statistical results. We replicated the alarm-
ingly high prevalence of such errors found in earlier studies (Bakker & Wicherts, 
2011; Bakker & Wicherts, 2014a; Berle & Starcevic, 2007; Caperos & Pardo, 2013; 
Garcia-Berthou & Alcaraz, 2004; Wicherts, Bakker, & Molenaar, 2011) using an 
automated procedure called ‘statcheck’ (Epskamp & Nuijten, 2013, 2015). This 
software package is able to quickly retrieve and check statistical results that are 
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reported according to the publication manual of the American Psychological As-
sociation (American Psychological Association, 2010) and can be applied to large 
samples of articles.  Moreover, we evaluated a potential solution to reduce such 
errors: the so called ‘co-pilot model of statistical analysis’ (Wicherts, 2011). This 
model entails a simple code of conduct prescribing that statistical analyses are 
always conducted independently by at least two persons (typically co-authors). 
This would stipulate double-checks of the analyses and the reported results, open 
discussions on analytic decisions, and improved data documentation, that facili-
tates later replication of the analytical results by (independent) peers. The co-pilot 
model of statistical analysis was based on how the field of aviation deals with the 
hazards of human error, where the co-pilot’s double checking of the pilot’s every 
move significantly reduces the risk of airplane crashes (Beaty, 2004; Wiegman & 
Shappell, 2003). 
In Chapter 3, we studied the potential effectiveness of the co-pilot model by 
examining the relationship between the reporting errors that statcheck found in a 
sample of 697 articles published in six flagship psychology journals, and whether 
the co-pilot model was employed in these articles. Specifically, by means of an 
online survey among authors, we documented which authors were involved in 
various aspects of the data analysis, and whether the data was shared among 
co-authors. Our goal was to see whether the use of collaborative co-piloting prac-
tices was associated with a lower prevalence of reporting errors in the articles. 
In light of our relatively small sample size and potential drawbacks of our survey 
methodology, such as memory effects (the survey pertained to articles published 
a year earlier), response bias, and socially desirable responding, we conducted 
a second study. In this study, we examined a much larger set of articles and em-
ployed a different method to measure co-piloting.     
In Chapter 4, we scanned the full population of psychology articles ever pub-
lished in the multidisciplinary Open Access journal PLOS ONE (14,946) for statis-
tical reporting errors, using statcheck. To measure whether co-piloting occurred 
in these articles, we made use of the mandatory author contribution statements 
made in all of these articles. From these author contribution sections and other 
meta-data on the articles, we automatically retrieved how many authors were 
listed on the article, how many authors were responsible for the analyses, and 
whether the first author was responsible for the analyses. Employing the author 
contribution statements eliminated the limitations of the use of a survey in the 
previous study and enabled us to obtain co-piloting data of many more articles 
than in the previous study to determine whether the use of co-piloting was asso-
ciated with a lower prevalence of reporting errors in the articles.
Chapters 5 and 6 concern biases in psychological science. In these chapters, 
we focus on a particular type of bias that emerges because of the many choices 
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researchers face in formulating their hypotheses, in designing their studies, in col-
lecting their data, in analyzing their data, and in reporting their results. Psycholog-
ical studies involve numerous choices that are often arbitrary from a substantive 
or methodological point of view. A key issue with these choices is that researchers 
might use these so-called researcher degrees of freedom strategically in order to 
obtain statistically significant results (Bakker et al., 2012; Simmons et al., 2011). 
Opportunistic use of researcher degrees is commonly known as ‘p-hacking’ (Gel-
man & Loken, 2013; John et al., 2012; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2013; 
Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 2014a) and is problematic for two main reasons. 
First, p-hacking greatly increases the chances of finding a false positive result 
(DeCoster, Sparks, Sparks, Sparks, & Sparks, 2015; Ioannidis, 2005b; Simmons et 
al., 2011). Second, it may inflate effect sizes (Bakker et al., 2012; Ioannidis, 2008; 
Simonsohn et al., 2014a; van Aert, Wicherts, & van Assen, 2016). Hence, together 
with publication bias (or the failure to publish non-significant results), the oppor-
tunistic use of researcher degrees of freedom might play  a central role in the 
publication of research findings that later prove to be difficult to replicate in new 
samples (Asendorpf et al., 2013).
In Chapter 5, we present and discuss an overview of researcher degrees of 
freedom that psychological researchers have in formulating their hypotheses, de-
signing their experiments, collecting their data, analyzing their data, and reporting 
of their results. For each of these phases separately, we describe how various 
choices can be used opportunistically. With the list of researcher degrees of free-
dom presented in Chapter 5 we aim to raise awareness of the risk of bias implicit 
in many psychological studies, to provide a practical checklist to assess the poten-
tial for bias in such studies, and to provide a tool to be used in research methods 
education. In addition, the list served as a basis for the study presented in Chapter 
6, where we examined the effectiveness of a potential solution to restrict oppor-
tunistic use of researcher degrees of freedom: study pre-registration.
Pre-registration has received the most attention as a solution to counteract 
the opportunistic use of researcher degrees of freedom and its elevated chances 
of finding false positive results and possibly inflated effect size estimates (Cham-
bers, 2013; Chambers & Munafo, 2013; de Groot, 1956/2014; van Aert et al., 
2016; Wagenmakers et al., 2012). Pre-registration requires the researcher to 
stipulate in advance the research hypothesis, data collection plan, data analyses, 
and what will be reported in the paper. Different forms of pre-registration are 
currently emerging in psychology, mainly varying in terms of the level of detail 
with respect to the research plan they require researchers to provide. The differ-
ences between pre-registration formats suggest that a statement that a particular 
study was pre-registered may not be indicative of how well researcher degrees 
of freedom were restricted in that study. We argue in Chapter 5 that in order to 
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be effective in restricting opportunistic use of researcher degrees of freedom, 
pre-registrations need to be sufficiently specific, precise, and exhaustive. That is, 
the ideal preregistration should provide a detailed description of all steps that 
will be taken from hypothesis to the final report (it should be specific). Moreover, 
each described step should allow only one interpretation or implementation (it 
should be precise). Finally, a preregistration should exclude the possibility that 
other steps may also be taken (it should be exhaustive). 
In Chapter 6, we examined two types of pre-registrations that are currently 
hosted by the Center for Open Science on the Open Science Framework: ‘Stan-
dard Pre-Data Collection Registrations’ and ‘Prereg Challenge Registrations’. The 
Standard Pre-Data Collection Registrations format simply asks for a summary of 
the research plan and asks researchers to indicate whether they have already col-
lected or looked at the data before composing the pre-registration. The Prereg 
Challenge format, on the other hand, requires authors to fill out a specific form 
consisting of 26 sections asking for details about many different aspects of the 
study plan. In our study, we evaluated to what extent random samples of each of 
these two types of pre-registrations restricted opportunistic use of the researcher 
degrees of freedom presented in Chapter 5, with the goals to assess the quality 
of current pre-registrations, to learn on which aspects these pre-registrations cur-
rently fall short of countering bias, and to provide recommendations to improve 
pre-registrations in the future. To evaluate the pre-registrations, we developed a 
scoring protocol. This protocol can also be used in future studies of pre-registra-
tions, or serve as a guide for reviewers assessing pre-registrations. 
Finally, in Chapter 7, I reflect on the findings in this dissertation and offer 
suggestions for future research. The ambition of this dissertation is to raise aware-
ness of the role of human fallibility in science, and to advance the development 
of solutions that help scientists deal with their fallibility. With a focus on vexing is-
sues in the use of null hypothesis significance testing in psychological science, we 
attempt to commence this ambition by contributing to the strengthening of psy-
chological science and increasing the trustworthiness of psychological research.
12      Chapter 1
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Who believes in the storybook 
image of the scientist?
This chapter is published as Veldkamp, C. L. S., Hartgerink, C. H. J., van Assen, M. A. L. M.,  
& Wicherts, J. M. (2017). Who believes in the storybook image of the scientist? Accountability 
in research, 24(3), 127-151.
CHAPTER 2
ABSTRACT
Do lay people and scientists themselves recognize that scientists are human and 
therefore prone to human fallibilities such as error, bias, and even dishonesty? 
In a series of three experimental studies and one correlational study (total N = 
3,278) we found that the ‘storybook image of the scientist’ is pervasive: American 
lay people and scientists from over 60 countries attributed considerably more ob-
jectivity, rationality, open-mindedness, intelligence, integrity, and communality to 
scientists than other highly-educated people. Moreover, scientists perceived even 
larger differences than lay people did. Some groups of scientists also differenti-
ated between different categories of scientists: established scientists attributed 
higher levels of the scientific traits to established scientists than to early-career 
scientists and PhD students, and higher levels to PhD students than to early-ca-
reer scientists. Female scientists attributed considerably higher levels of the sci-
entific traits to female scientists than to male scientists. A strong belief in the 
storybook image and the (human) tendency to attribute higher levels of desirable 
traits to people in one’s own group than to people in other groups may decrease 
scientists’ willingness to adopt recently proposed practices to reduce error, bias 
and dishonesty in science.
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“Scientists are human, and so sometimes do not behave as they should as scien-
tists.”
An anonymous science Nobel Prize Laureate in our sample, 2014
The storybook image of the scientist is an image of a person who embodies the 
virtues of objectivity, rationality, intelligence, open-mindedness, integrity, and 
communality (Mahoney, 1976, 1979). However, to avoid placing unreasonable ex-
pectations on scientists, it is important to recognize that they are prone to human 
frailties, such as error, bias, and dishonesty (Feist, 1998; Mahoney, 1976; Merton, 
1942; Mitroff, 1974; Nuzzo, 2015; Watson, 1938). Acknowledging scientists’ falli-
bility can help us to develop policies, procedures, and educational programs that 
promote responsible research practices (Shamoo & Resnik, 2015).  
According to Mahoney, the scientist is “viewed as the paragon of reason and 
objectivity, an impartial genius whose visionary insights are matched only by his 
quiet humility”(Mahoney, 1976, p. 3). With respect to scientists’ self-image, he 
claimed that “although somewhat more restrained in his self-portrait, the scien-
tist tends to paint himself generously in hues of objectivity, humility, and rational-
ity”, and that “the average scientist tends to be complacently confident about his 
rationality and his expertise, his objectivity and his insight”(Mahoney, 1976, p. 4). 
However, Mahoney never supported these claims with empirical evidence. Oth-
ers had demonstrated that scientists are indeed prone to human biases (Mitroff, 
1974; Rosenthal, 1966) and Mahoney himself showed that the reasoning skills of 
scientists were not significantly different from those of nonscientists (Mahoney & 
DeMonbreun, 1977), but actual belief in the storybook image of the scientist itself 
has never been examined. Hence, it remains unclear to what degree lay people 
and scientists recognize that scientists are only human. 
Some early data suggest that the belief in the storybook image of the scien-
tist may be strong among lay people. In a seminal study (Mead & Metraux, 1957), 
the analysis of a nationwide-sample of essays written by American high school 
students exposed the stereotypical image of the scientist: in terms of appearance, 
the scientist was depicted as “a man who wears a white coat and works in a lab-
oratory. He is elderly or middle-aged and wears glasses. He is small, sometimes 
small and stout, or tall and thin. He may be bald. He may wear a beard, may be un-
shaven and unkempt. He may be stooped and tired” (Mead & Metraux, 1957, pp. 
386-387). In terms of traits, the scientist was depicted as “a very intelligent man 
– a genius or almost a genius. He has long years of expensive training – in high 
school, college, or technical school, or perhaps even beyond – during which he 
studied very hard. He is interested in his work and takes it seriously. He is careful, 
patient, devoted, courageous, open-minded. He knows his subject. He records his 
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experiments carefully, does not jump to conclusions, and stands up for his ideas 
even when attacked […]” (Mead & Metraux, 1957, p. 387). A similar, male image 
was found in later studies (e.g. Basalla, 1976; Beardslee & O'dowd, 1961). The ste-
reotypical image in terms of appearance consistently returned in studies using the 
now classic ‘Draw a Scientist Test’ (Beardslee & O'dowd, 1961, p. 998; Chambers, 
1983; Fort & Varney, 1989; Newton & Newton, 1992; ó Maoldomhnaigh & Hunt, 
1988). More recently, European and American surveys have demonstrated that 
lay people have a stable and strong confidence both in science (Gauchat, 2012; 
Smith & Son, 2013) and in scientists (Ipsos MORI, 2014; Smith & Son, 2013). For 
example, the scientific community was found to be the second most trusted insti-
tution in the US (Smith & Son, 2013), and in the UK, the general public believed 
that scientists meet the expectations of honesty, ethical behavior, and open-mind-
edness (Ipsos MORI, 2014). 
As far as we know, no empirical work has addressed scientists’ views of the 
scientist. Although preliminary results from Robert Pennock’s ‘Scientific Virtues 
Project’ (cited in "Character traits: Scientific virtue," 2016) indicate that scientists 
consider honesty, curiosity, perseverance, and objectivity to be the most import-
ant virtues of a scientist, these results do not reveal whether scientists believe 
that the typical scientist actually exhibits these virtues. A number of studies on sci-
entists’ perceptions of research behavior suggest that scientists may not believe 
that the typical scientist lives up to the stereotypical image of the scientist. First, a 
large study among NIH-funded scientists (Anderson, Martinson, & De Vries, 2007) 
found that scientists considered the behavior of their typical colleague to be more 
in line with unscientific norms such as secrecy, particularism, self-interestedness 
and dogmatism than with the traditional scientific norms  of communality, univer-
salism, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism (Merton, 1942; Mitroff, 1974). 
Second, a meta-analysis including studies from various fields of science showed 
that over 14% of scientists claimed that they had witnessed serious misconduct 
by their peers, and that up to 72% of scientists reported to have witnessed ques-
tionable research practices (Fanelli, 2009). Third, publication pressure and com-
petition in science are perceived as high (Tijdink et al., 2014; Tijdink, Vergouwen, 
& Smulders, 2013), while scientists have expressed concerns that competition 
“contributes to strategic game-playing in science, a decline in free and open shar-
ing of information and methods, sabotage of others’ ability to use one’s work, in-
terference with peer-review processes, deformation of relationships, and careless 
or questionable research conduct” (Anderson, Horn, et al., 2007). Based on these 
reports, one would expect scientists’ belief in the storybook image of the scientist 
to be low compared to lay people’s belief. 
On the other hand, there is also reason to hypothesize that scientists do be-
lieve in the storybook image: scientists may be prone to the well-established hu-
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man tendencies of in-group bias and stereotyping (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 
Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). In-group bias might lead them to evalu-
ate scientists more positively than non-scientists, or their own group of scientists 
more positively than other groups of scientists and non-scientists, while stereo-
typing might lead scientists to believe that some scientists (e.g. elderly and/or 
male scientists) fit the storybook better than other scientists.
In this paper, we will address potential in-group bias and stereotyping among 
scientists by examining two versions of social grouping that are particularly rel-
evant in science: the scientist’s career level and his or her gender. Status differ-
ences of established scientists, early-career scientists and PhD students may be 
perceived as reflecting the degree to which different scientists fit the storybook 
image, while in-group biases may lead scientists to attribute more of the story-
book characteristics to scientists of their own professional level. For instance, due 
to the stereotypical image of a scientists being an elderly male (Mead & Metraux, 
1957), established scientists might be viewed overall as fitting the storybook im-
age of the scientist better than early-career scientists. Yet, in-group bias might 
lead early-career scientists to regard themselves as fitting the storybook image of 
the scientist better than established scientists. It is relevant to study these views 
among scientists because differences in how researchers view their typical col-
league and their own group could play a role in the adoption of recent efforts 
in science aimed at dealing with human fallibilities. For instance, if established 
scientists view early-career scientists as being more prone to biases in their work, 
these established scientists might believe that programs aimed at improving re-
sponsible conduct of research should be targeted at early-career scientists, while 
early-career scientists themselves might feel otherwise.
Similarly, while gender inequality in science is still a widely debated topic 
(Miller, Eagly, & Linn, 2014; Shen, 2013; Sugimoto, 2013; Williams & Ceci, 2015), 
male scientists may be believed to fit the storybook image better than female sci-
entists because of the common stereotype of the scientist being male (Chambers, 
1983; Hassard, 1990; Mead & Metraux, 1957). However, at the same time in-
group biases may lead scientists to attribute more of the storybook characteristics 
to scientists of their own gender. Knowing how male and female scientists view 
applicability of the storybook image of the scientist to male and female scientists 
could contribute to the debate on the nature and origins of gender disparities in 
science (Ceci & Williams, 2011; Cress & Hart, 2009; Shen, 2013; Sugimoto, 2013; 
West, Jacquet, King, Correll, & Bergstrom, 2013). 
We investigate lay people’s and scientists’ belief in the storybook image of 
the scientist in four studies. Studies 1 and 2 aimed to test whether highly-educat-
ed lay people and scientists believe the storybook characteristics of the scientist 
to apply more strongly to scientists than to other highly-educated people. In Study 
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1, we used an experimental between-subjects design to compare the perception 
of the typical scientist to the perception of the overall group of other highly-edu-
cated people who are not scientists, whereas in Study 2, we used a mixed design 
with random ordering to compare scientists with nine specific other professions 
that require a high level of education, like medical doctors or lawyers. We expect-
ed that both scientists and non-scientists with a high level of education would 
attribute higher levels of objectivity, rationality, open-mindedness, intelligence, 
cooperativeness, and integrity to people with the profession of scientist than to 
people with one of the other nine professions. 
Studies 3 and 4 only involved scientist respondents and zoomed in on po-
tential effects of in-group biases and stereotypes related to academic levels and 
gender. In Study 3, we used an experimental between-subjects design to study 
whether scientists overall believe that scientists of higher professional levels fit 
the storybook image of the scientist better than scientists of lower professional 
levels, as the ‘elderly’ stereotype prescribes. We also studied whether scientists at 
different career stages differ in this belief, because in-group biases might lead them 
to attribute more of the storybook characteristics to their own professional level. 
In Study 4, we used a similar experimental between-subjects design to test 
the hypothesis that scientists believe that male scientists fit the storybook im-
age of the scientist better than female scientists, as expected on the basis of the 
predominantly male stereotype of the scientist. Moreover, Study 4 addresses the 
question whether male and female scientists are prone to in-group biases leading 
them to believe that the storybook characteristics apply more strongly to scien-




Three groups of participants participated in Study 1, constituting the variable Re-
spondent Group. These groups are specified below. 
Scientists
To obtain a representative sample of scientists, we extracted e-mail addresses of 
corresponding authors from scientific articles published in 2014 that were listed 
in the Web of Science database (Thomson Reuters, 2014). We sent out batches 
of e-mail invitations until we reached our desired sample sizes (see power calcu-
lations in our study pre-registration through https://osf.io/z3xt6/). Our e-mailed 
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invitations to participate in our study yielded 1,088 fully completed responses 
from across the globe, of which 343 were from the United States. The response 
rate was 10.6% (see Table S1 in the supplementary materials in Appendix A). In 
order to compare results of scientists with results of American highly-educated 
lay people (see below), only responses from American scientists were used in our 
statistical analyses. After a priori determined outlier removal (see study pre-reg-
istration through https://osf.io/z3xt6/), we were able to use the responses of 331 
American scientists (34% female). Their mean age was 49 years (SD = 11.4, range 
= 26 – 77).
Highly-educated lay people
Survey software and data collection company Qualtrics provided us with 315 ful-
ly completed responses of a representative sample of highly-educated non-sci-
entists. These respondents were members of the Qualtrics’ paid research panel, 
and were selected on the following criteria: American citizen, aged over 18, and 
having obtained a Bachelor’s degree, a Master’s degree, or a Professional degree, 
but not a PhD. Response rates could not be computed for this sample, as Qualtrics 
advertises ongoing surveys to all its eligible panel members and terminates data 
collection when the required sample size is reached.  However, Qualtrics indicates 
that their response rate for online surveys generally approaches 8%. After a priori 
determined outlier removal we were able to use the responses of 312 respon-
dents (46% female). Their mean age was 49.2 years (SD = 13.8, range = 23 – 84). 
Nobel Prize laureates
To our sample of scientists and highly-educated lay people we added a sample 
of scientists who might be viewed as the ‘paragon of the ideal scientist’: Nobel 
Prize laureates in the science categories. As we anticipated that the size of this 
additional sample would be too small to include in the statistical analyses, we 
decided in advance that the data of this extra sample would be used descriptively 
in the graphical representation of the data but not in the statistical analyses. We 
conducted an online search for the e-mail addresses of all Nobel Prize laureates in 
the science fields to date as listed on the Official Web Site of the Nobel Prize (No-
belprize.org, 2014). Our emailed invitations yielded 34 fully completed responses 
from science Nobel Prize laureates (100% male). The response rate in this sample 
was 19.0%. The mean age was 75.3 (SD = 12.7, range = 45 – 93). 
Materials and procedure
We programmed our between-subjects experimental design into an electronic 
questionnaire using Qualtrics software, Version March 2014 (Qualtrics, 2014). The 
program randomly assigned the scientist respondents and the highly-educated 
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respondents to one of two conditions (Targets): either to a condition in which the 
questions pertained to the ‘typical scientist’ (Target ‘Scientist’, defined as “a per-
son who is trained in a science and whose job involves doing scientific research or 
solving scientific problems”), or to a condition in which the statements pertained 
to the ‘typical highly-educated person’ (Target ‘Highly-educated person’, defined 
as “a person who obtained a Bachelor's Degree or a Master's Degree or a Profes-
sional Degree and whose job requires this high level of education”). Participating 
Nobel Prize laureates were always assigned to the condition in which the Target 
was ‘Scientist’. By using a between-subjects design, we explicitly ensured that re-
spondents did not compare the Target ‘Scientist’ to the Target ‘Highly-educated 
person’, but rated their Target on its own merits.
Respondents were asked to indicate on a seven-point Likert scale to what 
extent they agreed or disagreed with 18 statements about the objectivity, ratio-
nality, open-mindedness, intelligence, integrity, and communality (cooperative-
ness) of their Target (either a scientist or a highly-educated person (depending 
on the experimental condition to which they had been assigned). The statements 
were presented in randomized order. Each set of three statements constituted a 
small but internally consistent scale: Objectivity (α = 0.73), Rationality (α = 0.76), 
Open-mindedness (α = 0.77), Intelligence (α = 0.73), Integrity (α = 0.87), and Com-
munality (α = 0.79). The statements were based on the ‘testable hypotheses about 
scientists’ postulated by Mahoney in his evaluative review of the psychology of 
the scientist [7] and can be found in the ‘Materials’ section of the supplementary 
materials in Appendix A and on our Open Science Framework page (https://osf.
io/756ea/). The instructions preceding the statements emphasized that respon-
dents should base their answers on how true they believed each statement to 
be, rather than on how true they believed the statement should be. Finally, all re-
spondents were asked to answer a number of demographic questions, and were 
given the opportunity to answer an open question asking whether they had any 
comments or thoughts they wished to share. 
Results
The results of Study 1 are presented in Figure 2.1. In line with our expectations, 
there was a main effect of Target for each of the characteristics: respondents who 
were assigned to the Target ‘Scientist’ ascribed more objectivity (Cohen’s d = 0.47, 
95% CI =  [0.31, 0.63]), rationality (d = 0.63 [0.48; 0.79]), open-mindedness (d 
= 0.35 [0.19; 0.50]), intelligence (d = 0.44, 95% CI = [0.29, 0.60]), integrity (d = 
0.77, 95% CI = [0.61, 0.93]), and communality (d = 0.48, 95% CI = [0.32, 0.63]) to 
their Target than respondents who were assigned to the Target ‘Highly-educated 
person’. The absence of any interaction effects indicated that there was no evi-
dence that the effects of Target were different in size in the respondent groups. 
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In addition, there were main effects of Respondent Group: scientists on average 
tended to be less generous than lay people in their attributions of objectivity (d 
= 0.45, 95% CI = [0.29, 0.60]), intelligence (d = 0.36, 95% CI = [0.21, 0.52]), and 
communality (d = 0.47, 95% CI = [0.31, -0.62]), but a little more generous in their 
attributions of rationality (d = 0.16, 95% CI = [0.00, 0.31]) and integrity (d = 0.23, 
95% CI = [0.07, 0.38]). As can be seen in Figure 2.1, Nobel Prize laureates tended 
Note: H-e = Highly-educated respondent group; Sc = Scientist respondent group; NPL = Nobel Prize laure-
ates respondent group. Nobel Prize laureates were always assigned to the Target ‘Scientist’. The error bars 
represent 95 % confidence intervals.
Figure 2.1 Attributions of Objectivity, Rationality, Open-mindedness, Intelligence, Integrity, and 
Communality to the Targets ‘Highly-educated person’ and ‘Scientist’, by Respondent Group.
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to attribute relatively high levels of the storybook characteristics to their Target 
‘Scientists’. In all studies, we conducted separate analyses for each of the six sto-
rybook characteristics and employed an alpha of 0.008333 (0.05/6) for the inter-
action effects or main effects. We used an alpha of 0.05 for subsequent analyses 
of simple effects.  Detailed descriptive results for each subsample and all statistical 
test results can be found in supplementary Tables S1-S4 in Appendix A.
Discussion of Study 1
Study 1 confirmed our hypothesis that lay people perceive scientists as considerably 
more objective, rational, open-minded, honest, intelligent, and cooperative than 
other highly-educated people. We also found scientists’ belief in the storybook im-
age to be similar to lay people’s belief. Comparable patterns were found among sci-
entists from Europe (N = 304) and Asia (N = 117, see Figure S1 in the supplementary 
materials in Appendix A), indicating that the results may generalize to scientists out-
side the USA. Nobel laureates’ ratings of the Target ‘Scientist’ were generally similar 
to, albeit somewhat higher than other scientists’ ratings of the Target ‘Scientist’.
One potential drawback of the design of Study 1 was that the scale may have 
been used differently in the two conditions; because the concept ‘a highly-edu-
cated person’ refers to a more heterogeneous category than the concept ‘a sci-
entist’, respondents may have given more neutral scores in the ‘highly-educated’ 
condition than in the ‘scientist’ condition. In Study 2, we addressed this issue by 
examining whether similar results would be obtained when explicit comparisons 
were made between the profession of scientist and other specific professions that 




Two groups of participants participated in Study 2, constituting the variable Re-
spondent Group. Sample sizes were smaller than in Study 1 because Study 2 em-
ployed a mixed design in which all respondents rated all targets (in a randomized 
order). 
Scientists
We recruited a group of scientist respondents in the same manner as in Study 1. 
After excluding the 281 non-American responses, our method to recruit partici-
pants yielded 123 complete responses. The response rate was 11.0% (see Table S5 
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in the supplementary materials in Appendix A). After a priori determined outlier 
removal we were able to use the responses of 111 American scientists (20% fe-
male). Their mean age was 49.9 years (SD = 12.4, range = 27 – 85). 
Highly-educated lay people
Qualtrics provided us with 81 fully completed responses from a representative 
sample of highly-educated American people. These respondents were members 
of the Qualtrics’ paid research panel, and they were selected on the following 
criteria: American citizen, aged over 18, and having obtained a Bachelor’s degree, 
a Master’s degree, or a Professional degree, but not a PhD. Response rates could 
not be computed for this sample, as Qualtrics advertises ongoing surveys to all its 
eligible panel members and terminates data collection when the required sample 
size is reached. However, Qualtrics indicates that their response rate for online 
surveys generally approaches 8%. After a priori determined outlier removal we 
were able to use 75 of their responses (47% female). The mean age in this group 
was 46.3 years (SD = 14.7, range = 22 – 83). 
Materials and procedure
We programmed a mixed between-subjects / within-subjects design into an elec-
tronic questionnaire using Qualtrics software, Version March 2014 (Qualtrics, 
2014). This time, respondents were not randomly assigned to one of two condi-
tions, but all respondents were asked how much each of the six characteristics of 
the ideal scientist (objectivity, rationality, open-mindedness, integrity, intelligence 
and communality) applied to ten different professions requiring a high-level edu-
cation. For each of the features, respondents indicated on slider bars ranging from 
0 to 100 how much they believed it applied to the typical person with the profes-
sion of lawyer, politician, journalist, medical doctor, accountant, army-lieutenant, 
banker, judge, detective, and scientist. Respondents were explicitly instructed to 
indicate how much they believed each feature really applied to the typical per-
son within this profession rather than how much the feature should apply to the 
typical professional in each category. We used Mahoney’s (1979) antonym ‘com-
petitiveness’ instead of ‘communality’ because we were concerned that the term 
‘communality’ might be unclear for respondents. The characteristics were pre-
sented in random order, and within the characteristics, the professions were also 
presented in random order. Finally, just as in Study 1, all respondents were asked 
to answer a number of demographic questions and were given the opportunity 
to answer an open question asking whether they had any comments or thoughts 
they wished to share.  
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Results
Results of Study 2 are presented in Figure 2.2. Because we were specifically in-
terested in the overall differences in perception between the profession of the 
scientist and other professions that require a high level of education, we pooled 
the ratings of the non-scientist professions and compared these to the ratings of 
the scientist profession. The means of the ten different professions separately are 
Note: The error bars represent 95 % confidence intervals.
Figure 2.2 Attributions of Objectivity, Rationality, Open-mindedness, Intelligence, Integrity, and 
Communality to people with highly-educated professions and people with the profession of sci-
entist, by Respondent Group.
26      Chapter 2
presented in Figure S2 in the supplementary materials in Appendix A and indicate 
that the patterns were similar across professions, justifying the pooling of their 
means. 
Similar to Study 1, respondents attributed more objectivity, rationality, 
open-mindedness, intelligence, integrity, and competitiveness to scientists than 
to other types of professionals. However, this time, interactions qualified the ef-
fects. Follow-up analyses of the effect of Target in each Respondent Group (sci-
entists and highly-educated lay people) indicated that scientists perceived greater 
differences between scientists and other types of professionals than lay people 
did. The effect sizes of the difference in attributions to scientists and to the other 
types of professionals were much larger in the scientist respondent group (objec-
tivity: d = 1.76, 95% CI = [1.57, 1.94], rationality: d = 1.50, 95% CI = [1.31, 1.69], 
open-mindedness: d = 1.71, 95% CI = [1.52, 1.90], intelligence: d = 1.88, 95% CI 
= [1.69, 2.07], integrity: d = 1.51, 95% CI = [1.32, 1.69], and competitiveness: d 
= 0.75, 95% CI = [0.56, 0.93]) than in the lay people respondent group (objec-
tivity: d = 1.02, 95% CI = [0.79, 1.25], rationality: d = 0.79, 95% CI = [0.56, 1.02], 
open-mindedness: d = 0.63, 95% CI = [0.40, 0.86], intelligence: d = 1.44, 95% CI 
= [1.21, 1.67], integrity: d = 0.87, 95% CI = [0.64, 1.10], and competitiveness: d = 
-0.03, 95% CI = [-0.26, 0.20]). Detailed descriptive results and statistical test re-
sults can be found in supplementary Tables S5-S8 in Appendix A. 
Discussion of Study 2
Study 2 again confirmed the hypothesis that scientists are perceived as consider-
ably more objective, more rational, more open-minded, more honest, and more 
intelligent than other highly-educated professionals. Study 2 did not confirm that 
scientists are perceived as more communal than other highly-educated profes-
sionals. Our choice of measuring perceived ‘communality’ (a potentially unclear 
term) through its opposite ‘competitiveness’ might explain the difference with 
Study 1, where scientists were perceived as more communal than other high-
ly-educated people: respondents may not have perceived competitiveness as an 
antonym of communality. 
Comparing specific professions ruled out the potential alternative explana-
tion for the results of Study 1: that the highly-educated Target was referring to 
a more heterogeneous category than the scientist Target and therefore elicited 
more neutral responses. Again, similar patterns were found among European (n 
= 67) and Asian scientists (n = 20, see Figure S3 in the supplementary materials in 
Appendix A), indicating that these results may generalize beyond American scien-
tists. While in Study 1 there was no evidence that the effect of Target was larger in 
one respondent group than in the other respondent group, in Study 2 we did find 
that the effect of Target was larger in the Scientist respondent group: scientists 
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perceived much larger differences between people with the profession of scien-
tist and people with other highly-educated professions than highly-educated lay 
respondents did. 
Although our studies are not equipped to test whether any of these per-
ceived differences between professions in attributed traits reflect actual differenc-
es in these traits, our finding that scientists rate scientists higher on the storybook 
traits than lay people do may be explained by in-group biases among scientists. 
In-group biases, or tendencies to rate one’s own group more favorably, are not ex-
pected to play any role among the heterogeneous sample of lay respondents (not 
specifically sampled to be in any of the nine remaining professions), but might 
have enhanced ratings of scientists among the scientists. In-group biases among 




We recruited an international sample of scientists in the same manner as in Stud-
ies 1 and 2. This time our method to recruit participants yielded 1,656 complete 
responses from scientists who fulfilled our inclusion criteria for PhD student, ear-
ly-career scientist (defined as having obtained a PhD 10 years ago or less, and not 
having obtained tenure), or established scientist (defined as having obtained a 
PhD more than 10 years ago and having obtained tenure). The response rate was 
10.6% (see Table S9 in the supplementary materials in Appendix A). Because the 
sample of PhD students turned out much too small compared to the size required 
by our sample size calculations (see supplementary materials in Appendix A), we 
decided not to use their responses in our analyses. Because in this study we did 
not compare results with lay people from the US, we included responding scien-
tists from across the globe. After removal of the PhD students and a priori deter-
mined removal of outliers we were able to use the responses of 515 early-career 
scientists from 55 countries (32% female) and 903 established scientists from 63 
countries (22% female) in our analysis. The mean age of the early-career scientists 
was 35.2 years (SD = 5.8, range = 26 – 94), the mean age of the established scien-
tists was 51.9 years (SD = 9.2, range = 35 – 90). The data of the PhD students are 
retained in the publicly available data file on the Open Science Framework (see 
https://osf.io/756ea/).
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Materials and procedure
As in Study 1, we programmed a between-subjects experimental design into an 
electronic questionnaire using Qualtrics software, Version March 2014 (Qualtrics, 
2014). The program randomly assigned respondents to one of three conditions; 
either to a condition in which the statements pertained to an established scientist 
(Target ‘Established scientist’), to a condition in which the statements pertained 
to an early-career scientist (Target ‘Early-career scientist’), or to a condition in 
which the statements pertained a PhD student (Target ‘PhD student’). The sets of 
statements again constituted sufficiently consistent scales: Objectivity (α = 0.63), 
Rationality (α = 0.74), Open-mindedness (α = 0.67), Intelligence (α = 0.70), Integ-
rity (α = 0.82), and Communality (α = 0.63). As in the other studies, the instruc-
tions preceding the statements emphasized that respondents should base their 
answers on how true they believed each statement to be, rather than on how true 
they believed the statement should be. The 18 statements were presented in ran-
domized order. Finally, all respondents were asked to answer a number of demo-
graphic questions, and they were given the opportunity to answer an open ques-
tion asking whether they had any comments or thoughts they wished to share.
Results
Results of Study 3 are presented in Figure 2.3. In line with the notion of in-group 
biases, interactions were statistically significant for all features except intelligence 
and communality, indicating that effects of Target were different in the two analyzed 
respondent groups. Subsequent analyses of the effects in the separate respondent 
groups of early-career scientist respondents and established scientist respondents 
indicated that established scientists who were assigned to the Target ‘Established 
scientist’ attributed considerably more objectivity (d = 0.41, 95% CI = [0.25, 0.57]), 
rationality (d = 0.64, 95% CI = [0.48, 0.81]), open-mindedness (d = 0.62, 95% CI 
= [0.46, 0.79]), and integrity (d = 0.61, 95% CI = [0.45, 0.77]) to their Target than 
established scientists who were assigned to the Target ‘Early-career scientist’. Es-
tablished scientists who were assigned to the Target ‘Established scientist’ also at-
tributed more objectivity (d = 0.30, 95% CI = [0.13, 0.45]), rationality (d = 0.36, 95% 
CI = [0.15; 0.58]), open-mindedness (d = 0.42, 95% CI = [0.26, 0.58]), and integrity 
(d = 0.22, 95% CI = [0.06, 0.38]) to their Target than established scientists who were 
assigned to the Target ‘PhD student’. Interestingly, established scientists who were 
assigned to the Target ‘Early-career scientist’ attributed less open-mindedness (d = 
-0.23, 95% CI = [-0.49, -0.07]) and integrity (d = -0.44, 95% CI = [-0.60, -0.27]) to their 
Target than established scientists who were assigned to the Target ‘PhD student’.
The effects were smaller among early-career scientists; early-career scien-
tists who were assigned to the Target ‘Early-career scientist’ only attributed more 
objectivity (d = 0.28, 95% CI = [0.07, 0.50]) and rationality (d = 0.60, 95% CI = 
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[0.44, 0.76]) to their Target than early-career scientists who were assigned to the 
Target ‘PhD student’, and early-career scientists who were assigned to the Target 
‘Established scientist’ only attributed more rationality (d = 0.34, 95% CI = [0.12, 
0.55]) to their Target than early-career scientists who were assigned to the Target 
‘Early-career scientist’. Detailed descriptive results and statistical test results can 
be found in Tables S9-S12 in Appendix A. 
Note: The error bars represent 95 % confidence intervals.
Figure 2.3 Attributions of Objectivity, Rationality, Open-mindedness, Intelligence, Integrity, and 
Communality to the Targets ‘Established scientists’, ‘Early-career scientists’ and ‘PhD student’ by 
Respondent Group. 
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Discussion of Study 3
Study 3 partially confirmed our hypothesis that scientists, just like other human 
beings, are prone to in-group bias. Although stereotypes may play a role here 
as well, the in-group effect appears to be stronger among established scientists 
than among early-career scientists. This may be explained by research showing 
that high status group members have been found to be more prone to in-group 
bias than low status group members (Bettencourt, Charlton, Dorr, & Hume, 2001). 
In-group biases have also been found to be stronger among people who identify 
more strongly with their group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987), which 
might apply more to established scientists than to early-career scientists because 
they have been a scientist for a larger part of their lives. 
The difference in in-group bias between early-career scientists and estab-
lished scientists may also be partly explained by belief in the stereotypical image 
of the scientist as an old and wise person: if both early-career scientists and es-
tablished scientists believe that established scientists fit the storybook image bet-
ter, this would enhance the apparent in-group bias among established scientist, 
but not among early-career scientists. However, as the early-career scientists only 
agreed to some extent that established scientists fit the storybook image better 
than early-career scientists, the effect of the stereotypical image of the scientists 
cannot be fully responsible for the stronger in-group effect among established 
scientists. In addition, the stereotypical image of the older scientist cannot explain 
either why established scientists believe that in some respects, PhD students fit 
the storybook image of the scientist better than early-career scientists. In Study 4, 
we tested whether in-group biases among scientists generalize to another highly 




We recruited an international sample of scientists in the same manner as in the 
first three studies. This time method to recruit participants yielded 1,003 com-
plete responses (response rate 12.0%, see Table S13 in the supplementary materi-
als in Appendix A). After a priori outlier removal we were able to use the respons-
es of 711 male scientists from 63 countries (mean age = 45.1, SD = 11.9, range = 
25 – 86) and 286 female scientists from 46 countries (mean age = 41.8, SD = 10.3, 
range = 24 – 73).
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Materials and procedure
As in Studies 1 and 3, we programmed a between-subjects experimental design 
into an electronic questionnaire using Qualtrics software, Version March 2014 
(Qualtrics, 2014). The program randomly assigned respondents to one of two 
conditions; either to a condition in which the statements pertained to a female 
scientist (Target ‘Female scientist’), or to a condition in which the statements per-
tained to a male scientist (Target ‘Male scientist’). The sets of statements consti-
tuted sufficiently consistent scales: Objectivity (α = 0.58), Rationality (α = 0.78), 
Open-mindedness (α = 0.67), Intelligence (α = 0.62), Integrity (α = 0.79), and 
Communality (α = 0.58). As in the other studies, the instructions preceding the 
statements emphasized that responders should base their answers on how true 
they believed each statement to be, rather than on how true they believed the 
statement should be. The 18 statements were presented in randomized order. 
Finally, all respondents were asked to answer a number of demographic questions 
and were given the opportunity to answer an open question asking whether they 
had any comments or thoughts they wished to share.
Results
The results of Study 4 are presented in Figure 2.4. Interactions were significant for 
all features except objectivity and intelligence, indicating that the effect of Target 
was different for male and female respondents. Subsequent analyses of the ef-
fects for male and female respondents separately indicated that female scientists 
who were assigned to the condition ‘Female scientist’ attributed more rationality 
(d = 0.82, 95% CI = [0.57, 1.06]), more open-mindedness (d = 0.99, 95% CI = [0.75, 
1.24]), more integrity (d = 0.69, 95% CI = [0.45, 0.93]), and much more commu-
nality (d = 1.13, 95% CI = [0.88, 1.38]) to their Target than female scientists who 
were assigned to the Target ‘Male scientist’. Male scientists who were assigned 
to the Target ‘Female scientist’ attributed only somewhat more communality (d 
= 0.35 [0.20; 0.50]) to their Target than male scientists who were assigned to the 
Target ‘Male scientist’. We thus found support for in-group bias among female 
scientists, but not for in-group bias among male scientists. Furthermore, we found 
no evidence for the stereotypical notion that male scientists are believed to fit the 
storybook image of the scientist better than female scientists. If anything, overall, 
higher levels of the storybook characteristics were attributed to female scientists 
than to male scientists. Detailed descriptive results and statistical test results can 
be found in Tables S13-S16 in Appendix A. 
32      Chapter 2
Discussion of Study 4
Although there are no empirical data on actual gender differences in scientific 
traits or behavior  (except for a study showing that relatively more male scien-
tists than female scientists get caught for scientific misconduct; Fang, Bennett, & 
Casadevall, 2013), Study 4 showed that female scientists are generally believed to 
exhibit higher levels of the scientific traits than male scientists. This contrasts with 
lay people’s stereotypical image of the scientist being male. At the same time, we 
found interactions between the respondent groups and the targets that could 
Note: The error bars represent 95 % confidence intervals.
Figure 2.4 Attributions of Objectivity, Rationality, Open-mindedness, Intelligence, Integrity, and 
Communality to female scientists and to male scientists, by Respondent Group. 
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be explained in part by in-group biases among both male and female scientists. 
While women perceived a larger difference between female and male scientists 
than men did, we cannot rule out that in-group bias led male scientists to rate 
female scientists lower on the scientific traits than women themselves did. 
The finding that women tended to perceive larger differences between male 
and female scientists in terms of scientific traits might be explained by the fact that 
in most countries, universities are still male dominated (Shen, 2013). As minority 
group members, women may be more aware of inequalities and make an effort to 
have their in-group evaluated positively (Tajfel, 1981). In addition, minority group 
members tend to identify more strongly with their in-group than majority group 
members, and stronger group identification is associated with stronger in-group 
bias (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987). Strikingly, research on intragroup 
and intergroup perception among male and female academics in a natural setting 
yielded results very similar to ours: in evaluations of qualities of male and female 
scientists in an environment where female scientists were clearly a minority, fe-
male scientists demonstrated clear in-group favoritism, while male scientists did 
not (Brown & Smith, 1989).  
Even though respondents were intentionally randomly assigned to rate ei-
ther male or female scientists to prevent them from explicitly comparing the two 
groups, in this particularly study the implicit comparison was of course obvious. 
As academic environments are considered rather liberal and progressive, social 
desirability may have played a significant role in respondents’ answers. E-mails we 
received from male participants in particular indicated that the study topic was 
quite sensitive. 
While this study was designed to test scientists’ in-group bias and stereotyp-
ing, the unexpected results warrant further investigation of gender differences in 
scientists’ perceptions of colleagues, of the sensitivity of the topic, and of actual 
gender differences in the scientific traits. The results also advocate taking gender 
into account in future studies comparing lay people’s and scientists’ perceptions 
of scientists.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our results indicate strong belief among both lay people and scientists in the sto-
rybook image of the scientist as someone who is relatively objective, rational, 
open-minded, intelligent, honest, and communal. However, while the stereotyp-
ical image predicts that older, male scientists would be believed to fit the sto-
rybook image best, our results suggest that scientists believe that older, female 
scientists fit the image best. In addition, our research suggests that scientists are 
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not immune to the human tendency to believe that members of one’s own social 
group are less fallible than members of other groups. 
The extent to which our results generalize outside our samples may be limit-
ed by selection bias among scientist respondents. The method we used to recruit 
scientists yielded a high number of respondents, but the overall response rate was 
low (around 11%). However, our experimental designs in which participants were 
randomly assigned to different conditions should largely cancel out the potential 
effects of selection bias occurring through the possibility that scientists who were 
more interested in the topic of our study were more likely to agree to participate 
than scientists who were less interested in the topic. With respect to the gener-
alizability of our samples of highly-educated Americans, we cannot exclude the 
possibility that although the survey panel provider Qualtrics assures representa-
tiveness of the American (highly-educated) population, people who sign up to be 
paid survey panel members may differ in a number of aspects from people who 
do not sign up to be paid survey panel members.   
Our findings are particularly interesting in the context of current discussions 
on policy and practices aimed at reducing adverse effects of human fallibility in 
science. In recent years, mounting retractions due to scientific misconduct and er-
ror (Zimmer) and increasing doubts about the reproducibility of findings in many 
scientific fields (Ioannidis, 2005b, 2012; Open Science Collaboration, 2015) have 
evoked numerous proposals for methods to help us stop ‘fooling ourselves’ (Nuz-
zo, 2015): new ways to reduce error, bias, and dishonesty in science. Examples 
include initiatives that promote transparency in the research process, publication 
and peer review (Nosek et al., 2015; Nosek & Bar-Anan, 2012), pre-registration 
of hypotheses and data analysis plans (Chambers & Munafo, 2013; de Groot, 
1956/2014; Nosek & Lakens, 2015; Nosek et al., 2012; Wagenmakers et al., 2012), 
collaboration on statistical analysis (Veldkamp, Nuijten, Dominguez-Alvarez, van 
Assen, & Wicherts, 2014; Wicherts, 2011), blind data analysis (MacCoun & Per-
lmutter, 2015), reforms in incentive structures (Chambers, 2015; Nosek et al., 
2012), training in research integrity (Steneck, 2013), and modifications of reward 
systems (Ioannidis, 2014). However, the question that arises from our results is 
then: are scientists willing to adopt these practices if they believe that the typical 
scientist is mostly immune to human fallibility? Do they deem these initiatives 
necessary? And if they do deem them necessary, do they deem them necessary 
for themselves, or only for other (groups of) scientists? 
We found that scientists may be prone to in-group bias. Here, social group-
ing was only made salient in terms of professional level and gender, but in real 
academic settings, social grouping can occur at more levels and in different ways. 
Scientists may categorize themselves as members of a research group, a faculty 
department, a faculty, an institution, a scientific field, a certain paradigm, and 
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so on. If scientists are indeed prone to in-group biases, they may recognize that 
scientists are human, but still believe that scientists outside their group are more 
fallible than scientists within their group, and that new research policies aimed to 
counter human fallibilities need not focus to scientists like themselves.
The remarkable finding that established scientists believe that early-career 
scientists fit the storybook image of the scientist less well than PhD students 
may be related to a perceived relationship between publication pressure and use 
of questionable research practices (QRPs) or academic misbehavior. Early- and 
mid-career scientists have expressed concerns that competition and publication 
pressures negatively affect how science is done (Anderson, Horn, et al., 2007), 
and academic age has been found to be negatively correlated with experienced 
publication pressure (Tijdink et al., 2013). This may lead established scientists to 
believe that early-career scientists are more likely to engage in QRPs (and thus fit 
the storybook image less well) than PhD students and established scientists, but 
studies comparing self-admitted usage of QRPs and misbehavior between scien-
tists of different career-stages have yielded mixed results. Some studies found 
that younger scientists are more likely to admit to undesirable scientific behavior 
(Anderson, Martinson, et al., 2007; Tijdink et al., 2014), while other studies found 
that older scientists are more likely to admit to this kind of behavior (Martinson, 
Anderson, Crain, & De Vries, 2006; Martinson, Anderson, & de Vries, 2005). An-
other explanation might be sought in the idea that Ph.D. students represent po-
tential rather than practice, making it easier to imagine them as matching the 
ideal.
Just like any other professional endeavor involving human beings, science is 
prone to human error and bias. As long as we lack objective data on higher levels 
of objectivity, rationality, open-mindedness, intelligence, integrity or communali-
ty among scientists, the scientific community would benefit from acknowledging 
the human fallibility of scientists by encouraging or even implementing measures 
that reduce the effect of human factors. Not only scientists themselves, but sci-
ence policy makers, science funders, academic institutes, and scientific publishers 
should all actively strive together for a ‘scientific utopia’ (Nosek & Bar-Anan, 2012; 
Nosek et al., 2012): a transparent, reproducible science system in which there is 
room for correction of error. Institutes like the Center of Open Science (https://
cos.io/) are working hard to create user-friendly platforms such as the Open Sci-
ence Framework (https://osf.io/) that enable scientists to manage their entire re-
search cycle practicing transparency, open collaboration, proper documenting, ar-
chiving and sharing of research materials, data, and analysis scripts, and to benefit 
in other ways from open science (McKiernan et al., 2016). Peer-reviewed study 
pre-registration, as offered and encouraged by the Center for Open Science’s 
Pre-registration Challenge (see https://cos.io/prereg/), reduces ‘researcher de-
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grees of freedom’ (Simmons et al., 2011) and helps scientists to avoid falling prey 
to human biases such as confirmation bias and hindsight bias. It’s time to step off 
our pedestal, accept our humanness and collaborate to create an open research 
culture that acknowledges, but at the same time addresses, our fallibility.
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CHAPTER 3
ABSTRACT
Statistical analysis is error prone. A best practice for researchers using statistics 
would therefore be to share data among co-authors, allowing double-checking of 
executed tasks just as co-pilots do in aviation. To document the extent to which 
this ‘co-piloting’ currently occurs in psychology, we surveyed the authors of 697 
articles published in six top psychology journals and asked them whether they had 
collaborated on four aspects of analyzing data and reporting results, and wheth-
er the described data had been shared between the authors. We acquired re-
sponses for 49.6% of the articles and found that co-piloting on statistical analysis 
and reporting results is quite uncommon among psychologists, while data sharing 
among co-authors seems reasonably but not completely standard. We then used 
an automated procedure to study the prevalence of statistical reporting errors in 
the articles in our sample and examined the relationship between reporting errors 
and co-piloting. Overall, 63% of the articles contained at least one p-value that 
was inconsistent with the reported test statistic and the accompanying degrees of 
freedom, and 20% of the articles contained at least one p-value that was inconsis-
tent to such a degree that it may have affected decisions about statistical signifi-
cance. Overall, the probability that a given p-value was inconsistent was over 10%. 
Co-piloting was not found to be associated with reporting errors. 
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Most conclusions in psychological research (and related fields) are based on the 
results of null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) (Cohen, 1994; Hubbard & 
Ryan, 2000; Krueger, 2001; Levine, Weber, Hullet, Park, & Lindsey, 2008; Nicker-
son, 2000; Sterling, Rosenbaum, & Weinkam, 1995). Although the use and inter-
pretation of this method have been criticized (e.g. Cumming, 2014; Gigerenzer & 
Edwards, 2003; Wagenmakers et al., 2011), it continues to be the main method of 
statistical inference in psychological research (Bakker & Wicherts, 2011; Wetzels 
et al., 2011). Not only for the readers of the psychological literature to be able 
to interpret and assess the validity of research results, but also for the credibility 
of the field, it is thus crucial that NHST results are correctly reported. Recent re-
sults however suggest that reported results from t, F, and χ2 tests in the scientific 
literature are characterized by a great deal of errors (Bakker & Wicherts, 2011; 
Berle & Starcevic, 2007; Caperos & Pardo, 2013; Garcia-Berthou & Alcaraz, 2004; 
Wicherts et al., 2011).  An example of such an error can be found in the following 
results (which, apart from the variable names, appeared in a published article): 
“All two-way interactions were significant: A × B, F(1, 20) = 9.5, p < .006; A × C, F(1, 
20) = 0.54,  p < .03; and C × B, F(1, 20) = 6.8, p < .02”. Even without recalculation, 
the experienced user of NHST may notice that the second of these p-values is 
inconsistent with the reported F-statistic and the accompanying degrees of free-
dom. The p-value that corresponds to this F-statistic and these degrees of free-
dom equals .47. 
Bakker and Wicherts (2011) found that 50% of the articles reporting the re-
sults of NHST tests in the psychological literature contained at least one such in-
consistent p-value, and that 18% of the statistical results was incorrectly reported. 
Similar yet slightly lower error rates have been found in the medical literature 
(Berle & Starcevic, 2007; Garcia-Berthou & Alcaraz, 2004) and in recent replica-
tions (Bakker & Wicherts, 2014a; Caperos & Pardo, 2013; Leggett, Thomas, Loet-
scher, & Nicholls, 2013). Bakker and Wicherts (2011) discuss different reasons why 
these inconsistent p-values may appear. For example, the output for a three-way 
Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA) in the current version of the popular package 
SPSS contains no less than 79 numbers, many of which are redundant and there-
fore easily incorrectly retrieved. When several analyses are conducted, results are 
readily mixed up and typographic errors occur easily. Other reasons for statistical 
errors may be misunderstanding of data analysis in general (Zuckerman, Hodgins, 
Zuckerman, & Rosenthal, 1993) or misunderstanding of NHST (Nickerson, 2000) 
in particular. 
In many areas where human errors are common and potentially consequen-
tial, systems have been implemented to help reduce the likelihood of these er-
rors (Reason, 1990). An example of such a system is co-piloting in aviation: dou-
ble-checking the pilot’s every move significantly reduces the risk of human errors 
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leading to airplane crashes (Beaty, 2004; Wiegman & Shappell, 2003). Another 
example is pair-programming in Agile Software Engineering, which is found to 
help reduce errors in programming code (Lindvall et al., 2004). Wicherts (2011) 
suggested that scientists should learn from aviation and other fields that deal 
with human error, and proposed a method to reduce errors in the reporting of 
statistical results: the co-pilot model of statistical analysis. This model involves a 
simple code of conduct prescribing that statistical analyses are always conducted 
independently by at least two persons (typically co-authors). This would stipulate 
double-checks of the analyses and the reported results, open discussions on ana-
lytic decisions, and improved data documentation that facilitates later replication 
of the analytical results by (independent) peers. 
Contrary to common practice in medical sciences where statisticians usu-
ally conduct the statistical analyses, psychological researchers typically conduct 
their statistical analyses themselves. Although multiple authors on papers have 
become the de facto norm in psychology (Cronin, Shaw, & La Barre, 2003; Men-
denhall & Higbee, 1982; Over, 1982), it is currently unknown how many authors 
are generally involved in (double-checking) the analyses and reporting of the 
statistical results. Co-piloting in statistical analysis may concern the independent 
re-execution of the analyses (e.g., reproducing the results of a test in SPSS), veri-
fying the sample size details, scrutinizing the statistical results in the manuscript, 
and sharing the data among co-authors before and after publication. In this study, 
we therefore defined co-piloting as having at least two people involved in con-
ducting the statistical analyses, in writing down the sample details, in reporting 
the statistical results, and in checking the reported statistical results. In addition, 
co-piloting in our definition means that at least two people have access to the 
data before the manuscript is submitted, and that at least two people still have 
access to the data five years after publication of the article. Data sharing between 
at least two authors ensures shared responsibility for proper documentation and 
archiving of the data. 
In the present study we estimated the prevalence of inconsistent p-values re-
sulting from t, F, χ2, r, Z and Wald tests in articles published in six flagship journals 
in psychology. To this end, we employed an automated procedure to document 
the prevalence of statistical reporting errors in 697 articles published in high-im-
pact journals representing six main empirical psychology disciplines. Moreover, 
we documented the extent to which co-piloting currently occurs in psychology by 
asking the authors of the articles in our sample a number of questions about the 
first (or only) study reported in the article: we asked them to indicate whether 
they had collaborated on four aspects of analyzing data and reporting results, and 
whether the described data had been shared between the authors. Our design 
enabled us to fulfill a third objective: to examine the relationship between statisti-
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cal reporting errors and co-piloting.  As we are not aware of any other work docu-
menting collaboration practices on statistical analyses in psychology or any other 
research area, we had no hypotheses regarding the extent to which co-authors 
currently employ the co-pilot model. We did however hypothesize that co-piloting 
would be associated with a reduced risk of statistical reporting errors, and thus 
expected the probability of a given p-value being incorrect to be lower in papers 
in which the statistical analyses and the reporting of the results had been co-pi-
loted (i.e. where more than one person had been involved).  This time-stamped 
hypothesis can be found at the Open Science Framework via http://osf.io/dkn8a.  
METHODS
The Prevalence of Statistical Reporting Errors
Sample
For each psychology subfield as listed in the search engine of Thompson Reuters’ 
2012 Journal Citation Reports (Applied Psychology, Biological Psychology, Clinical 
Psychology, Developmental Psychology, Educational Psychology, Experimental 
Psychology, Mathematical Psychology, Multidisciplinary Psychology, Psychoanal-
ysis, and Social Psychology), we chose the journal with the highest 5-year Impact 
Factor, which (1) was published in English, (2) required  the publication style of the 
American Psychological Association (APA) (American Psychological Association, 
2010), and (3)  published at least 80 empirical articles in 2011. Four subfields were 
excluded for different reasons. Educational Psychology was excluded because 
high-ranking journals in Educational Psychology and Developmental Psychology 
largely overlapped. Mathematical Psychology was excluded because articles in 
this field do not usually report the results of NHST. We excluded Multidisciplinary 
Psychology because we did not regard this field useful to compare subfields of 
psychology, and we excluded Psychoanalysis because hardly any empirical studies 
are reported in this field.  From the remaining six subfields, the following journals 
were included in our sample: the Journal of Applied Psychology (Applied Psychol-
ogy), the Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology (Clinical Psychology), the 
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry (Developmental Psychology), the Jour-
nal of Cognitive Neuroscience (Experimental Psychology), the Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology (Social Psychology), and Psychophysiology (Biological 
Psychology). On 24 October 2012, we downloaded all 775 articles published in 
these journals since Jan 1st, 2012 and then read each abstract in order to deter-
mine whether an article was empirical or not. After this selection, our final sample 
consisted of 697 empirical articles (see Table 1). 
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Procedure
To assess the accuracy of the p-values reported in our sample of articles, we used 
a recently developed automated procedure called statcheck (Epskamp & Nuijten, 
2013). Statcheck is a package in R, a free software environment for statistical com-
puting and graphics (R Core Team, 2013), and is available through https://github.
com/MicheleNuijten/statcheck. The version of statcheck that we used for this pa-
per (0.1.0) extracts t, F, χ2, r, Z and Wald statistics from articles that are reported 
as prescribed by the APA Publication Manual (American Psychological Association, 
2010).  Statcheck re-computes p-values in the following way: first, it converts a 
PDF or HTML file to plain text, and then scans the text for statistical results. Next, 
it re-computes p-values using the test statistics and the degrees of freedom. Fi-
nally, it compares the reported and recomputed p-value and indicates whether 
these are consistent or not, while taking into account the effects of rounding. In 
addition, it specifies whether an inconsistent p-value comprises a ‘gross error’: 
when the p-value is inconsistent to the extent that it may have affected a decision 
about statistical significance (in this case: when it is reported as smaller than 0.05 
while the recomputed p-value is larger than 0.05, or vice versa). It is important to 
note that statcheck’s error prevalence estimate may somewhat underestimate or 
overestimate the true error prevalence because it cannot read statistical results 
that are inconsistent with the APA’s reporting guidelines (American Psychological 
Association, 2010) or statistical results that contain additional symbols represent-
ing for example effect sizes.
Table 3.1 Sample.
Field Journal title 5-year IF No. of articles Empirical






Clinical Psychology Journal of Consulting and  
Clinical Psychology (JCCP)
6.369 120 105
Developmental Psychology Journal of Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry (JCPP)
6.104 114 90
Experimental Psychology Journal of Cognitive Neurosci-
ence (JCN)
6.268 150 147




Note: 5-yr IF = five-year Impact Factor in 2011. Articles = number of articles published in 2012. Empirical = 
number of empirical articles published in 2012
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In total, 8,110 statistical results were retrieved from 430 of the 697 empirical 
articles (see Table 2).  Five p-values that were seemingly reported as larger than 
1 were excluded after determining that these had been incorrectly retrieved due 
to the program’s inability to read p-values reported as ‘p times 10 to the power 
of’. A close inspection of the retrieved results revealed that statcheck also had dif-
ficulties reading results containing the χ2 symbol and results in which effect sizes 
or other measures had been included between the p-values and the test statistics 
(e.g. F(1, 46) = 8.41, ηp
2 = .16, p = .006). This explains at least partly why results 
were retrieved from a relatively low number of articles. For each of the remaining 
8,105 retrieved results, two independent coders tracked down whether the test 
was reported as one-sided or two-sided, and whether the results belonged to the 
first (or only) study reported in the article or not. Moreover, the two coders man-
ually checked all statistical results that statcheck identified as ‘gross errors’ using 
a strict coding protocol that required the coders to verify whether these p-values 
indeed constituted an error related to statistical significance. Inter-rater reliabil-
ity was high: in most cases, both coders agreed on whether the study belonged 
to Study 1 (Cohen’s Kappa = 0.92) and on whether the results were reported as 
one-sided or as two-sided (Cohen’s Kappa = 0.85). The inter-rater reliability for 
decision errors was somewhat lower (Cohen’s Kappa = 0.77), because of possible 
disagreement on whether the result was tested as one-sided or as two-sided due 
to ambiguous reporting. Such ambiguity in reporting sidedness of the test high-
lights the importance of reporting standards, hence we suggest that one-sided 
tests always be described as “one-tailed”, “one-sided”, or “directional”.  Whenever 
two coders disagreed on the test’s sidedness, a third coder was asked to inde-
pendently code the final result. 
In the second phase of the protocol, we manually checked the statistical re-
sults for which the p-value had been reported as ‘p=0.05’. We realized that this 
was necessary because statcheck could not determine whether a result that had 
been reported this way was classified as significant by the authors of the article. 
We therefore looked up all 105 p-values reported as ‘=0.05’ in the text of the arti-
cle, determined whether the result had been described as significant or not, and 
copied the sentence in which the result was reported in into our data file. Again, 
in those cases where the two coders disagreed (in 2 of the 105 cases), a third 
coder was asked to independently code the result. For a detailed description of 
the coding protocol and the flowchart we used, please refer to the supplementary 
materials (Appendix B: Table S1, Figure S1, and Figure S2).  All manual checks were 
conducted before the link was made with the survey responses in order to keep 
the coders blind to whether or not particular analyses were co-piloted. 
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Co-Piloting in Psychology
Participants
We searched for the contact details of all 3,087 authors of the 697 empirical ar-
ticles in our sample and obtained at least one email address for each article in 
our sample. In total, we managed to track down the email addresses of 2,727 
authors (88.3%) and sent them an invitation to participate in our online survey in 
the first week of July, 2013. We sent two reminders to non-responding authors 
and stopped collecting data one week after sending the second reminder.  This 
way, we aimed to obtain at least one response for most articles. In total, we re-
ceived at least one response for 346 articles, amounting to an article response 
rate of 49.6%. Using personalized hyperlinks to the survey (containing the article 
title and the ‘author number’ indicating whether the respondent was first author, 
second author, etc.) we were able to establish whether more than one author of 
an article had responded. To make sure that no more than one response per arti-
cle was used in the analyses that included survey responses, we only retained the 
response of the ‘first responding author’, i.e., the author with the lowest author 
number. 
Procedure
The online survey was generated using Qualtrics software version 500235 (Qual-
trics, 2012). We programmed the survey in such a way that each respondent was 
asked the same questions, but that the questions pertained to a specific article 
published by the individual respondent. In the invitation to the survey, we expli-
cated ethical issues (see below) and stated that survey responses would be linked 
to the accuracy of the p-values in the article with which the survey questions 
Table 3.2 Number of articles from which p-values were retrieved, number of p-values retrieved 
per journal, and mean number of p-values retrieved per article and per journal.
Journal No. of articles No. of p-values
retrieved
Mean no. of p-values retrieved
per article
JAP 42 340 8.10
JCCP 67 833 12.43
JCN 107 1721 16.08
JCPP 39 444 11.38
JPSP 133 4018 30.21
PP 42 749 17.83
Total 430 8105 18.86
Note: JAP = Journal of Applied Psychology; JCCP = Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology; JCN = 
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience; JCPP = Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry; JPSP = Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology; PP = Psychophysiology;
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were concerned. In addition, we provided the first author’s email address for re-
spondents to write to if they had further questions before deciding whether to 
participate. 
At the beginning of the survey we encouraged respondents to have the ar-
ticles near at hand by asking them to indicate how many authors were listed in 
the paper. Many articles reported more than one study. As different people may 
have contributed to different studies, the questions would have been difficult 
or even impossible to answer if they had pertained to all studies. Therefore, the 
respondents were presented with a set of six questions about the first or only 
study reported in the article asking them to specify who, as indicated by the au-
thor number (or ‘other’ category), was involved in: (1) conducting the statistical 
analyses, (2) writing down the sample details, (3) reporting the statistical results, 
and (4) checking the reported statistical results. The last two questions in this set 
pertained to data sharing and asked how many people (5) had access to the data 
when the manuscript was submitted, and (6) currently have access to the data. 
These six questions allowed us to construct six corresponding ‘co-piloting’ vari-
ables: if only one person was involved, the variable was coded ‘0’ (not co-piloted), 
if two or more persons were involved, the variable was coded ‘1’ (co-piloted). 
Finally, we asked respondents whether they wished to receive a report about the 
accuracy of the p-values reported in their article, and whether they wished to par-
ticipate in a raffle in which they could win one of five $100 Amazon.com vouch-
ers. The invitation e-mail and the survey itself can be found at the Open Science 
Framework via http://osf.io/ncvxg.
The Relationship between Co-Piloting and Statistical 
Reporting Errors
To analyze the relationship between co-piloting and the accuracy of p-values re-
ported in the first or only study in the corresponding articles, we merged the data 
file containing the retrieved p-values from each article and the data file containing 
the survey responses. While p-values had been retrieved from 430 out of 697 ar-
ticles, and survey responses were obtained for 346 articles, these sets of articles 
did not completely overlap (i.e., for some articles statistical results were retrieved 
but no survey response was obtained, and vice versa). In total, the data of 210 ar-
ticles (48.8% of the 430 articles from which statistical results had been retrieved) 
could be matched. Thus, we matched each statistical result retrieved from the 
first (or only) study reported in these articles to the survey responses given by the 
respondent with the lowest author number. The statistical results of the remain-
ing 220 articles were retained in the file to analyze the effect of non-response. A 
schematic overview of our sample is presented in Figure 3.1. Based on the study 
of Wicherts, Bakker, and Molenaar (2011) who found a relationship between will-






























































































































































































































































































































































































ingness to share research data and the prevalence of reporting errors in a sample 
of 48 articles, we expected to have enough power to detect a relationship be-
tween co-piloting and statistical reporting errors in our sample of 430 papers from 
which p-values were retrieved. With the 210 articles for which we obtained survey 
Figure 3.1 Flow chart for composition of sample
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responses and had retrieved p-values, our sample was still more than four times 
as large as in Wicherts et al.’s study (2011).
Ethics Statement
This study was approved by the ethics committee of the Tilburg School of Social 
and Behavioral Sciences under the following conditions: (1) specific errors un-
covered during this study would not be discussed in publications, presentations, 
writing or conversation with others, (2) the survey responses would be processed 
anonymously, and (3) survey respondents would receive feedback about the ac-
curacy of the p-values in their article if they wished. In total, 384 respondents 
requested and received feedback via email. Respondents provided informed con-
sent by ticking ‘yes’ at the statement ‘I have read and understood the above and 
agree to participate’ on the introductory page of the survey. 
Statistical analysis
We uploaded our analytical plan regarding the confirmatory analyses at the Open 
Science Framework (https://osf.io/qutsy) before collecting the survey data. As our 
main hypotheses were tested by six analyses each, we corrected our alpha levels 
in these analyses for multiple testing by dividing .05 by six. All our analyses were 
conducted by at least two of the authors in order to reduce the probability of any 
errors on our own part. All scripts used to prepare the data files, to conduct the 
analyses and to construct the graphs, to anonymize our data, and to draw the 
winners of the raffle can be found on the Open Science Framework via http://osf.
io/ekush.
Data availability
The first, non-merged anonymous survey data file can be viewed via http://osf.
io/4bvqh. The data on the Open Science Framework are open access with no copy 
right issues and can be accessed by readers in the same manner as the authors. 
The second, merged data file contains p-values that can be traced back to indi-
vidual articles, and can therefore not be shared without restrictions imposed by 
our ethics committee. The Psychology Ethics Committee of the Tilburg School of 
Social and Behavioral Sciences approved this study under the strict condition that 
we would not make these data file publicly available. We will however share these 
data after written agreement, and only with other researchers wishing to verify 
our results (see Article 8.14 of the APA ethical principles of psychologists and code 
of conduct (American Psychological Association, 2002)). Requests for data can be 
sent to the authors Coosje L. S. Veldkamp (C.L.S.Veldkamp@tilburguniversity.edu) 
or Jelte M. Wicherts (J.M.Wicherts@tilburguniversity.edu).
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RESULTS
The Prevalence of Statistical Reporting Errors
Our first aim was to estimate the prevalence of statistical reporting errors in jour-
nals representing different areas of psychology using an automated procedure. 
First, we present the error rates at the article level: what is the probability that an 
article contains at least one p-value that comprises an error? As the dependent 
variable was dichotomous (the article does or does not contain at least one incon-
sistent p-value), we carried out simple logistic regression analyses (intercept only 
models) to estimate the probabilities and their 95% confidence intervals (CI). The 
results collapsed over all journals revealed that almost two out of three articles 
(63.0%, CI [58.4 – 67.5]) contained at least one p-value that comprised an error, 
and that one in five articles (20.5%, CI [16.9 – 24.5] contained at least one p-value 
that comprised a gross error.  
We also compared the error prevalence across different journals/fields. Lo-
gistic regression analyses with journal as predictor revealed that there were dif-
ferences in error rates between the journals: χ2 (5, N = 430) = 49.46, p < .001. The 
probability that an article contained at least one p-value that comprised an error 
was lower in the Journal of Applied Psychology than in all other journals (23.8 
%, CI [13.3 - 38.9], all ps ≤ .002 < 0.05/6) except the Journal of Child Psychology 
and Psychiatry (51.3%, CI [36.0 – 66.4], p = .012 > 0.05/6). At the same time, this 
probability was higher in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (79.7%, 
CI [72.0 - 85.7], all ps ≤ .006 < 0.05/6) than in all other journals except Psychophys-
iology (71.4%, CI [56.1 – 83.0], p = .264 > 0.05/6). These differences may be attrib-
utable to differences between journals in the mean number of reported p-values 
per article, as a higher number of reported p-values entails a higher probability 
that an article contains an error. For example, an article in the Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology contains more than 30 p-values on average, whereas 
the average article in the Journal of Applied Psychology contains only slightly more 
than eight p-values. The probability that an article contained at least one p-value 
that comprised a gross error differed also by journal: χ2 (5, N = 430) = 15.46, p = 
.009, but no journal differed significantly from any other journal (all ps ≥ 0.012 > 
0.05/6). The error probabilities for the sample as a whole and for each field sep-
arately are presented in Figure 3.2, together with their 95% confidence intervals. 
Next, we present the results at the level of the individual p-value: i.e. what is 
the probability that a given p-value comprises an error? Because the dependent 
variable was again dichotomous (the p-value is either inconsistent or not) and 
because the p-values are nested within their articles, we carried out multilevel 
logistic regression analyses with article as random factor to estimate the probabil-
ities and their 95% confidence intervals (CI). The results collapsed over all p-values 





























showed that approximately one in ten p-values comprised an error (10.6%, CI 
[9.4 – 11.9]) and one in 125 p-values comprised a gross error (0.8%, CI [0.6 – 1.0]). 
Running the multilevel logistic regression analyses with article as a random 
factor and journal as a fixed factor revealed that there were differences in the 
p-values’ error probabilities between journals: χ2 (5, N = 8105) = 17.53, p =.004. 
The probability that a given p-value comprised an error was lower in the Journal 
of Applied Psychology (3.4%, CI [1.7 – 6.6]) than in all other fields (all ps ≤ .004 
< 0.05/6). One explanation for the lower error probability in this journal may be 
that its low mean number of reported p-values per article (8.10) renders errors 
more easily detectable by (co-)authors and other readers. The probability that a 
p-value comprised a gross error did not significantly differ between journals: χ2 (5, 
N = 8105) = 1.92, p = .860. The error probabilities for the sample of p-values as a 
whole as well as for the p-values in each field separately are presented in Figure 
3.3, together with their 95% confidence intervals. 
Note: JAP = Journal of Applied Psychology (n = 42); JCCP = Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology (n = 
67); JCN = Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience (n = 107); JCPP = Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry (n 
= 39); JPSP = Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (n = 133); PP = Psychophysiology (n = 42); TOTAL 
= all articles together (N = 430).  
Figure 3.2 The probability per journal that an article contains at least one p-value comprising an 
error or gross error (with 95% confidence interval).































One may notice that for the Journal of Applied Psychology (JAP) the probabil-
ity that a p-value comprises a gross error seems relatively high compared to the 
overall probability that a p-value in JAP comprises an error. However, we tested 
if the conditional probability of a gross error given an error was different across 
journals, and this does not appear to be the case: χ2(5, N = 1149) = 9.09, p = .106. 
Co-Piloting in Psychology
Our second aim was to document the extent to which co-piloting currently occurs 
in psychological research. To answer this, we computed a co-piloting variable for 
each of the six co-piloting questions in the survey. Specifically, we computed for 
each of the processes (analyzing the data, writing down the sample details in the 
manuscript, writing down the statistical results in the manuscript, checking the 
results written down in the manuscript, sharing the data among co-authors before 
submission, and archiving the data after submission) how many people had been 
Note:  JAP = Journal of Applied Psychology (n = 340); JCCP = Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 
(n = 833); JCN = Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience (n = 1,721); JCPP = Journal of Child Psychology and 
Psychiatry (n = 444); JPSP = Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (n = 4,018); PP = Psychophysiology 
(n = 749); TOTAL = all p-values together (N = 8,105).
Figure 3.3 The probability per journal that a given p-value comprises an error or a gross error 
(with 95% confidence interval).































































involved and coded those parts in which two or more people had been involved 
as 1 (co-piloted), and those parts in which only one person had been involved as 0 
(not co-piloted). We ran a logistic regression analysis (intercept model only) to es-
timate the probabilities and 95% confidence intervals for each of the six processes 
(see Figure 3.4). Because journal was no significant predictor in any of the six anal-
yses (all ps ≥.015 > 0.05/6), the results presented in Figure 3.4 are collapsed over 
journals.  Note that the sample sizes for the individual analyses differed slightly due 
to some missing values that were excluded pairwise (see note below Figure 3.4).
As can be seen in Figure 3.4, the statistical analyses were most often conduct-
ed by one person only: co-piloting occurred in just 39.7% of the articles (CI [34.6% 
– 45.0%]. Similarly, in most articles, only one person wrote down the sample de-
tails and the statistical results in the manuscript (co-piloting occurred in 23.3 % (CI 
[19.1% - 28.2%]) and 26.6% (CI [22.2% - 31.6%]) of the articles, respectively). Howev-
er, the results of the analyses as written down in the manuscript were checked by a 
second person slightly more often than not (54.9%, CI [49.5% - 60.2%). On the other 
hand, in most articles, the data had been shared with at least one other person 
Note: statistical analyses = conducting the statistical analyses (N= 335); write  up sample details = writing 
the sample details in the manuscript (N = 330); write up results = writing up the results in the manuscript (N 
= 334); check results in manuscript = checking of the results in the manuscript by someone other than the 
person who wrote up the results in the manuscript (N= 326); data sharing at submission = having access to 
the data at the moment the manuscript was submitted (N= 333); data sharing now = having access to the 
data at the moment the survey was being filled in (N= 332).
Figure 3.4 The percentage of articles in which co-piloting occurred for various processes (with 
95% confidence intervals).

































































































































when the manuscript was submitted (79.0%, CI [74.3% - 83.0%], meaning that at 
least one other person had the opportunity to look at the data set before the article 
was published. Less than two years after publication however, data storage by more 
than one person occurred only in the minority of cases (41.9%, CI [36.7% - 47.2%]. 
The Relationship between Co-Piloting and Reporting 
Errors
Our third aim was to establish whether a relationship exists between co-piloting 
and the probability that a p-value comprised an error. To answer this question, 
we only took into account those p-values of articles of which at least one au-
thor responded to our survey. By means of a multilevel logistic regression analysis 
with article as random factor and journal as fixed factor we first established that 
in this subsample there were no differences between journals in the probabil-
Note: statistical analyses = conducting the statistical analyses (N= 2,247); write  up sample details = writing 
the sample details in the manuscript (N = 2,215); write up results = writing up the results in the manuscript 
(N = 2,231); check results in manuscript = checking of the results in the manuscript by someone other than 
the person who wrote up the results in the manuscript (N= 2,185); data sharing at submission = having ac-
cess to the data at the moment the manuscript was submitted (N= 2,228); data sharing now = having access 
to the data at the moment the survey was being filled in (N= 2,226).
Figure 3.5 The probability that a p-value in the first (or only) study reported comprises an error: 
co-piloted studies versus non-co-piloted studies. 

































































































































ity that a p-value comprised an error (χ2 (5, N = 2299) = 6.35, p = .274), nor in 
the probability that a p-value comprised a gross error (χ2 (5, N = 2299) = 4.15, 
p = .528). We then ran six different multilevel logistic regression analyses, each 
with article as random factor, and one of the six co-piloting variables as fixed fac-
tor. Our hypothesis that co-piloting is related to the probability that a given p-value 
was associated with a reduced error risk lacked support: we found no significant 
differences for any of the six processes between articles in which co-piloting had 
occurred and articles in which co-piloting had not occurred in the probability that 
a given p-value was inconsistent (all ps ≥ .283 > 0.05/6, see Figure 3.5), nor in the 
probability that a p-value was inconsistent to the extent that it may have affected 
a decision about statistical significance (all ps ≥.323 > 0.05/6, see Figure 3.6). 
Note: statistical analyses = conducting the statistical analyses (N= 2,247); write  up sample details = writing 
the sample details in the manuscript (N = 2,215); write up results = writing up the results in the manuscript 
(N = 2,231); check results in manuscript = checking of the results in the manuscript by someone other than 
the person who wrote up the results in the manuscript (N= 2,185); data sharing at submission = having ac-
cess to the data at the moment the manuscript was submitted (N= 2,228); data sharing now = having access 
to the data at the moment the survey was being filled in (N= 2,226).
Figure 3.6 The probability that a p-value in the first (or only) study reported comprises a gross 
error: co-piloted studies versus non-co-piloted studies.
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Non-Response
Finally, we studied the effect of non-response by comparing the error probabilities 
in articles for which we obtained survey responses to the error probabilities in ar-
ticles for which we did not obtain survey responses. Responses to the survey were 
not significantly associated either with the probability that an article contained at 
least one p-value that comprised an error (Wald Z = -0.882, p = .378), or with the 
probability that an article contained at least one p-value that comprised a gross 
error (Wald Z = -1.308, p = .191). These results indicate that the probability that an 
article contained at least one p-value that comprised an error did not seem to be 
associated with whether the authors responded to the survey. 
At the p-value level, there was an effect of response on the probability that 
a given p-value comprised an error (Wald Z = -2.194, p = .028), but there was no 
significant effect of response on the probability that a given p-value comprised a 
gross error (Wald Z = -1.819, p = .069). In other words, these results indicate that 
the probability that a p-value comprised an error was higher in articles published 
by authors who did not respond to the survey than in articles published by au-
thors who did respond to the survey, but that no such association was found with 
respect to the probability that a p-value comprised a gross error. 
DISCUSSION
We estimated the prevalence of inconsistent p-values in six top psychology jour-
nals by means of an automated procedure to retrieve and check errors in the re-
porting of statistical results, in order to replicate earlier estimates of error rates in 
the psychological literature (Bakker & Wicherts, 2011; Bakker & Wicherts, 2014a; 
Caperos & Pardo, 2013; Leggett et al., 2013). Our results show a somewhat high-
er probability for articles to contain at least one p-value that comprises an error 
compared to the two studies by Bakker and Wicherts (63% vs. 45% (2014a) and 
50% (2011)), and a higher probability for articles to contain at least one p-value 
that comprises a gross error (20% vs. 15% (2011; 2014a)). Our error probability 
estimates at the article level may be somewhat higher because the top journals in 
our sample typically require more than one study and hence include the results of 
more tests than the lower-ranked journals in Bakker and Wicherts’ (2011) study. 
Our estimate of the probability that a p-value comprises an error was in between 
the estimates of Bakker and Wicherts: 10% vs 7% (2014a) and 18% (2011). A pos-
sible explanation for the difference with the higher estimate of 18% (Bakker & 
Wicherts, 2011) is that in the first study by Bakker and Wicherts (2011), statistical 
results that were not exactly reported as prescribed by the APA manual (American 
Psychological Association, 2010) were counted as errors, whereas in their later 
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study (Bakker & Wicherts, 2014a) and in our study, this type of error was not 
taken into account. On the other hand, our error prevalence estimates may have 
been somewhat inflated by excluding reported statistical results that included an 
effect size. If we would assume that reporting effect sizes is associated with more 
knowledge about statistics, authors who reported effect sizes may have made 
fewer mistakes in reporting. In any case, our estimates are alarmingly high: almost 
two out of three of the articles published in one of these flagship journals con-
tain at least one statistical reporting error and one in every ten reported p-values 
is inconsistent with the reported test statistic and the accompanying degrees of 
freedom. 
Moreover, we documented the extent to which co-piloting currently occurs 
in psychology. Ours is the first study that looked at how often psychology research-
ers work together on the analyses and reporting of results and at how often data 
are shared among co-authors. Although 99.1% of the articles had more than one 
author, not all co-authors appear to feel shared responsibility for the accuracy of 
the data analysis. In most articles the analyses were conducted by one person 
only and the results in the manuscript were checked only slightly more often than 
not by a co-author or someone else. We realize however that ‘checking the results 
in the manuscript’ may not actually constitute re-analysis or recalculation of the 
p-values and that the term ‘checking the results’ may therefore have been some-
what ambiguous. Yet data sharing among co-authors seems quite common: the 
results indicated that data from four out of five articles had been shared among 
at least two authors at the time the manuscript was submitted. This means that 
at least one co-author had the opportunity to have a look at the data file before 
submission, although this does not mean that they have actually done so, and if 
they did, in what way they inspected the data. On the other hand, we find it rather 
disconcerting that even if the data were shared before submission, the data of 
more than half of the published articles are currently stored by one person only. If 
the data are stored in a safe place (e.g., in a data repository, or in the ‘cloud’), this 
may not constitute an archiving problem (specifically if they are well document-
ed). However, if the data are stored on one researcher’s hard drive, the risk of loss 
of the data is considerable. Recent results show that the availability of research 
data declines rapidly over time (Vines et al., 2013), notwithstanding that ethical 
guidelines (American Psychological Association, 2002) and professional standards 
require the archiving of data for at least five years after publication. Sharing data 
with co-authors requires rigorous documentation, which is likely to increase the 
chances that data are still available for re-analyses, verification, and further use in 
the future (Simonsohn, 2013; Wicherts, 2013; Wicherts & Bakker, 2012; Wicherts, 
Borsboom, Kats, & Molenaar, 2006). Finally, our survey results show that in the 
majority of articles only one author wrote down the sample details and the sta-
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tistical results. However, one could argue that these two variables may not have 
captured the concept of co-piloting very well, as it may not have been clear to 
our respondents how we actually envisioned co-piloting on actual writing. Our in-
tention was to measure whether the sample size details and the results were dis-
cussed between authors before/during the actual writing process, as we believe 
that some errors may occur in this phase and may be reduced by discussion of the 
results and the output of the analyses among co-authors. Such aspects should be 
subject to further study. Another interesting avenue for further research would 
be a more fine-grained analysis of specific roles of each author and potential dif-
ferences between responding authors in their responses to co-piloting questions.
Finally, we looked at whether co-piloting on statistical analyses, reporting of 
results, and data sharing among co-authors was associated with a reduced risk of 
statistical reporting errors. Contrary to our expectations, we did not find support 
for this relationship. A relationship may simply not exist, but we believe that the 
relationship may have been obscured by confounding mechanisms. For instance, 
our reliance on self-report may have produced socially desirable responses (in this 
case, answers indicating shared responsibility). The fact that we asked respon-
dents to indicate which authors were involved in each part of the processes rather 
than asking how many people were involved may have also rendered the survey 
more sensitive. Another factor that may have played a role is that the difficulty 
of the statistical analyses may have increased both the error probability of the 
reported statistical result and the probability that the authors collaborated on the 
statistical analyses, which may have offset the effect of collaboration on the error 
probability. Finally, the finding that the probability that a given p-value was incon-
sistent was higher in articles of which the authors did not respond to our survey 
may be an indication that authors who worried that some of their p-values might 
turn out inconsistent were less inclined to respond to our survey. Note, howev-
er, that the relation between responses and inconsistent p-value probability was 
weak. Finally, because we could only use those statistical results that were part of 
the first or only study reported in the articles and because those results could not 
always be matched to survey responses, our sample size (and hence our statistical 
power) turned out lower than we expected.  
Even if co-piloting turns out not to be associated with a reduced risk of sta-
tistical reporting errors, we do believe that co-piloting helps to intercept other 
human errors in the use of statistics and in scientific research in general. The risk 
of many forms of slips and lapses, to which experts in any field are particularly 
prone (Reason, 1990) should diminish considerably when more than one person 
is involved (Beaty, 2004; Wiegman & Shappell, 2003). In addition, co-piloting may 
benefit science by requiring transparency: co-piloting among co-authors requires 
proper data documentation, data archiving, openness, and discourse about sta-
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tistical and methodological decisions. Most articles concerning data sharing focus 
on data sharing with people outside the research group (Ceci, 1988; Ceci & Walk-
er, 1983; Vogeli et al., 2006; Wicherts & Bakker, 2012; Wicherts et al., 2006), but 
we believe that sharing of data as well as of methodological and statistical deci-
sions ought to start within the research group, i.e., among co-authors themselves. 
Even if full co-piloting as defined in this article is not feasible due to time or other 
constraints, we encourage authors to implement at least some double-checking 
of data files, analysis scripts, and results into their routines. For example, this dou-
ble-checking could be part of regular PhD-student supervision, fostering acuity 
on the part of both the student and the supervisor(s). At the same time, such a 
practice would set an example in emphasizing the importance of meticulousness 
in data analysis and reporting.
There have been suggestions for journal editors to increase author account-
ability by requesting a description of author contributions to each stage of the 
research process (Balon, 2005), a policy that enhances transparency and account-
ability and has now been adopted by a number of journals including the Journal 
of the American Medical Association, The Lancet, PLOS ONE, and Psychological 
Science. Finally, reporting confidence intervals and effect sizes as suggested by 
many statisticians trying to improve the use and reporting of statistics (e.g. (Cum-
ming, 2014) and as prescribed by the APA’s updated reporting guidelines (Ameri-
can Psychological Association, 2010) may reduce error rates as this requires more 
scrutiny in interpreting results and may allow (co-)authors (and other readers) to 
quickly spot striking inconsistencies between reported numbers. Like all fields of 
science, psychological science depends on the accuracy of the results reported in 
its literature. Human error of all forms is a part of science, but scientists nonethe-
less have the responsibility to eliminate as much error as possible.
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Shared responsibility for statistical 
analyses and statistical Reporting 
errors in psychology articles 
published in PLOS ONE (2003 – 2016)
This manuscript will be submitted as Veldkamp, C. L. S., Hartgerink, C. H. J.,  
van Assen, M. A. L. M., & Wicherts, J. M. Shared responsibility for statistical analyses and 
statistical reporting errors in psychology articles published in PLOS ONE (2003 – 2016).
CHAPTER 4
ABSTRACT
While it has become clear that many of the statistical test results reported in the 
psychological literature contain errors, it remains unclear which factors contrib-
ute to these errors and how error rates can be reduced. One solution that has 
been proposed is the ‘co-pilot’ model, where at least two of a paper’s authors 
independently run all of the analyses in order to verify the results.  In our pre-
vious work, employing a relatively small sample of psychology articles (n = 697) 
and using survey methodology to measure co-piloting, we failed to find support 
for the effectiveness of co-piloting to reduce error rates. In the current study, we 
examined all psychology articles ever published in PLOS ONE (n = 14,946) for sta-
tistical reporting errors using the automated procedure ‘statcheck’, and used the 
author contributions sections to derive author responsibilities. Although we con-
firmed the alarmingly high prevalence of statistical reporting errors, we found no 
support for a relationship between reporting errors and shared responsibility for 
the analyses. Secondary analyses failed to reveal additional relationships between 
reporting errors and the number of authors on a paper, the number of authors 
responsible for the analyses, or the first author being responsible for the analyses. 
We discuss several potential best practices that may contribute to the reduction 
of both errors and biases in psychological research, including use of statcheck, 
pre-registration, well-organized project management, rigorous data documenta-
tion and archiving, and use of programs that automatically insert all statistical 
results into a text file, such as R Markdown.
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The most widely used method of statistical inference in psychological research is 
null hypothesis significance testing (NHST; Cohen, 1994; Hubbard & Ryan, 2000; 
Krueger, 2001; Nickerson, 2000; Wetzels et al., 2011). The results of statistical 
tests using NHST typically contain three elements: the test statistic, the degrees 
of freedom of the test statistic, and the p-value associated with the combina-
tion of the test statistic and the degrees of freedom. When one or more of these 
three elements are incorrectly reported, the statistical result will be inconsistent. 
Such an inconsistency can vary from a difference that does not have any effect on 
the conclusions based on the statistical test (further called an ‘error’; Bakker & 
Wicherts, 2011; Bakker & Wicherts, 2014a; Veldkamp et al., 2014; Wicherts et al., 
2011) to a difference affecting the overall conclusions of a study (further called 
‘gross error’; Bakker & Wicherts, 2011; Bakker & Wicherts, 2014a; Veldkamp et 
al., 2014; Wicherts et al., 2011), but recently also called ‘‘gross inconsistency’ (Nu-
ijten, Hartgerink, van Assen, Epskamp, & Wicherts, 2016). Errors and gross errors 
in the reporting of statistical results can occur in different ways: the elements in 
the reported test result can be incorrectly retrieved from the output of the statis-
tical software used to conduct the analysis, they can be incorrect due to mere ty-
pographic errors or rounding errors, or they can be incorrect due to confirmation 
bias or intentional misreporting (Agnoli et al., 2017; John et al., 2012).
Over the last decade, it has become clear that many of the statistical test 
results reported in the psychological literature contain (gross) errors (Bakker & 
Wicherts, 2011; Bakker & Wicherts, 2014a; Berle & Starcevic, 2007; Caperos & 
Pardo, 2013; Garcia-Berthou & Alcaraz, 2004; Nuijten et al., 2016; Veldkamp et 
al., 2014; Wicherts et al., 2011). Bakker and Wicherts (2011) manually retrieved 
and recomputed 4,077 statistical results from 281 psychology articles and found 
around 18% of the results to be erroneous, with 1.2% of results showing a gross 
error. More recently, Epskamp and Nuijten (2015) developed ‘statcheck’, software 
to automatically retrieve and check statistical results from articles that contain 
results that are reported according to the publication manual of the American 
Psychological Association (2010). Statcheck is used to examine the error rates in 
the psychology literature (Hartgerink, van Aert, Nuijten, Wicherts, & van Assen, 
2015; Nuijten et al., 2016; Veldkamp et al., 2014), is currently being employed 
at several journals (including Psychological Science and PsychOpen) to screen for 
errors during the peer review process, and is undergoing developments allowing 
use for articles written according other reporting styles. The largest and most re-
cent of studies employing statcheck (Nuijten et al., 2016) concluded that almost 
50% of psychology articles published between 1985 and 2013 contained at least 
one error and almost 13% at least one gross error. Of all statistical results report-
ed, almost 10% constituted an error, and 1.4% constituted a gross error. Errors in 
reported results may not only have consequences for the validity of conclusions 
Reporting errors and co-piloting II      63 
based on these results, but also for meta-analyses that calculate effect sizes on 
the basis of the reported results (Bakker & Wicherts, 2011; Gøtzsche, Hróbjarts-
son, Marić, & Tendal, 2007; Levine & Hullett, 2002; Nuijten et al., 2016) and for 
meta-research using reported p-values (e.g. Simonsohn et al., 2014b; van Assen, 
van Aert, & Wicherts, 2015). Generally, the occurrence of reporting errors nega-
tively affects trust in the accuracy of the results in published articles. 
To date, it remains unclear which factors contribute to these errors and how 
error rates can be reduced. Veldkamp et al. (2014, Chapter 3) investigated wheth-
er ‘co-piloting’ applied to statistical analyses, as proposed by Wicherts (2011), was 
associated with reduced error rates in articles published in the flagship journals 
of six major areas of psychological science. The idea of ço-piloting on statistical 
analyses is that at least two of a paper’s authors store copies of the data and in-
dependently run all of the analyses in order to verify the results (Wicherts, 2011; 
Wicherts et al., 2011). Such a rigorous practice requires proper documentation of 
the data and analyses to allow co-authors (and peers) to double check the results 
(Wicherts et al., 2011). Veldkamp et al. hypothesized that more than one author 
having been involved in the statistical analyses implied that the results had been 
double checked and sufficiently documented to allow verification, and that in-
volvement of more than one author in the analyses would therefore be associated 
with a lower likelihood of errors in the reported results. 
While Veldkamp et al. confirmed the high reporting error rates in psychology 
and found support for the notion that involvement of more than one author in the 
statistical analysis is rather uncommon among psychologists, they failed to find an 
association between shared involvement and error rates. However, Veldkamp et 
al.’s data had several limitations that may have restricted the study’s ability to de-
tect this potential association. First, estimation of collaboration on statistical anal-
ysis was based on a questionnaire asking authors to recall who had been involved 
in the statistical analyses reported in a paper they had published over a year ago, 
which may have yielded inaccurate responses. Second, the data resulting from the 
questionnaire could have been subjected to response biases and social desirabili-
ty, as some of the survey respondents indicated that they considered the issue of 
reporting errors to be rather sensitive. Third, the study potentially suffered from 
lack of statistical power due to the use of a relatively small sample of articles, 
and the choice to consider only the results reported in the first (or only) study 
reported in these articles and collaboration that had occurred in these first (or 
only) studies. For these reasons, we decided to conduct another study to investi-
gate the relationship between co-piloting and errors in reported statistical results 
without any of these limitations; we made use of a considerably larger set of ar-
ticles, and did not make use of questionnaire but rather used publically available 
indicators of the number of authors being responsible for the statistical analyses. 
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In studies of reporting errors it has become customary to examine both the 
probability that an article contains at least one (gross) error, and the probability 
that a statistical result constitutes a (gross) error (Bakker & Wicherts, 2011; Berle 
& Starcevic, 2007; Garcia-Berthou & Alcaraz, 2004; Nuijten et al., 2015; Veldkamp 
et al., 2014). In line with this, we here report all of these probabilities whenever 
relevant. Specifically, we first examined whether the probabilities that an article 
contains at least one (gross) error, and the probability that a statistical result con-
stitutes a (gross) error were lower when more than one author was responsible 
for the analyses than when only one author was responsible for the analyses. We 
then investigated the potential role of the first author. It is widely believed that the 
chance that an article will be published is higher when hypotheses are confirmed 
than when hypotheses are not confirmed (e.g. Franco, Malhotra, & Simonovits, 
2014), making statistical analysis prone to confirmation bias, which may in turn 
lead to reporting errors. As the first author typically has a higher interest in getting 
the article published than co-authors have, we examined whether the probabil-
ities of reporting errors were higher when the first author was responsible for 
the analyses than when the first author was not responsible for the analyses. All 
confirmatory hypotheses were pre-registered on the Open Science Framework 
and can be accessed through https://osf.io/8n7mj/ along with all data and scripts 
used in this study. 
We also exploratively examined two additional factors that are potentially re-
lated with the probability that reporting errors occur. These two factors are relat-
ed to diffusion of responsibility (Wallach, Kogan, & Bem, 1964) and the potential 
for ‘social loafing’ (Karau & Williams, 1993; Latane, Williams, & Harkins, 1979), 
in which the mere presence of many others and the expectation that others will 
bear certain responsibilities might lower individual’s diligence. In the present con-
text, having too many people responsible for the statistical analyses or having a 
very large number of authors on the article may increase the probability of mak-
ing errors in the reporting of statistical results. In these explorative analyses, we 
therefore examined the associations between the probabilities of statistical re-
porting errors and the number of authors responsible for the statistical analyses 
and between the probabilities of statistical reporting errors and the number of 
authors on the article. 
METHOD
Articles published in journals of the Public Library of Science (PLOS) are Open 
Access and provide an overview of author contributions in a standard format, 
including which authors conducted the analyses of a given article. Therefore, the 
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full collection of articles published in PLOS journals provides an excellent large-
scale database to study the relation between co-piloting of the analyses and re-
porting errors. To this end, we first downloaded all available meta-data of all ar-
ticles ever published in the journals of PLOS until 31 December 2016 using the R 
package ‘rplos’ (v0.6.4; Chamberlain, Boettiger, & Ram, 2015)). The full script is 
available through https://osf.io/hq43m/. From the obtained metadata we extract-
ed for each article how many authors were responsible for the statistical analyses, 
whether the first author was among those being responsible for the analyses, and 
how many authors were listed. We also retrieved data on declarations of compet-
ing interests to study whether the presence of a competing interest increased the 
probability of gross errors due to confirmation bias. However, as it proved infeasi-
ble to automatically determine whether a competing interest had been declared 
due to the unlimited number of ways in which authors could declare the absence 
or presence of a competing interest, we did not pursue this in the current study 
(thereby deviating somewhat from our pre-registration). Second, we downloaded 
the full texts of all articles that had the tag ‘psychology’, and employed statcheck 
(v1.2.2; Epskamp & Nuijten, 2015) to retrieve and check the reported statistical 
results in these psychology articles.
From the downloaded meta-data of all articles published in PLOS journals and 
from the statcheck results based on the downloaded full texts of the psychology 
articles, we created four data files. The first file (‘all meta’) contains for each article 
published in all PLOS journals how many authors were responsible for the statisti-
cal analyses, whether the first author was among those being responsible for the 
analyses, how many authors were listed, whether a conflict of interest had been 
declared, the number of statistical results that had been retrieved by statcheck (if 
any), the number of statistical results flagged by statcheck as constituting a (gross) 
error (if any results had been retrieved), and whether statcheck flagged at least 
one statistical result as a (gross) error (if any results had been retrieved). This file 
(which also contains additional meta-data that are not used in the current study) 
can be found through https://osf.io/7tsxf/. The second file (‘psych meta’) contains 
a subset of the data in the first file: the meta-data for PLOS psychology articles 
only. This file can be found through https://osf.io/p9jm6/. The first and second file 
have as many cases (or rows) as articles. The third file (‘all statcheck’) contains the 
same meta data of all articles as the first file, but also includes all statistical results 
retrieved from each article by statcheck and accompanying data on whether the 
result was flagged as constituting a (gross) error. This file can be found through 
https://osf.io/wm6f3/. Finally, the fourth file (‘psych statcheck’) contains a subset 
of the data in the third file: the same data but then for PLOS psychology articles 
only. This file can be found through https://osf.io/u279t/. The third and fourth file 
have as many cases (or rows) as statistical results in all articles combined.
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ANALYSIS PLAN
Our pre-specified analysis plan was pre-registered (see https://osf.io/8n7mj/). As 
pre-registered, we only included psychology articles published in PLOS ONE in 
our confirmatory analyses because over 90% of the psychology articles published 
in PLOS journals is published in PLOS ONE. Since we included all psychology pa-
pers ever published in PLOS ONE and thereby examined the whole population of 
(retrievable) statistical results ever reported in all psychology articles published 
in PLOS ONE, statistical testing (based on sampling) is superfluous in our study. 
Because of the use a population and lack or sampling, the error probabilities cal-
culated by our models cannot be generalized to other journals or other scientific 
fields. Missing values in our study only occurred in the form of any of the relevant 
meta-data being unavailable for articles or no statistical results being retrieved 
from an article, or a combination of both. As pre-registered, when this occurred, 
the missing data points were excluded from the analyses based on pairwise de-
letion. Finally, although we overlooked this issue while pre-registering our study, 
we decided to delete (the same) three articles from all four data files: Bakker & 
Wicherts, 2014; Veldkamp at al., 2014; Wicherts et al., 2011. These were articles 
about statistical reporting errors, which deliberately listed examples of such er-
rors. Leaving these articles in the data set would thus inadvertently have biased 
the calculations of the probabilities that reporting errors occur. We did not ex-
clude any other data points as no obvious errors occurred during the extraction of 
the data (which was our pre-specified criterion for data exclusion). All scripts used 
to clean and analyze the data can be found through https://osf.io/pxdtv/.
RESULTS
Shared responsibility for statistical analyses in PLOS 
articles
Table 4.1 displays for each PLOS journal the number of articles, the number of 
authors per article, the number of authors responsible for the analyses per article, 
the percentage of articles that were co-piloted (i.e., where more than one author 
was responsible for the analyses), and the percentage of articles where the first 
author was responsible for the analyses.
Number of articles
In total, we obtained meta data of 187,163 articles. Out of these articles, 164,150 
(87.7%) were published in PLOS ONE. Of the articles published in PLOS ONE, 
14,946 (9.1%) had the tag 'psychology'. We verified that across all journals the 
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vast majority of articles with the tag 'psychology was published in PLOS ONE 
(93.6%), justifying our pre-registered decision to solely focus on psychology arti-
cles published in PLOS ONE.
Number of authors per article
Across all fields and journals, the mean number of authors per article was 7.0 (SD 
= 4.9). In PLOS ONE, the mean number of authors per article was 6.9 (SD = 4.2). 
In psychology articles published in PLOS ONE, the mean number of authors was 
5.3 (SD = 3.4).
Number of authors responsible for the analyses
Across all PLOS journals, the mean number of authors responsible for the analyses 
per article was 3.5 (SD = 2.2). In articles published in PLOS ONE, the mean number 
of authors responsible for the analyses was 3.4 (SD = 2.2). In psychology articles 
published in PLOS ONE, the mean number of authors responsible for the analyses 
was again somewhat lower, namely 2.7 (SD = 1.7).
Co-piloting
We considered an article 'co-piloted' when more than one author was responsible 
for the analyses. Across all journals, the percentage of articles that were co-pilot-
ed was 85.8%. In PLOS ONE, the percentage of articles that were co-piloted was 
85.6%. The percentage of psychology articles in PLOS ONE that were co-piloted 
was 76.4%. The way we measured co-piloting in the current study yielded a per-
centage that was more than twice as high than the percentage yielded by the way 
we measured co-piloting in our previous work  (39.7%; Veldkamp et al., 2014). 
There, we used a survey in which we asked first authors of the published articles 
included in our study to indicate how many people had been involved in the first 
or only study reported in their article. In the current study, we used the publicly 
available author contribution sections of the published articles included in our 
study and were not able to distinguish between the first study and other studies 
reported in the article.
The first author being responsible for the analyses
We also examined the percentage of articles in which the first author was respon-
sible for the analyses. Across all PLOS journals, the first author was among those 
listed as responsible for the analyses in the vast majority of articles: in 91.21%. 
In PLOS ONE, the first author was responsible for the analyses in 90.80% of the 
articles, and in PLOS ONE psychology articles, this was 92.38%. 
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Table 4.1 Relevant author contributions in PLOS articles.
Journal No. of 
articles
Mean no. of 
authors (SD)






% of articles with 
1st author respon-
sible for analyses
PLOS Biol. 2,275 7.4 (7.6) 4 (2.6) 87.11 98.22
PLOS Comput. Biol. 4,404 4.4 (2.8) 2.6 (1.6) 75.14 94.43
PLOS Genet. 5,874 9.7 (13.1) 4.4 (3.1) 92.26 96.34
PLOS Med. 1,288 10.2 (9.9) 3.7 (3.4) 84.43 88.94
PLOS Neglected Trop. D. 4,230 8.6 (4.3) 3.9 (2.5) 89.31 93.79
PLOS Pathog. 4,942 8.5 (5.3) 4.7 (2.9) 93.47 96.45
PLOS ONE 164,150 6.9 (4.2) 3.4 (2.2) 85.55 90.80
PLOS ONE psych. articles 14,946 5.3 (3.4) 2.7 (1.7) 76.44 92.38
Total 187,163 7 (4.9) 3.5 (2.2) 85.76 91.21
Errors in statistical results reported in psychology 
articles published in PLOS ONE
Numbers of statistical results retrieved by statcheck
Statcheck retrieved statistical results from 4,178 (28%) of the psychology articles 
published in PLOS ONE, yielding a total of 48,496 statistical results. Across these 
psychology articles, the mean number of statistical results retrieved per article 
was 11.61 (SD = 12.60), and the median number of retrieved results was 7. The 
mean and median retrieved numbers of results are somewhat lower than in most 
major psychology journals, but in line with those found in flagship journals such 
as the Journal of Applied Psychology, Psychological Science, and the Journal of 
Consulting and Clinical Psychology (Nuijten et al., 2016; Veldkamp et al., 2014).
The probability that a psychology article in PLOS ONE contained at 
least one (gross) error.
The probability that a psychology article published in PLOS ONE contained at least 
one error was 40.57%, and the probability that a psychology article published in 
PLOS ONE contained at least one gross error was 9.77%. These results align with 
earlier results documented for the psychology journals Journal of Applied Psychol-
ogy, Psychological Science, and the Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 
where the mean and median numbers of statistical results per article were similar 
to those in PLOS ONE (Bakker & Wicherts, 2011; Nuijten et al., 2016; Veldkamp et 
al., 2014). As the probability that an article contains at least one (gross) error is 
higher in journals with higher numbers of retrieved results per article, comparison 
of our results at the article level with results at the article level in journals with a 
different number of retrieved results is cumbersome.
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The probability that a statistical result reported in a psychology article 
in PLOS constituted a (gross) error
At the level of the statistical results, there are three methods to calculate the prob-
ability that a statistical result reported in a psychology article in PLOS ONE consti-
tutes a (gross) error. First, the simplest model (M1) simply calculates the probabil-
ity as the total number of errors divided by the total number of statistical results. 
The problem with M1 is that it does not take into account the nested structure of 
the data. The second method (M2) calculates the probability by dividing for each 
article the number of errors by the number of reported statistical results, and then 
takes the mean value across the articles. The problem with M2 is that it weighs all 
articles equally, even though some articles may contain many more results than 
others. The third method (M3) calculates the probability by fitting a multilevel lo-
gistic regression null model to the data. Because transforming the fixed intercept 
of the logistic model to a probability does not correspond to the model’s implied a 
probability when the variance of the random effect (i.e. of the article) exceeds zero 
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002), we integrated out the random effect to calculate the 
probability of an error. The problems with M3 are that its assumption of a normally 
distributed random effect may be violated, and recent simulation results highlight-
ed that its estimation may not work well if both the probability of an error and 
the sample size at the article level are very small (Nuijten, 2017). To conclude, the 
probability of an error can be calculated with three different methods that are all 
meaningful and problematic at the same time, and may provide diverging results. 
We therefore report the results of all three methods, even though in our pre-regis-
tration (predating Nuijten, 2017), we only foresaw the use of M3.
The probabilities that a statistical result reported in a psychology article in 
PLOS ONE constituted an error as calculated by M1, M2, and M3, were 11.48%, 
11.02%, and 11.09%, respectively. These probabilities are quite close to those 
found in the major psychology journals (9.7% according to M1 and 10.6% accord-
ing to M2 (Nuijten et al., 2016)). The probabilities that a statistical result consti-
tuted a gross error as calculated by M1, M2, and M3 were 1.48%, 1.56%, and 
5.16%, respectively. The probabilities as computed by M1 and M2 are again close 
to the probabilities in flagship psychology journals  (1.4% and 1.6% respectively; 
Nuijten et al., 2016). The probability as computed by M3 cannot be compared to 
estimates in the literature as M3 was not used in previous research (other than 
in Chapter 3 of this dissertation). Because of the large differences in probabilities 
yielded by M1 and M2 on the one hand, and M3 on the other hand, the implausi-
ble implication of M3’s probability that almost half of the errors are gross errors, 
and problems with fitting the multilevel logistic regression model to similar data 
on gross errors as ours (Nuijten, 2017), we have more faith in the probabilities of 
gross errors found by M1 and M2.
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Associations between the probability of errors and 
author contributions
For clarity, we will first present our results at the level of the articles, followed by 
the results at the level of individual statistical results. To compute the probabilities 
of error in relation to author contributions at the level of the article, we fitted 
logistic regression models with the article containing at least one (gross) error 
(yes/no) as the dependent variable, and the type of author contribution variable 
(co-piloting / the first author being responsible for the analyses / the number of 
authors on the paper / the number of authors responsible for the analyses) as 
predictor. Subsequently, we converted the intercepts from the models to proba-
bilities. To compute the probabilities at the level of the statistical results, we fitted 
multilevel logistic regression models with the article as random factor and the 
type of author contribution variable as fixed factor. Here, we integrated out the 
random effects from the models to calculate the probabilities of an error in the 
reported statistical result. 
As explained in the section ‘analysis plan’, we refrained from statistical test-
ing. However, for the sake of completeness and to align with our pre-registration, 
we provided results for tests of relevant differences in notes below the tables 
summarizing the results at the level of the article (Table 4.2) and at the level of 
the statistical result (Table 4.3). 
Associations between the probability of errors and 
author contributions at the level of the article
The probability that an article contained at least one (gross) error and 
co-piloting (primary hypothesis). 
Contrary to our hypotheses, the probability that an article contained at least one 
error was higher when co-piloting occurred (40.48%) than when co-piloting did 
not occur (37.11%). The same held for gross errors: the probability that an article 
contained at least one gross error was (marginally) higher when co-piloting oc-
curred (9.70%) than when co-piloting did not occur (9.30%).
The probability that an article contained at least one gross error 
and the first author being responsible for the analyses (secondary 
hypothesis)
In line with our hypothesis, the probability that an article contained at least one 
gross error was slightly higher when the first author was responsible for the anal-
yses (9.65%) than when the first author was not responsible for the analyses 
(8.21%).
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Table 4.2 Probabilities that an article contained at least one (gross) error and author contributions.






No. of articles with at 
least one (gross) error
error Not co-piloted 37.11i 1,032 383
Co-piloted 40.48 2,722 1,102
gross error Not co-piloted 9.30ii 1,032 96
Co-piloted 9.70 2,722 264
gross error 1st author not responsible 8.21iii 207 17
1st author responsible 9.65 3,556 343
Note: i Wald Z = 1.89, p = .059; ii Wald Z = .37, p = 0.713; iii Wald Z = 0.68, p = .496.
The probability that an article contained at least one (gross) error and 
diffusion of responsibility (exploratory hypotheses)
We also examined the potential role of diffusion of responsibility by looking at the 
association of the probability that an article contained at least one (gross) error 
with both the number of authors on an article and the number of authors being 
responsible for the analyses. As can be seen in Figure 4.1, we found no evidence 
Note: The size of the dots represents the number of articles used to compute the probability. 
Figure 4.1 Probabilities that an article contained at least one (gross) error in relation to the 
number of authors and the number of authors responsible for the analyses.
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for these relationships. Please note that we cut the number of authors off at > 9, 
as the number of articles in which more than 9 authors were listed and/or respon-
sible for the analyses strongly dropped to no more than a few observations.
Associations between the probability of errors and 
author contributions at the level of the statistical result
The probability that a statistical result constituted a (gross) error and 
co-piloting (primary hypothesis)
Contrary to our hypotheses, the probability that a result constituted an error was 
slightly higher when co-piloting occurred (11.87%, 11.36%, and 11.52% according 
to methods M1, M2, and M3 respectively) than when co-piloting did not occur 
(11.11%, 9.42%, and 9.66%). We found mixed results with respect to the hypoth-
esis that the probability that a result constituted a gross error would be lower 
when co-piloting occurred than when co-piloting did not occur: according to M1 
and M2, the probability that a result constituted a gross error was lower when 
co-piloting occurred (1.39% and 1.43% respectively) than when co-piloting did 
not occur (1.82% and 1.82%). However, according to M3, the probability that a 
result constituted a gross error was marginally higher when co-piloting occurred 
(5.29%) than when co-piloting did not occur (5.22%). Yet, as explained above, 
model M3 suffers from problems (Nuijten, 2017) that lead us to focus on the re-
sults based on models M1 and M2.
The probability that a statistical result constituted a gross error and the 
first author being responsible for the analyses (secondary hypothesis)
Contrary to our hypotheses, the probability that a result constituted a gross error 
was lower when the first author was responsible for the analyses (1.45%, 1.51%, 
and 5.25% according to methods M1, M2, and M3 respectively) than when the 
first author was not responsible for the analyses (2.80%, 1.92%, and 5.64%).
The probability that a statistical result constituted a gross error and 
diffusion of responsibility (exploratory hypotheses)
We also examined the potential role of diffusion of responsibility by looking at the 
association of the probability that a statistical result constituted a gross error with 
both the number of authors on an article and the number of authors responsible 
for the analyses. As can be seen in Figure 4.2, there was no strong evidence for 
these relationships. We again cut the number of authors off at > 9, as there were 
only few articles in which more than 9 authors were listed and/or responsible for 
the analyses.
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Table 4.3 Probabilities that a statistical result constitutes a (gross) error and author contributions.

















No. of results 
constituting 
a (gross) error
error Not co-piloted 11.11 9.42 9.66i 2.89 11,952 1,328
Co-piloted 11.87 11.36 11.52 2.89 31,078 3,688
gross error Not co-piloted 1.82 1.82 5.22ii 22.62 11,952 217
Co-piloted 1.39 1.43 5.29 22.62 31,078 433
gross error 1st author not 
responsible
2.80 1.92 5.64iii 22.65 1,819 51
1st author 
responsible
1.45 1.51 5.25 22.65 41,263 599
Note: i: Wald Z = 2.9, p = .004; ii: Wald Z = 0.14, p = .885; iii: Wald Z = -0.36, p = .72.
Note: The size of the dots represents the number of statistical results used to compute the probability. 
Although an increasing number of authors responsible for the analyses was statistically significantly asso-
ciated with a higher probability that a statistical result constituted an error (Wald Z = 2.65, p = 0.008), this 
result is strongly influenced by the small number of articles in which 8 or 9 authors were responsible for the 
analyses. These yielded a total of only 69 and 75 statistical results respectively, compared to 1500 - 11925 
results yielded by articles with 1 to 5 authors responsible, 627 results yielded by articles with 6 authors 
responsible, and 254 results yielded by articles with 7 authors responsible. 
Figure 4.2 Probabilities that a statistical results constituted a (gross) error in relation to the 
number of authors and the number of authors responsible for the analyses.
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DISCUSSION
We replicated error rates reported in earlier studies on statistical reporting errors 
in psychology (Bakker & Wicherts, 2011; Bakker & Wicherts, 2014a; Caperos & 
Pardo, 2013; Nuijten et al., 2016; Veldkamp et al., 2014; Wicherts et al., 2011) and 
medical fields (Berle & Starcevic, 2007; Garcia-Berthou & Alcaraz, 2004) in the full 
population of psychology articles published in PLOS ONE between 2003 and 2016. 
Just as in other psychology journals, the error rates in PLOS ONE psychology articles 
were alarmingly high: more than four out of then articles contained an error, and 
about one in ten articles contained an error that could have affected conclusions 
about statistical significance. These and previous findings suggest that the accuracy 
of results reported in the psychological literature cannot be taken for granted. How-
ever, we have no reason to assume that these error rates are unique to psychology. 
To date, the only other fields where the prevalence of reporting errors has been 
studied have been psychiatry (Berle & Starcevic, 2007) and medicine (Garcia-Ber-
thou & Alcaraz, 2004), where the numbers were similar (albeit somewhat lower at 
the article level) to those in psychology. Studies of reporting errors in other scientif-
ic disciplines are therefore warranted. Currently, the software we used to automat-
ically retrieve and re-compute statistical results, ‘statcheck’ (Epskamp & Nuijten, 
2015), is undergoing developments that will allow its use in articles where results 
are reported according to reporting standards other than those of the American 
Psychological Association (American Psychological Association, 2010).
We found that co-piloting (here defined as declared shared responsibility for 
the statistical analyses) was ubiquitous in each of the PLOS journals, ranging from 
over 75% in PLOS Computational Biology to over 93% in PLOS Pathogens. In around 
90% of the psychology articles in PLOS ONE, multiple authors had declared responsi-
bility for the analyses. This result deviates from the earlier survey results (Veldkamp 
et al., 2014), where in only 39.7% of psychology articles multiple authors had been 
involved in the analyses of the data concerning the first or only study in the article. 
We have not verified the author contributions via a survey or other means and 
we are not aware of any systematic study of the validity of author contribution state-
ments among psychologists. In the medical literature however, concerns have been 
raised about the validity of the contribution disclosure forms (Bates, Anić, Marušić, 
& Marušić, 2004; Ilakovac, Fister, Marusic, & Marusic, 2007; Marušić, Bates, Anić, & 
Marušić, 2006). Hence it remains unclear why the percentages of co-pilot practices 
in the current study based on author contribution statements were so different than 
the percentages found in Veldkamp et al.’s (2014) survey. In the current study, we 
used the number of authors responsible for all analyses in the articles as a mea-
sure of co-piloting, while in our previous study (Veldkamp et al., 2014) we used the 
number of authors responsible for the first or only study reported in the article as 
Reporting errors and co-piloting II      75 
a measure of co-piloting. Our current strategy allowed us to examine many more 
articles than our previous strategy (14,946 versus 346), but had the disadvantage 
that measuring the number of authors responsible for all analyses reported in a 
complete article does not tell us how many authors were responsible for each of 
the analyses of each of the individual studies within one article. That is, co-piloting 
as measured with author contribution statements does not exclude the possibility 
that some analyses in a paper were not checked by more than one author. Given the 
high prevalence of reporting errors, it is clear that more research into the precise 
(best and worst) practices in analyzing and checking of results is warranted. 
We failed to find support for the notion that co-piloting reduced the proba-
bility of errors in the reporting of statistical results. Any differences between error 
probabilities in articles that were co-piloted and articles that were not co-piloted 
were marginal, and smaller than the differences in error probabilities that have 
been found between psychology journals (Bakker & Wicherts, 2011; Nuijten et 
al., 2016; Veldkamp et al., 2014). The marginal differences in combination with 
the inconsistent patterns rendered interpretation of these findings difficult. One 
interpretation of our results is, as previously alluded to, that many articles where 
more authors were responsible for the analyses did in fact not involve co-piloting, 
but rather having different authors bearing responsibility for different (types of) 
analyses in the article. However, when assuming that part of these articles actu-
ally did use co-piloting, we still would have found somewhat lower probabilities 
of (gross) errors if co-piloting had an effect. Another possible explanation of our 
findings may be that co-piloting does lower the probability of errors, but that this 
effect is outweighed by an opposite effect of diffusion of responsibility. That is, 
when sharing responsibility for the analyses, checking may occur in a less vigilant 
manner, resulting in multiple authors detecting as many errors as a single author 
who is fully responsible for all analyses. This alternative explanation is in line with 
our exploratory analyses examining potential effects of diffusion of responsibility, 
which yielded no support for the notion that an increasing number of authors or 
an increasing number of authors responsible for the analyses was associated with 
reduced probabilities of errors in reported statistical results.  
We did not find consistent support for a higher probability of (gross) errors in 
papers where the first author was responsible for the analyses. The inconsistent 
patterns and the marginal differences again rendered interpretations of these 
findings difficult. However, here too one may reason that opposite forces can-
celled out potential effects. On the one hand, there may be an adverse effect of 
confirmation bias affecting analyses by first authors more strongly than analyses 
by co-authors, leading to relatively more errors when the first author conducted 
the analyses. Yet on the other hand, first authors may have felt more responsi-
ble for the article and therefore also for accuracy of the reported results, leading 
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them to verify and double check the results reported in the article when analyzing 
the data themselves. Given that we currently know very little about why errors or 
gross errors occur (notwithstanding surveys identifying misreporting as a ques-
tionable and possibly deliberate practice in the pursuit of significance; John et al., 
2012; Agnoli et al., 2017), it remains difficult to interpret the (lack) of association 
between first author responsibility and reporting errors. 
Reasons for our inability to find support for relationships between statisti-
cal reporting errors and shared responsibility for the statistical analyses may be 
sought also in the manner in which we defined the concept ‘statistical reporting 
errors’. An inconsistency between a test statistic, its degrees of freedom, and its 
p-value may decrease trust in the article in which it is reported (and might affect 
meta-analyses and meta-research using the reported results), but is unlikely to 
reflect an error in the statistical analysis that yielded the result. Serious method-
ological and analytical flaws such as major violations of underlying assumptions 
or exploitation of degrees of freedom in the analyses in the quest for significance 
might not show up as inconsistencies in the reported results, while such flaws 
might still be countered by co-piloting. Having two instead of one expert involved 
in processes that are prone to human error has been found to help reduce the risk 
of error (Beaty, 2004; Lindvall et al., 2004; Reason, 1990; Wiegman & Shappell, 
2003) and might well lower the risk of biased analytic results. In statistical analysis, 
this would translate to at least two authors openly discussing the analytical strat-
egy to be taken, conducting the analyses collaboratively, and/or independently 
conducting the analyses while (cross-) checking the results. For this to work, the 
data file(s) need to be appropriately documented, analysis scripts need to be clear 
and properly annotated, and data files need to be shared between authors. This, 
in turn, will increase transparency, accountability, and the ease with which other 
researchers can verify the results reported in an article. 
The use of NHST involves many, often arbitrary decisions that its users 
need to make (Bakker et al., 2012; Bakker & Wicherts, 2014a; John et al., 2012; 
Kriegeskorte, Simmons, Bellgowan, & Baker, 2009; Nieuwenhuis, Forstmann, & 
Wagenmakers, 2011; Simmons et al., 2011; Simonsohn et al., 2014a; Steegen, 
Tuerlinckx, Gelman, & Vanpaemel, 2016; van Aert et al., 2016; Wagenmakers et 
al., 2011; Wicherts et al., 2016). Making as many of those decisions before the 
analyses are conducted or even before the study takes place forces authors to 
think through all potential pitfalls in the design and the analyses and to collab-
oratively formulate an analysis plan. When fully documented a priori, this strat-
egy is known as study pre-registration (Chambers, 2013; de Groot, 1956/2014; 
Wagenmakers et al., 2012). Pre-registration may help reduce methodological and 
analytical error through fostering open discourse among co-authors. In an ideal 
pre-registration, the analysis script is also written (and ideally checked on a mock 
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data set) prior to the execution of the analyses. Pre-registration can be challeng-
ing, and not all issues in a study can be foreseen, as for instance evidenced in 
our own pre-registration of the current study, where we did not anticipate the 
difficulty of retrieving data on competing interests and overlooked the need to 
remove our own articles about reporting errors from our data set. However, as 
long as all deviations from a pre-registration are transparently reported, the value 
of pre-registration remains high. User-friendly platforms such as the Open Science 
Framework (https://osf.io/) offer authors different versions of pre-registration, 
and a secure environment in which to manage research projects, safely archive all 
research files, and share files with co-authors, collaborators, or other researchers. 
The type of well-organized project management that these platforms offer, in-
creases accountability and transparency and may thereby increase the likelihood 
of detection of methodological and statistical errors. 
Returning to statistical reporting errors as examined in this study, we still con-
sider finding ways to reduce these errors of utmost importance. Editors, reviewers, 
and readers of scientific articles need to be able to trust that the reported results 
are accurate. The human eye easily oversees errors and gross errors; even if all au-
thors of a paper checked all results in their article, these errors may go unnoticed. 
Rather than requiring two or more authors to scan the results for inconsistencies, 
it may therefore be more effective and efficient to leave this scanning to computer 
programs such as statcheck. Any author can download this easy to use package, 
which comes with a clear manual, or use the website statcheck.io to readily check 
articles prior to submitting the article. In addition, journals can employ statcheck as 
part of the submission or peer review process. Statcheck is currently implemented 
as part of the peer review process by journals including Psychological Science and 
PsychOpen, and will soon be adopted by other journals, including PLOS ONE. An-
other way to reduce human error in reporting of statistical results is to compose 
manuscripts using programs in which scripts can be written that automatically in-
sert all statistical results into a text file. An example of such a program is ‘R Mark-
down’ (http://rmarkdown.rstudio.com/), which is part of the open source software 
‘R’. In R Markdown, authors write their complete manuscript text, or only the text 
of the results section of their manuscript, within the R environment. Instead of 
manually inserting individual results after viewing analysis output, authors insert 
the R code producing their results directly into the sentences reporting the results. 
For example, rather than writing ‘p = .123’, authors write ‘p = `r test_1$p.value`’. 
After writing a section like this, authors click a button that generates a Word file or 
pdf file containing the text with results corresponding to the inserted R code. This 
way, errors in retrieving and copying the right numbers from analysis output are 
avoided and results sections can be easily checked by co-authors.
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To examine the effectiveness of the potentially error reducing strategies such 
as listed above, we suggest three possibly fruitful avenues for future research. 
First, we recommend comparisons of error rates in articles where statcheck was 
used during the peer review process with error rates in articles where statcheck 
was not used. The Tilburg University meta-research group is currently in the early 
phase of conducting such a study in collaboration with PLOS for psychology arti-
cles submitted to PLOS ONE. Second, studies in which error rates in articles pub-
lished by researchers who pre-registered their study, or who rigorously managed 
their data and documented their analyses well on the Open Science Framework 
may be compared to error rates in articles published by researchers who failed 
to do this. Finally, error rates in articles that were composed using R Markdown 
may be compared to error rates in articles that were composed without the use 
of R Markdown. Preferably, such meta-research should employ randomization 
of articles or studies to different treatment conditions to preclude the possible 
alternative explanation that researchers who chose to use statcheck, pre-regis-
tration, rigorous management of data and analyses syntaxes, or R-markdown are 
also those researchers who tend to make less (or more) reporting errors, and to 
determine the actual effects of these best practices.
As in our earlier study (Chapter 3), we failed to find a clear relationship between 
co-piloting and statistical reporting errors. Despite the alarmingly high error rates, 
it remains unclear how psychologists currently analyze their data and which best 
practices may help in diminishing errors. We did however identify several potential 
best practices that may contribute to the reduction of both errors and biases in 
psychological research, including use of statcheck, pre-registration, well organized 
project management, rigorous data documentation and archiving, and use of pro-
grams that automatically insert all statistical results into a text file. These practices, 
especially when combined, would result in science with high levels of transparency 
and accountability. This way, co-piloting would entail creating a methodologically 
rigorous workflow wherein co-authors first agree on a pre-specified analysis plan 
or analysis script. The complete research process would be pre-registered, and all 
materials, data, and scripts would be shared among co-authors on a research proj-
ect management platform. After data collection and analysis, at least two of the 
authors would independently run the analysis scripts (preferably using a program 
like R Markdown), and verify the results reported in the draft manuscript. Subse-
quently, statcheck would be run to check the consistency of the reported results. Fi-
nally, before or after submission of the manuscript, all well-documented materials, 
data, and scripts would be made public in such a way that others (peer reviewers or 
readers of the article) can readily and independently reanalyze the data and verify 
reported results. When data sharing is infeasible for ethical reasons, the data can 
be made shared in different ways to allow verification (Wicherts & Bakker, 2012). 
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Degrees of freedom in planning, 
running, analyzing, and reporting 
psychological studies: a checklist to 
avoid p-hacking
This chapter is published as Wicherts, J. M., Veldkamp, C. L. S., Augusteijn, H. E. M., Bakker, M., 
van Aert, R. C. M., & van Assen, M. A. L. M. (2016). Degrees of Freedom in Planning, Running, 




The designing, collecting, analyzing, and reporting of psychological studies entail 
many choices that are often arbitrary. The opportunistic use of these so-called 
researcher degrees of freedom aimed at obtaining statistically significant results 
is problematic because it enhances the chances of false positive results and may 
inflate effect size estimates. In this chapter, we present an extensive list of 34 
degrees of freedom that researchers have in formulating hypotheses, and in de-
signing, running, analyzing, and reporting of psychological research. The list can 
be used in research methods education, and as a checklist to assess the quality of 
preregistrations and to determine the potential for bias due to (arbitrary) choices 
in unregistered studies.
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From the inception of the first study idea to the final publication, psychological 
studies involve numerous choices that are often arbitrary from a substantive or 
methodological point of view. These choices could affect the outcome of signif-
icance tests applied to the data, and hence the conclusions drawn from the re-
search. These choices are also called researcher degrees of freedom (Simmons 
et al., 2011) in formulating hypotheses, and designing, running, analyzing, and 
reporting of psychological studies, and they have received considerable recent 
interest for two main reasons. First, researchers’ opportunistic use of them great-
ly increases the chances of finding a false positive result (DeCoster et al., 2015; 
Ioannidis, 2005b; Simmons et al., 2011), or a Type I error in the language of Ney-
man-Pearson’s variant of null hypothesis significance testing (NHST). Second, their 
strategic use in research may inflate effect sizes (Bakker et al., 2012; Ioannidis, 
2008; Simonsohn et al., 2014a; van Aert et al., 2016). Hence, researcher degrees 
of freedom play a central role in the creation of (published) research findings that 
are both hard to reproduce in a reanalysis of the same data and difficult to repli-
cate in independent samples (Asendorpf et al., 2013).
Among many potential solutions to counter inflated effects and elevated 
chances of finding false positive results caused by researcher degrees of freedom, 
one solution has received most attention: preregistration (Chambers, 2013; de 
Groot, 1956/2014; Wagenmakers et al., 2012). Preregistration requires the re-
searcher to stipulate in advance the research hypothesis, data collection plan, 
specific analyses, and what will be reported in the paper. Although “planned re-
search” more accurately describes this preregistered research, we will employ 
the commonly used term “confirmatory research” to describe it. An increasing 
number of journals now support preregistration for confirmatory research (e.g., 
Eich, 2014). In addition, over 35 journals now use a format of registered reports 
(Chambers, 2013) in which the registrations themselves are subject to peer re-
view and revisions before the data collection starts, and the report is accepted 
for publication regardless of the direction, strength, or statistical significance of 
the final results. For instance, this format is now used in the journals Cortex, Com-
prehensive Results in Social Psychology, and Perspectives on Psychological Science 
(for Registered Replication Reports). 
To disallow researchers to still use researcher degrees of freedom, it is crucial 
that preregistrations provide a specific, precise, and exhaustive plan of the study. 
That is, the ideal preregistration should provide a detailed description of all steps 
that will be taken from hypothesis to the final report (it should be specific). More-
over, each described step should allow only one interpretation or implementation 
(it should be precise). Finally, a preregistration should exclude the possibility that 
other steps may also be taken (it should be exhaustive). Hence, a preregistration 
specifies the project in such a way that all potential contingencies in formulating 
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hypotheses, and designing, running, analyzing, and reporting are covered. For 
instance, the syntax for the statistical analyses should preferably be created in 
advance to be run (once) on the collected data to yield the final statistical results. 
Our own experiences with preregistration taught us that this specification is no 
easy task and that maneuverability remains if preregistrations are not sufficiently 
specific, precise, or exhaustive. For instance, just indicating one’s use of a certain 
scale as the main outcome measure in an experiment typically does not preclude 
the researcher to attempt many different ways in how to score the items of the 
scale in his or her pursuit for statistical significance. A pre-registration should also 
be exhaustive because the stipulation that one will test Hypothesis A in a certain 
way does not preclude the possibility that one can also test Hypothesis B in the 
study. Therefore, for confirmatory aspects of the study, the word “only” is key 
(e.g., “we will only test Hypothesis A in the following manner”). 
The goal of this chapter is to present a list of researcher degrees of freedom 
that can be used in research methods education, as a checklist to assess the qual-
ity of preregistrations, and to determine the potential for bias due to (arbitrary) 
choices in unregistered studies. By pointing out many different researcher de-
grees of freedom, we hope to raise awareness of the risk of bias implicit in a lot 
of research designs in psychology and beyond. The list enables a charting of what 
Gelman and Loken (2014) dubbed the garden of forking paths in the analysis of 
data; i.e., the many different analytic decisions that could be or could have been 
made with a given data set. In what follows, we use the singular term researcher 
DF (degree of freedom) to mean a particular choice during the study, and the plu-
ral term researcher DFs when referring to multiple researcher degrees of freedom 
(or different types of choices).
Because NHST is by far the most used statistical framework used in psychol-
ogy and related fields, we created the list of researcher DFs with NHST in mind. 
Other possible statistical frameworks are based on confidence intervals (Cum-
ming, 2012), precision of effect size estimation (Maxwell et al., 2015), or Bayesian 
statistics (e.g., Kruschke, 2015). We note that most researcher DFs are relevant 
for all statistical frameworks. However, some researcher DFs need to be replaced 
or omitted (e.g. power analysis [D6], which is defined in the NHST framework) or 
added (e.g., selection of the prior, which is only used in Bayesian statistics) in ap-
proaches other than NHST. At this point, we therefore recommend using our list 
primarily for research using NHST.
We created the list in a qualitative manner; we as a group of methodologists 
studying researcher DFs, publication bias, meta-analysis, misreporting of results, 
and reporting biases, came up with a large list of researcher DFs, discussed these, 
and created a manageable list in several rounds of revision. We are aware that 
our list may not be exhaustive, but believe the list is a good starting point for a 
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Table 5.1 Degrees of freedom in formulating the hypotheses, designing the study, collecting 
the data, analyzing the data, and reporting of psychological studies
Code Related Type of Researcher Degree of Freedom
Hypothesizing
T1 R6 Conducting explorative research without any hypothesis
T2 Studying a vague hypothesis that fails to specify the direction of the effect
Design
D1 A8 Creating multiple manipulated independent variables and conditions
D2 A10 Measuring additional variables that can later be selected as covariates, indepen-
dent variables, mediators, or moderators
D3 A5 Measuring the same dependent variable in several alternative ways
D4 A7 Measuring additional constructs that could potentially act as primary outcomes
D5 A12 Measuring additional variables that enable later exclusion of participants from the 
analyses (e.g., awareness or manipulation checks)
D6 Failing to conduct a well-founded power analysis
D7 C4 Failing to specify the sampling plan and allowing for running (multiple) small studies
Data collection
C1 Failing to randomly assign participants to conditions
C2 Insufficient blinding of participants and/or experimenters
C3 Correcting, coding, or discarding data during data collection in a non-blinded manner
C4 D7 Determining the data collection stopping rule on the basis of desired results or 
intermediate significance testing
Data Analysis
A1 Choosing between different options of dealing with incomplete or missing data on 
ad hoc grounds
A2 Specifying pre-processing of data (e.g., cleaning, normalization, smoothing, motion 
correction) in an ad hoc manner
A3 Deciding how to deal with violations of statistical assumptions in an ad hoc manner
A4 Deciding on how to deal with outliers in an ad hoc manner
A5 D3 Selecting the dependent variable out of several alternative measures of the same 
construct
A6 Trying out different ways to score the chosen primary dependent variable
A7 D4 Selecting another construct as the primary outcome
A8 D1 Selecting independent variables out of a set of manipulated independent variables
A9 D1 Operationalizing manipulated independent variables in different ways (e.g., by 
discarding or combining levels of factors)
A10 D2 Choosing to include different measured variables as covariates, independent vari-
ables, mediators, or moderators
A11 Operationalizing non-manipulated independent variables in different ways
A12 D5 Using alternative inclusion and exclusion criteria for selecting participants in analyses
A13 Choosing between different statistical models
A14 Choosing the estimation method, software package, and computation of SEs
A15 Choosing inference criteria (e.g., Bayes factors, alpha level, sidedness of the test, 
corrections for multiple testing)
Reporting
R6 T1 Presenting exploratory analyses as confirmatory (HARKing)
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checklist that serves the purpose to assess the degree to which preregistrations 
truly protect against the biasing effects of researcher DFs. Most of the researcher 
DFs have been described in previous publications (Bakker et al., 2012; Bakker & 
Wicherts, 2014b; Chambers, 2013; Francis, 2013; John et al., 2012; Kriegeskorte 
et al., 2009; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2011; Simmons et al., 2011; Simonsohn et al., 
2014a; Steegen et al., 2016; van Aert et al., 2016; Wagenmakers et al., 2011). 
The researcher DFs on our list are invariably inspired by actual research we have 
encountered as researchers, replicators, re-analyzers, and critical readers of pub-
lished and unpublished works. Although we have actual examples of the use of 
each of the researcher DFs we discuss below, we choose not to identify the re-
searchers, projects, or papers involved; the issues are general and it would not 
help to focus on individual cases. 
We discuss the different researcher DFs categorized under headers that refer 
to different phases in a study from its early theoretical underpinnings to its final 
publication (hypothesizing, designing, data collection, analyzing, and reporting), 
and indicate links between different researcher DFs at the different phases. Each 
researcher DF will be coded according to its phase. All researcher DFs are listed 
in Table 5.1. We focus on experiments as the most basic design used to study 
the (causal) effect(s) of independent variable(s) on the dependent variable(s). 
This design is the most widely used in psychology and entails a good archetype 
to discuss the many researcher DFs in a multitude of research designs, including 
quasi-experimental studies and correlational studies aimed to explain dependent 
variables on the basis of one or more predictor variable(s). 
HYPOTHESIZING PHASE
The degree to which the researcher can find relevant statistically significant re-
sults in the data is already partly determined by the specificity of theoretical pre-
dictions that the study aims to address. A confirmatory study requires a clearly 
stated hypothesis to be tested, while more exploratory studies aimed at finding 
interesting (typically statistically significant) patterns in the data often lack a priori 
theorizing on (causal) relations. Such exploratory studies are virtually guaranteed 
to yield support for something interesting (Wagenmakers et al., 2011). Since most 
results in psychology are presented in the realm of the hypothetico-deductive 
model (Hubbard, 2015), it is tempting to present exploratory findings incorrect-
ly as having been hypothesized in advance. This practice, to which we return 
when discussing the reporting phase, is also called Hypothesizing After Results 
are Known or HARKing (Kerr, 1998). The relevant researcher DF during the the-
orizing phase, namely T1: conducting explorative research pervades many of the 
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researcher DFs that we describe below in the later phases of the study. HARKing 
yields statistical evidence for found patterns that is often much weaker than it 
appears to be. The reason is that the evidence should be seen in the context 
of the size and breadth of the explorations, allowing for appropriate corrections 
for multiple testing. Unfortunately, data explorations are often presented without 
such necessary corrections. T1 could be dealt with by specifying the independent 
variable and the dependent variable of interest before running the study, prefera-
bly in a preregistration of the study (Wagenmakers et al., 2012). Note that even a 
preregistered (confirmatory) study can include some exploratory analyses, which 
is unproblematic as long as these explorations are clearly distinguished from the 
confirmatory analyses.
However, even if there is a vague prior notion about the relation between 
the independent and dependent variables, hypotheses that fail to indicate the 
direction of an effect (or relation) enable later flexibility in the analysis and inter-
pretation of results (Schaller, 2016). If the hypothesis is merely “X is related to Y” 
or “X affects Y”, the researcher can later analyze the data in two alternative ways; 
one way to obtain a positive effect and another way to obtain a negative effect of 
X on Y, which entails a strategy that is a special case of HARKing. The researcher 
DF is T2: studying a vague hypothesis that fails to specify the direction of the ef-
fect. Note that specifying the direction of the hypothesized effect is relevant for 
the decision to use a one- or two-tailed test. One-tailed tests can only be used to 
reject the null hypothesis when the a priori hypothesis was directional and the 
result was in the predicted direction. Testing hypotheses requires specificity and 
precision regardless of whether one uses one- or two-tailed tests. Consequently, 
a preregistered hypothesis needs to specify the direction of the effect or relation. 
Because of the need for proper power analyses (discussed below under D6), it 
is also important to have a prior sense of the size of the effect or strength of the 
relation. 
DESIGN PHASE
Although most researcher DFs discussed in the literature pertain to the analysis 
of the data, both the theoretical predictions and the design of an experiment (or 
other types of studies) already allow the researcher to create options for flexible 
analyses in later phases of the study. A psychological experiment can be set up to 
have a certain degree of redundancy in the design that creates maneuverability in 
the collection of data, analysis of data, and reporting of results. This redundancy 
applies to both independent variables and dependent variables.
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Independent variable(s)
We distinguish here between manipulated and non-manipulated independent 
variables. Manipulated independent variables are those manipulated in the de-
sign of the experiment, and typically involve randomization. In contrast, non-ma-
nipulated independent variables are based on measures of behavior or individual 
differences that (could) pertain to the research question. These independent vari-
ables are the main focus in correlational studies, but are also widely used in study-
ing (moderation of) experimental effects. Moreover, additional measures taken 
after the manipulation or in correlational studies could later be used as mediators 
in explaining variance in the dependent variable, but an underspecified preregis-
tration enables researchers to use these variables as primary dependent variables 
as well (see our discussion of D4).
Experiments can involve multiple manipulated independent variables (i.e., 
experimental factors), that are often crossed and that researchers can select or 
discard in later analyses based on particular (preferred) outcomes. Dropping of 
experimental conditions has been found to be quite common in a survey among 
psychological researchers (John et al., 2012) and in a study that considered psy-
chological studies from a register (Franco, Malhotra, & Simonovits, 2016). Specif-
ically, a researcher can discard a factor in a multifactorial experiment by pooling 
the data over the levels of that factor, or the researcher can select certain levels of 
a discarded factor. For instance, in a two-by-two factorial design studying the ef-
fects of both ostracism (including vs. excluding someone socially) and group com-
position (being in- or excluded by either a social in-group or a social out-group) 
on participants’ mood, the researcher could ignore group composition either by 
pooling in- and outgroup levels, or by selecting one of the levels of group com-
position (say, the in-group) in the later analyses. Moreover, a given experimental 
factor involving more than two levels can later be analyzed in different ways. For 
instance, if an experimental factor has three conditions (say, 0, 1, and 2), the re-
searcher can focus on all three levels, but also select two out of the three in the 
later analyses. Or the researcher can combine conditions 0 and 1 to compare it 
with condition 2, etc. In this way, this simple three level factor already yields sev-
en different operationalizations for the analysis, from which the researcher can 
later choose one(s) that yielded the “best” result. So the design of manipulated 
independent variables offers the following researcher DF: D1 creating multiple 
manipulated independent variables and conditions. Like all researcher DFs, this 
researcher DF becomes more relevant as the number of scoring options increas-
es, like with complex mixed designs involving multiple between-subject and with-
in-subject factors featuring multiple levels. Consequently, preregistrations of such 
studies should specifically and precisely delineate how independent variables are 
later used in testing the focal hypotheses. 
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Non-manipulated independent variables based on the observed characteris-
tics of participants, are also measured in most research designs. These non-ma-
nipulated independent variables such as personality characteristics, IQ, age, gen-
der, ethnicity, political preference, etc. offer great flexibility in the later analyses of 
the data; one can use them as main predictor, but also as moderators to study po-
tential interactions with manipulated factors, or as control variables or covariates 
as in ANCOVA. For instance, measured age can assume any of these roles in later 
analyses: e.g., for studying age differences, for testing whether age moderates the 
effects of any of the other independent variable(s), or as a control variable to ex-
plain some of the within-condition variation in the dependent variable. Moreover, 
measures taken after the manipulations can be used in later mediation analyses to 
explain variance in the dependent variable. This entails D2: Measuring additional 
variables that can be selected later as covariates, independent variables, media-
tors, or moderators. Obviously, adding more measures offers multiple ways to find 
interesting patterns in later stages of the study. Just as manipulated independent 
variables can often be operationalized in different ways, many non-manipulated 
independent variables, once selected, offer flexibility in how they will be used in 
the analyses. Participants can be assigned to different levels of those independent 
variables on the basis of flexible thresholds or category assignments (Steegen et 
al., 2016). For instance, age can be used to create two age groups (young and old), 
or three age groups (young, middle-aged, and old) on the basis of many different 
age-based category assignments. However, age can also be used as a continu-
ous factor, covariate or moderator in later analyses. Similar flexibility applies to 
designs that involve demographic variables (e.g., income, SES, educational level, 
ethnicity, mother tongue, relationship status) or psychological individual differ-
ences (e.g., IQ, extraversion, diagnostic criteria, etc.) and is discussed below in the 
context of the analyses. 
In sum, a research design that is littered with research DFs related to inde-
pendent variables is complex and offers room for selecting and operationalizing 
these variables in multiple ways. An ideal preregistration, then, specifically and 
precisely specifies which manipulated independent variables and non-manipulat-
ed independent variables will be used in the analyses and also indicates how both 
types of variables are to be operationalized, and that no other variables are to be 
used in the confirmatory analyses. We again emphasize that these specifications 
are only necessary for the confirmatory analyses; a potential exploratory analyses 
section of a paper is not at all problematic, as long as the preregistration and the 
paper clearly distinguish between these very different types of analyses.
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Dependent variable(s)
The measurement of human behavior is often complex and is seldom done in a 
single predefined manner. A design prone to bias due to researcher DFs offers 
multiple dependent measures of the same construct. This enables the researcher 
to choose among different outcome measures the one(s) that offer(s) statistical 
significance. The relevant researcher DF in the design phase is D3: measuring the 
same dependent variable in several alternative ways. For instance, anxiety can 
be measured with various self-report scales, or with physiological measures (e.g., 
galvanic skin response, heart rate variability). 
Another particularly flexible design allows the researcher to choose among 
several dependent variables that concern different constructs in cases where the 
originally targeted primary outcome failed to show statistically significant effects. 
Among the research practices studied by John et al., this practice of not report-
ing all dependent measures showed quite high prevalence estimates (John et al., 
2012). Additionally, direct evidence indicates that psychological researchers often 
choose among different outcome measures (Franco et al., 2016; LeBel, Borsboom, 
Giner-Sorolla, Hasselman, Peters, Ratliff, & Smith, 2013). In the medical literature 
on randomized clinical trials, this researcher DF is often called outcome switching 
and the bias it introduces is called outcome reporting bias (Chan, Hrobjartsson, 
Haahr, Gotzsche, & Altman, 2004; Kirkham et al., 2010; Weston et al., 2016). For 
instance, outcomes that were initially designated as secondary outcome variables 
appeared as primary outcome variables in the published article. Or a variable that 
was originally viewed as a potential mediator of an effect might replace the orig-
inal main outcome variable if the latter failed to show an effect. Here we denote 
this researcher DF by D4: measuring additional constructs that could potentially 
act as primary outcomes. 
Thus in the design of studies, the researcher can already create many re-
searcher DFs that allow for opportunistic use in later phases of the research pro-
cess, relating to using multiple measures of the same construct (D3), and creating 
opportunities to find additional effects by adding measures of additional con-
structs besides the one(s) that were the original focus of interest (D4). D4 allows 
HARKing (Kerr, 1998), whereas D3 is aimed at the same targeted construct and 
related to how the primary outcome will be used in later analyses. It is clear that 
the ideal preregistration should specify which dependent variable(s) will be used 
in testing particular hypotheses. However, as we discuss below, even specifying 
the measure (say, the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale) that is to be used as primary 
outcome is not specific and precise enough to avoid p-hacking during analyses, 
because often the scores on such measures can be computed in different ad hoc 
ways. 
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Excluding participants 
Adding numerous measures besides the main independent and dependent vari-
ables to the design offers yet another researcher DF: background variables (e.g., 
age, gender, ethnicity) or other individual differences can be used to later discard 
participants in an ad hoc manner from the analysis. For instance, a researcher 
might decide to exclude older-aged participants for some reason that might actu-
ally not be independent of the effect of the exclusion on the final analysis. Such 
exclusion of cases on the basis of measured variables often comes across as ad 
hoc because if that decision rule had been a priori, these older-aged participants 
should not have completed the study in the first place. 
Other types of measures that can be used to discard participants include 
awareness checks, as often used in priming research (e.g., the funnel debriefing; 
Bargh & Chartrand, 2000), checks for alertness in responding like the blue dot task 
(Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009), or even the simple question like “did 
you participate seriously in this study?”. Decision rules on how to deal with these 
questions need to be pre-specified to avoid them becoming a researcher DF. Simi-
larly, manipulation checks (i.e., measures of the independent variable) can also be 
implemented in the design, offering a way not only to assess the strength of the 
manipulation, but also to discard particular participants from the analyses for not 
showing any desired response to the manipulation. These decisions in the data 
selection offer great flexibility in choosing whom to include in the analysis. D5: 
measuring additional variables that enable later exclusion of participants from the 
analyses (e.g., awareness and manipulation checks). Therefore, an ideal preregis-
tration specifically and precisely describes which types of participants will be ex-
cluded from the analyses, and also explicates that the stated rules of exclusion will 
be the only ones that will be used to discard participants (it should be exhaustive). 
The reason is that only stating a particular exclusion rule in the preregistration does 
not preclude the possibility to also exclude participants on other ad hoc grounds.
Power and sampling plan
Despite the core importance of statistical power in NHST, most studies using NHST 
fail to report a formal power analysis (Bakker et al., 2012; Cohen, 1990; Sedlmei-
er & Gigerenzer, 1989). This is problematic because researchers’ intuitions about 
power are typically overly optimistic (Bakker, Hartgerink, Wicherts, & van der 
Maas, 2016) and studies in psychology are often underpowered. More important-
ly, underpowered studies are themselves more susceptible to bias (Bakker et al., 
2012), particularly in combination with the use of many of the other researcher 
DFs that we describe here. The reason is that the sampling variability is larger and 
many decisions made in analyzing the data will have proportionately larger effects 
when sample sizes are smaller. In other words, using researcher DFs to obtain 
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statistically significant results is typically more effective with smaller samples. Low 
power can create bias and hence D6: Failing to conduct a well-founded power 
analysis is a researcher DF in designing studies. 
A rigorous preregistration not only provides a good rationale for the sample 
size in the form of a power analysis, but also should describe the complete sam-
pling plan, i.e. the targeted sample size, when the data collection starts and ends, 
and how the participants are to be sampled. The sampling plan should specify the 
population from which sampling occurs, the procedure of sampling, and the end 
point of data collection. The sampling plan should also specify when additional 
participants are to be sampled in cases where the targeted sample size is not met 
(e.g., due to drop-out or data exclusions). The sampling plan should be specific and 
precise to disallow researchers to conduct intermediate tests during data collec-
tion. If not, a researcher can decide to collect more data after witnessing a non-sig-
nificant result or to cease data collection earlier than planned if the result is already 
significant (see also C4), both of which affect the Type I error rate. The sampling 
plan should also preclude the researcher to conduct a particular study multiple 
times, and only present the “best” study (i.e., the one with the most desirable 
results). The use of multiple small studies instead of a larger one is an effective 
(yet problematic) strategy to find at least one statistically significant result (Bakker 
et al., 2012) and small underpowered studies can also be pooled by means of a 
meta-analysis in an ad hoc manner to obtain a statistically significant result (Ueno, 
Fastrich, & Murayama, 2016). Hence, we call the following researcher DF, D7: Fail-
ing to specify the sampling plan and allowing for running (multiple) small studies.
DATA COLLECTION PHASE
During the collection of experimental data, it is possible to act in certain ways 
that enhance the probability of finding a statistically significant result. Most of 
the issues are methodological, although some are statistical and bear on issues 
of multiple testing and sequential analyses. In our discussion, we assume that the 
design itself is internally valid and that the measures are construct valid, in the 
sense that the experiment does not involve any confounds or artifacts and uses 
appropriate measures. This, of course, does not always mean that the actual study 
does not suffer from threats to internal validity or construct validity.
Non-random assignment
Although methodological textbooks are clear on the benefits of random assign-
ment, the randomization techniques used to assign participants to conditions 
are often not specified in research articles. Using non-random assignment could 
92      Chapter 5
greatly affect differences between conditions in personal characteristics or other 
factors that could affect the outcome. For instance, an experimenter might (pur-
posively or not) only run treatment participants in the evening, thereby creating 
a potential confound, or the assignment could be based on observable personal 
characteristics that might bear on the outcome measure (e.g., a particularly slow 
moving participant is assigned to the condition that aligns with slowness). In other 
words, the randomization technique should be specifically and precisely stipulat-
ed in advance and followed throughout the experiment, thereby avoiding C1: the 
failure to randomly assign participants to conditions. 
Incomplete blinding
It is widely recommended to employ double-blinding techniques to avoid demand 
characteristics and placebo effects on part of participants as well as experimenter 
expectancy effects during data collection (Rosenthal, 1966). Participants are blind-
ed if the design prevents them from knowing to which condition they have been 
assigned or from knowing the research hypotheses. Experimenters are blinded if 
they do not know to which condition a participant is allocated at any time. There 
are several ways in which both types of blinding can be unsuccessful, potentially 
leading experimenters to treat participants (unwillingly) differently across condi-
tions, or participants to act in ways that yield invalid support for the research 
hypothesis. Hence, C2: Insufficient blinding of experimenters and/or participants 
could potentially introduce bias. For instance, experimenters could use non-naïve 
participants (e.g., a fellow student) or (in)avertedly convey information about 
what is expected from participants in a given condition. The pre-registration study 
should specifically and precisely describe the procedure of how participants and 
experimenter(s) are blinded, if applicable. 
Discarding, correcting, and coding data
If experimenters are involved in coding or other ways of data handling, incom-
plete blinding concerning condition assignment or hypotheses could introduce 
bias. Working with participants is a social process in which experimenters have 
information about participants or their behavior that might enable them to pre-
dict scores on the dependent variable for individual participants. For instance, an 
experimenter may witness a slowly working student in a condition that is expect-
ed to yield quick responses and might decide to discard that participant for not 
participating seriously even though there is no clear experimental protocol that 
dictates such a decision. This creates biases during the data collection, and such 
biases are particularly problematic in experiments involving coding of behavior in 
a non-blinded manner. Similarly, missing values or incorrectly filled out answers 
on a questionnaire or test could also be corrected or filled out during data col-
Researcher degrees of freedom      93 
lection by someone who is not blind to condition (or the hypotheses) and hence 
might make biased decisions. For instance, the experimenter could decide to cor-
rect or fill in the answer of a participant who indicated the incorrect gender or 
no gender on a questionnaire. Although making such corrections or imputations 
deliberately might go beyond questionable and so might entail falsification (a vi-
olation of research integrity), doing this without awareness in a poorly structured 
research setting might nonetheless cause considerable bias. A specific, precise, 
and exhaustive research protocol can help avoid this researcher DF. C3: correct-
ing, coding, or discarding data during data collection in a non-blinded manner.
Intermediate significance testing
The decision whether or not to continue with data collection could be dependent 
on intermediate analyses of the data. This is reflected by the common practice to 
continue data collection after witnessing a statistically nonsignificant result or by 
quitting data collection earlier than planned after witnessing a statistically signifi-
cant result (John et al., 2012). It is well known that this type of sequential testing 
is problematic without any formal correction for multiple testing (Wagenmakers, 
2007) and increases Type 1 error rates. C4: determining the data collection stop-
ping rule on the basis of desired results or intermediate significance testing. A 
specific and precise a priori sampling plan could ameliorate this, and so this re-
searcher DF is related to D7 described above.
ANALYSIS PHASE
In the analysis phase, the researcher directly witnesses the effects of choices on 
the statistical outcome. It is surprising that blinding to conditions and hypotheses 
of experimenters, coders, and observers is considered to be crucial during data 
collection, while in practice, the analyses are typically conducted by a person who 
is not only aware of the hypotheses, but also benefits directly from corroborating 
them (commonly by means of a significance test). Together with the many re-
searcher DFs during the analyses, these factors do not entail the most optimal mix 
for objective and unbiased results.
Data cleaning and processing
Before running the focal analyses, experimental data often need to be cleaned 
and prepared for analysis. Data cleaning involves many choices related to missing-
ness, outliers, or violations of the distributional assumptions. Because of potential 
drop-out, data collection problems, or a lack of full responses for other reasons 
(e.g., participants’ inattention or refusal to answer some questions), some data 
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might be missing entirely for participants or for some or many of the variables 
of interest. Missing data can be dealt with by listwise deletion, pairwise deletion, 
multiple imputation, full information methods, and other methods (Schafer & 
Graham, 2002). This choice creates a researcher DF, namely A1: choosing between 
different options of dealing with incomplete or missing data on ad hoc grounds.
Neuroimaging techniques (e.g., signals from fMRI, EEG, MEG) and other da-
ta-intense measurement procedures require extensive pre-processing steps that 
entail considerable maneuverability in the analysis of the data (Kriegeskorte, Lind-
quist, Nichols, Poldrack, & Vul, 2010; Kriegeskorte et al., 2009; Poldrack et al., 2016). 
For instance, with neuroimaging data, decisions related to regions of interest, deal-
ing with head motions, corrections for slice timing, spatial smoothing, and spa-
tial normalization can create a large number of different ways to analyze the data 
(Poldrack et al., 2016). The processing of such data can be done based on whether 
they provide preferred results, which offers A2: Specifying pre-processing of data 
(e.g., cleaning, normalization, smoothing, motion correction) in an ad hoc manner.
Tests have assumptions related to how the data are distributed. The typical 
assumption in the F-family of parametric tests is that the data are independent-
ly normally distributed and that variances of different groups are homogenous. 
There are various ways to deal with violated assumptions of such statistical tests: 
one could use non-parametric analyses, transform the data in various ways to ap-
proach normality or simply ignore the violations. Moreover, violations of variance 
homogeneity in ANOVAs or t-tests, non-normality, non-linearity in linear models, 
or heteroscedascity in regression could be dealt with in several alternative ways 
(Wilcox, 2012). When done in data-driven manner, this creates: A3: Deciding on 
how to deal with violations of statistical assumptions in an ad hoc manner.
Dealing with outliers is a particularly vexing issue that warrants specifically, 
precisely, and exhaustively described protocols in a preregistration. Outliers can 
be operationalized and detected in various ways (Bakker & Wicherts, 2014b; Bar-
nett & Lewis, 1994; Wilcox, 2012) and they can be deleted or kept on the basis 
of many alternative criteria that could be chosen based on whether they lead to 
significance. Alternatively, the researcher can choose to conduct analyses that are 
less sensitive to outliers, like non-parametric or robust analyses. This creates A4: 
deciding on how to deal with outliers in an ad hoc manner.
Dependent variable(s)
Statistical analyses of experimental data boil down to predicting scores on the 
outcome measure chosen in the analysis on the basis of predictors (typically fac-
tors, but also covariates, mediators, and/or interaction terms). While running the 
analysis, the researcher can choose between different measures or operational-
izations of the same construct implemented in the design of the study in an effort 
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to find the measure that shows the preferred or best results. This practice, which 
is paired with the use of various measures in the design (D3), concerns the follow-
ing researcher DF: A5 selecting the dependent variable out of several alternative 
measures of the same construct.
The dependent variable, once selected, can often be scored or operational-
ized in various ways. There also exist degrees of freedom even if there is only one 
overall measure or scale. Discarding, weighting, selecting, or redefining scoring 
rules of individual items can offer flexibility in analyses even if the items are based 
on a commonly used scale. For example, items of a scale that are originally mea-
sured on a five-point Likert scale can be dichotomized, or some items might be 
discarded from the scale score for showing low or negative item-rest correlations. 
Moreover, the scale score can be based on an unweighted sum of item scores or 
on weighting of items based on an item response model, or by running a principal 
components analysis and choosing among alternative ways to estimate the factor 
scores. So even for existing scales, flexibility exists in operationalizing the scores in 
the analyses. The use of response time data involving responses to many stimuli 
also involves many choices in dealing with slow response times, and how to sum-
marize the major outcome variable. The researcher DF is A6: trying out different 
ways to score the chosen primary dependent variable.
Finally, researchers can choose to measure additional constructs next to the 
one(s) originally targeted as the main dependent variable (or primary outcome) 
in the design (see D4). During the analyses this creates A7: selecting another con-
struct as the primary outcome.
Independent variables 
If we consider ANOVA as a regression model, the use of independent variables 
means selecting among numerous predictors and/or interaction terms to predict 
the outcome, and hence different regression models. Without specific preregis-
tration, a researcher often has numerous options to choose between different 
regression models. The researcher can also typically operationalize the non-ma-
nipulated and manipulated in various ways, particularly in flexible designs. During 
the analysis, the researcher can employ A8: select independent variables out of a 
set of manipulated independent variables (paired with D1). Similarly, even for a 
given manipulated variable, the researcher can often choose to discard or com-
bine different levels of factors, which creates A9: operationalizing the manipulat-
ed independent variables in different ways (e.g., by discarding or combining levels 
of factors; paired with D1). 
Furthermore, during the analyses, the researcher can make opportunistic 
use of a host of additional non-manipulated measures (D2), as well as possible 
mediator variables measured during the study, thereby creating A10: choosing 
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to include different measured variables as covariates, independent variables, me-
diators, or moderators in the analysis. The number of different analytic options 
considered for finding some statistically significant result (mediation, moderation, 
main effect) on the basis of measured variables can be quite large. For instance, 
adding big five personality measures to a simple one-way experimental design en-
ables the researcher to seek for the moderation of effects by all of these personal-
ity traits. However, these big five traits can also be used as covariates, or simply as 
independent variables to help explain variance in the outcome measure(s). More 
degrees of freedom are added if the researcher does not specifically and precisely 
describe in advance how these measured variables are to be used and scored in 
the analysis (Steegen et al., 2016). For example, a measure of extraversion could 
be used as a linear predictor based on unweighted sum of individual item scores 
or some estimate of the factor score reflecting the underlying construct. Howev-
er, the researcher can also compare participants with some (arbitrarily chosen) 
high or low score on the scale used to measure extraversion (and even there, the 
researcher could discard some items because they showed low item-rest correla-
tions). This creates A11: operationalizing non-manipulated independent variables 
in different ways. 
An exceptionally flexible analysis involves many different regression models 
based on a host of different combinations of predictors (main effects, interac-
tions, control variables or covariates), and alternative ways to operationalize these 
predictors, leading to a very large number of regressions (Sala I Martin, 1997) in 
some designs. For instance, a researcher might add age as a moderator during 
the analysis and check whether different ways to categorize age groups yields 
some interesting results. Running so many regressions creates a massive multiple 
testing problem that can be solved in statistical ways or with a sufficiently detailed 
preregistration. 
Selection criteria
One can also change the analysis by altering the sample size on the basis of dif-
ferent criteria to (de)select participants. This yields A12: Use of alternative inclu-
sion and exclusion criteria in selecting participants for use in the analysis. This 
researcher DF is paired with D5, i.e. the design choice to include many additional 
variables related to manipulation checks or awareness checks or any other per-
sonal characteristics that can be used as selection criteria. There are many bases 
to select or deselect participants for the analysis, including performance (e.g., 
many alternative levels of the percentage of items answered correctly on some 
task that measures the manipulation), awareness questions, or any personal char-
acteristics. A specific, precise, and exhaustive plan to not include particular partic-
ipants in the final data analyses not only avoids this researcher DF, but could also 
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spare resources by simply not collecting any (additional) data for participants who 
fail to meet the inclusion criteria. For instance, if a linguistics researcher is not 
interested in participants who are not native speakers of the language of interest, 
he or she would be better off not running these participants at all, instead of ex-
cluding their data only at the analysis phase.
Statistical model, estimation, and inference 
Even for relatively straightforward experiments, many different statistical models 
can be used to analyze experimental data, including linear regression, ANOVA, 
MANOVA, or robust or non-parametric analyses. Hence, an obvious researcher 
DF is A13: choice of the statistical model. However, choosing the statistical model 
(say, a regression with three predetermined predictors), often does not preclude 
additional statistical choices. Specifically, statistical models need to be estimated 
and this can frequently be done in several ways. Even with a given estimation 
method, the researcher can choose between different corrections to the standard 
errors (SEs) of parameters. For instance, one could choose for robust standard 
errors instead of the standard SEs. Moreover, different statistical software packag-
es (e.g., SPSS, R, SAS) often implement the same estimation techniques and cor-
rection methods in slightly different ways, leading to diverging results. These al-
ternative estimation methods, software packages, and correction methods might 
lead to different outcomes and hence entail a researcher DF. A14: the choice for 
estimation method, software package, and computation of SEs. To wit, even a 
standard ANOVA requires a choice between different types of sum of squares, 
three of which are available in SPSS (this choice is typically not described in ar-
ticles). This problem is particularly vexing for more advanced analyses, that can 
be estimated with Maximum Likelihood (ML), Ordinary Least Squares, Weighted 
Least Squares, Mean and Variance Adjusted Weighted Least Squares, Partial Least 
Squares, or Restricted ML, with or without robust standard errors (to name just a 
few options). 
Finally, without a specific and precise registration, a researcher can choose 
inference criteria (e.g., Bayes factors, alpha level, sidedness of the test, correc-
tions for multiple testing) in different ways, and on the basis of analytic outcomes. 
Thus A15: choosing inference criteria (e.g., Bayes factors, alpha level, sidedness of 
the test, corrections for multiple testing) is another researcher DF. For instance, 
a researcher can choose to use a one-sided test if this is the only way to obtain 
significance, or employ more lenient corrections for multiple testing if the need 
arises. Preregistrations should explicate these criteria. 
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REPORTING PHASE
In the reporting of results, the researcher is faced with the freedom to report de-
tails of the a priori hypotheses, design, data collection, and analysis of the study. 
Here, the potential exploitations of the many researcher DFs discussed above can 
or cannot be reported, which renders the reporting of such details crucial (Wig-
boldus & Dotsch, 2016). For instance, the researcher could report only a subset of 
many analyses that showed the researcher's most desirable results. The compre-
hensive reporting of the study design and results is necessary for both reproduc-
ibility (reanalyzing the study using the same data) and replicability (rerunning the 
study as similar as possible in a new sample) (Asendorpf et al., 2013). It is obvious 
that the many researcher DFs can be hidden for readers (or critical reviewers) by 
failing to report some independent variables, some dependent variables, miss-
ing data, data exclusions, or other relevant choices made during the analyses. 
Reproducibility requires a verification of the steps taken from the data collection 
to the final report, including choices made during the collection and analysis of 
the data, such as pre-processing of the data, the statistical model, the estimation 
technique, software package, and computational details, data exclusions, dealings 
with missing or incomplete data, violated distributional assumptions, and outliers. 
This offers the following researcher DF in the reporting phase: R1: failing to assure 
reproducibility (verifying the data collection and data analysis). The preferred way 
to assure reproducibility is to share data and analytic details (computer syntaxes/
code) in or alongside the paper (Nosek et al., 2015). 
The exploitation of researcher DFs creates bias, which might lower replica-
bility of earlier results in novel samples (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). To 
allow later (direct) replications of a study, it is crucial that the report (or its supple-
ments) include sufficient details on the data collection, including procedures and 
all materials used (stimuli, instructions, manipulations, and measures). Nowadays, 
such information can be shared via online repositories or platforms such as the 
Open Science Framework. Failing to do this impedes replications, and so we con-
sider this another researcher DF during the reporting of studies, namely R2: fail-
ing to enable replication (re-running of the study). Although both reproducibility 
and enabling replication are considered matters of reporting here, a preregistra-
tion of the study could already specifically and precisely indicate what information 
is going to shared and in what manner.
Furthermore, for preregistered studies, there exists an additional researcher 
DF related to reporting of results. Specifically, the researcher(s) could R3: fail to 
mention, misrepresent, or misidentify the study preregistration. Studies of prereg-
istrations of randomized clinical trials highlight that preregistrations in the medical 
literature are often not followed in the final report (Chan, Hrobjartsson, et al., 
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2004). This problem can be avoided by having reviewers compare the preregistra-
tion to the (submitted) research article. 
Moreover, researchers could fail to present relevant unpublished work in 
their final publication. This creates R4: failing to report so-called “failed studies” 
that were originally deemed relevant to the research question. Note that failed 
studies are often those that showed no statistically significant results, which is a 
main reason for authors for not publishing the results (Cooper, DeNeve, & Charl-
ton, 1997). However, if the study was seen in advance as valid and methodologi-
cally rigorous, the study cannot be considered “failed” and should be considered 
as adding relevant evidence. This is the idea underlying the article format of reg-
istered reports, in which the rationale and methods of a study are reviewed and 
the final study is accepted for publication regardless of the (statistical significance 
of the) final result (Chambers, 2013; de Groot, 1956/2014; Simons, Holcombe, & 
Spellman, 2014).
There are two more researcher DFs in the reporting of studies that bear on 
the results or the rationale for the study, respectively. First, researcher(s) could 
R5: misreport results and p-values (Bakker & Wicherts, 2011), for instance by pre-
senting a statistically nonsignificant result as being significant. This practice and 
similar practices of misreporting of results (e.g., incorrectly stating a lack of mod-
eration by demographic variables) are quite common (John et al., 2012; Nuijten et 
al., 2016). Second, researchers can choose to R6: hypothesize after the results are 
known (HARKing). They can falsely present results of data explorations as though 
they were confirmatory tests of hypotheses that were stipulated in advance (Wa-
genmakers et al., 2011), which is related to lack of clear hypotheses (T1) and ap-
pears to be quite commonly practiced by psychologists (John et al., 2012). Both 
types of misreporting lower trust in reported findings and potentially also the 
replicability of results in later research.
DISCUSSION
We created a list of 34 researcher DFs, but our list is in no way exhaustive for the 
many choices that need be made during the different phases of a psychologi-
cal experiment. Some of the researcher DFs are clearly related to others, but we 
nonetheless considered it valuable to list them separately according to the phase 
of the study. One can envision many other ways to create bias in studies, including 
poorly designed experiments with confounding factors, biased samples, invalid 
measurements, erroneous analyses, inappropriate scales, data dependencies that 
inflate significance levels, etc. Moreover, some of the researcher DFs on our list do 
not apply to other statistical frameworks, and our list does not include the specific 
100      Chapter 5
DF associated with those frameworks (e.g., specifying priors in Bayesian analyses). 
Here we focused on the researcher DFs that are often relevant even for well-de-
signed and rigorously conducted experiments and other types of psychological 
studies that use NHST to test their hypotheses of interest.
We sympathize with Gelman and Loken’s (2014) argument that the term 
questionable research practices in relation to researcher’s use of researcher DFs 
is not always necessary, because the majority of the researcher DFs we describe 
involve choices that are arbitrary: researchers just need to decide between these 
different options and could but not necessarily will use these researcher DFs in an 
opportunistic manner. What matters is that the data could be collected and ana-
lyzed in different ways and that the final analyses reported in the research article 
could have been chosen differently if the results (based on these different choices 
and bearing on statistical significance) had come out differently. The issue, then, 
is not that all researchers try to obtain desirable results by exploiting researcher 
DFs but rather that the researcher DFs have strong potential to create bias. Such 
potential for bias is particularly severe for experiments that study subtle effects 
with relatively small samples. Hence, we need an appropriate way to deal with 
researcher DFs; one way to assess the relevance of choices is to report all poten-
tially relevant analyses either as a traditional sensitivity analyses or as a multiverse 
analysis (Steegen et al., 2016). Another solution is that the data are available for 
independent reanalysis after publication, although this is not always possible due 
to low sharing rates (Wicherts et al., 2011). However, preventing bias is better 
than treating it after it has occurred. Thus, the preferred way to counter bias due 
to researcher DFs is to preregister the study in a way that no longer allows re-
searchers to exploit them.
The ideal preregistration of a study provides a specific, precise, and exhaus-
tive story of the planned research, that is, it describes all steps, with only one 
interpretation, and excludes other possible steps. Our list can be used in research 
methods education, as a checklist to assess the quality of preregistrations, and to 
determine the potential for bias due to (arbitrary) choices in unregistered studies. 
We conducted a study (see Chapter 6) focusing on the quality of a random sam-
ple of actual pre-registrations on the Open Science Framework in which we used 
a scoring protocol based on our checklist to assess the degree to which these 
pre-registrations avoid any potential p-hacking. The protocol assesses the prereg-
istration’s specificity, precision, and completeness at the level of each researcher 
DF; a score of 0 is assigned if the DF is not limited, whereas 1 and 2 are assigned 
if the description is partly or fully specific and precise, respectively. A score of 3 is 
assigned if it is also exhaustive, i.e. if it excludes other steps. By applying the pro-
tocol, authors can also score their own preregistration, enabling them to improve 
their preregistration, and reviewers of registered reports and registered studies 
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can use the protocol as well. Both authors and reviewers can thus use the protocol 
to limit potential p-hacking in planned studies.
We suggest a few avenues for future research. First, while most of the re-
searcher DFs in our list are relevant to other statistical frameworks as well, the 
list should be adapted for studies planning to use confidence intervals and certain 
precision of effect size estimates (Cumming, 2012, 2014; Maxwell et al., 2015), 
or Bayesian analyses (Kruschke, 2015). Second, where we focused on preregistra-
tions and assessing their quality, it is likewise urgent to develop and assess pro-
tocols for using ‘open materials’, ‘open data’, and ‘open workflows’ (Nosek et al., 
2012). These transparent practices have many benefits and are currently gaining 
traction (e.g., Eich, 2014; Kidwell et al., 2016), but are often insufficiently detailed, 
documented or structured to allow other researchers to reproduce and replicate 
results (e.g., reuse of open data requires solid documentation and meta-data; 
Wicherts, 2017). While we believe all these open practices strengthen research, 
a lot can still be gained by creating protocols that provide specific, precise, and 
exhaustive descriptions of materials, data, and workflow.
102      Chapter 5
Researcher degrees of freedom      103 

Restriction of opportunistic use of  
researcher degrees of freedom in  
pre-registrations on the Open 
Science Framework
After all authors have approved this manuscript, it will be submitted as Veldkamp, C. L. S., 
Bakker, M., van Assen, M. A. L. M., Crompvoets, E. A. V., Ong, H. H., Soderberg, C. K.,  
Mellor, D., Nosek, B. A., & Wicherts, J. M. Restriction of opportunistic use of researcher 
degrees of freedom in pre-registrations on the Open Science Framework.
CHAPTER 6
ABSTRACT 
In psychological science, researchers face many, often seemingly arbitrary choices 
in formulating the hypotheses of their study, designing their experiment, collect-
ing their data, analyzing their data, and reporting their results. Opportunistic use 
of these ‘researcher degrees of freedom’ aimed at obtaining statistical significance 
however increases the likelihood of obtaining false positive results and overesti-
mating effect sizes, and lowers the reproducibility and replicability of published 
results. Here, we compared the effectiveness of two types of pre-registration 
(i.e. stipulating all planned aspects of a study in advance) as a solution to restrict 
opportunistic use of researcher degrees of freedom (or p-hacking). Both types 
(Standard Pre-Data Collection Registrations and Prereg Challenge Registrations) 
are currently available on the Open Science Framework and differ in the extent to 
which they provide authors with detailed instructions and requirements on how 
to write the pre-registration. Results of comparing random samples of 53 pre-reg-
istrations from each type indicate that neither of the two types of pre-registra-
tions sufficiently restricted opportunistic use of researcher degrees of freedom. 
However, on average, Prereg Challenge Registrations, which follow a format pro-
viding more detailed instructions and requirements, worked better than Standard 
Pre-Data Collection Registrations, which follow a basic format hardly providing 
any instructions. We discuss the benefits and limitations of pre-registration, and 
provide suggestions on how to improve pre-registration formats. 
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Attempts to replicate original research findings seem uncommon in psychology 
(Asendorpf et al., 2013; Mahoney, 1985; Makel, Plucker, & Hegarty, 2012; but also 
see Neuliep & Crandall, 1993a; Neuliep & Crandall, 1993b), but when replications 
are conducted, they produce weaker evidence in the large majority of cases, or 
even no evidence for the original findings in many cases (Asendorpf et al., 2013; 
Chang & Li, 2015; Ioannidis, 2005a, 2007; Marsman et al., 2017; Mobley, Linder, 
Braeuer, Ellis, & Zwelling, 2013; Open Science Collaboration, 2015). In recent 
years, many psychologists have expressed their concerns about the size and the 
gravity of these problems, even referring to it as a replication crisis (Nosek & Lak-
ens, 2015; Open Science Collaboration, 2015; Pashler & Harris, 2012; Spellman, 
2015).
The difficulty of replicating published results is believed to be due to several 
interrelated problems. First, statistically significant results have a higher probabil-
ity of getting published (Dwan et al., 2008; Fanelli, 2010b, 2012; Sterling, 1959; 
Sterling et al., 1995), a problem commonly known as publication bias. As a con-
sequence of this selection for significance, many published effect sizes over-es-
timate population effect size (Bakker et al., 2012; Ioannidis, 2008; Simonsohn et 
al., 2014a; van Aert et al., 2016), and many published statistically significant re-
sults may constitute false-positive findings (Ioannidis, 2005b). Second, analyses 
of (psychological) data often involve many (often arbitrary) choices that have to 
be made during data analysis that researchers could use opportunistically when 
confronted with an (undesired) non-significant result (DeCoster et al., 2015; Ioan-
nidis, 2005b; Nuzzo, 2015; Sijtsma, Veldkamp, & Wicherts, 2015; Simmons et al., 
2011; Wicherts et al., 2016). This use may result in statistically significant findings 
after all, (denoted p-hacking) and may also result in overestimated effect sizes 
and dissemination of false positive results. In psychology, the opportunistic use of 
the so-called ‘Researcher Degrees of Freedom’ (Simmons et al., 2011; Wicherts 
et al., 2016)  constitutes a large problem because its occurrence is estimated to 
be high (Agnoli et al., 2017; Fanelli, 2009; Fiedler & Schwarz, 2015; Franco et al., 
2016; John et al., 2012; LeBel, Borsboom, Giner-Sorolla, Hasselman, Peters, Ratliff, 
& Tucker Smith, 2013; O’Boyle, Banks, & Gonzalez-Mulé, 2014) and its effects are 
particularly strong for underpowered (small sample) studies that are very com-
mon in psychology  (Bakker et al., 2012; Cohen, 1962; Maxwell, 2004). 
We believe that the tendency to use Researcher Degrees of Freedom oppor-
tunistically can largely be attributed to human cognitive biases such as confirma-
tion bias, motivated reasoning, hindsight bias, and the inclination to see patterns 
in any data (Mahoney & DeMonbreun, 1977; Mynatt, Doherty, & Tweney, 1977; 
Nickerson, 1998), combined with the common practice (if not requirement) to re-
port positive results in research papers (Fanelli, 2010). Just like other humans, sci-
entists do not always recognize their own biases: they can ‘fool themselves’ (Nuzzo, 
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2015). We also believe that many scientists do not perceive their data-analytical 
choices as opportunistic, but rather as being ‘justified by the data’. However, mak-
ing data-analytical decisions after seeing the data and results of analyses on these 
data violates the principles of confirmatory null hypothesis significance testing or 
NHST (Wagenmakers et al., 2012), which is the most widely used statistical frame-
work in psychology (Hubbard & Ryan, 2000; Wetzels et al., 2011) and creates op-
tions to present data-driven hypotheses as confirmatory hypotheses (Kerr, 1998). 
Human biases combined with the many choices in how to design studies, collect 
data, analyze data, and report results likely inflate the likelihood of both false-pos-
itive findings and exaggerated effect sizes. In environments where competition is 
high (Anderson, Ronning, De Vries, & Martinson, 2007; Fanelli, 2010a; Martinson 
et al., 2005) and where the pursuit of significant results is strongly incentivized by 
publications of positive and “novel” results in high impact journals  (Asendorpf 
et al., 2013; Nosek et al., 2012), reporting false-positive results and/or over-esti-
mated effect sizes may be beneficial for researchers in the short run. In the long 
run, however, researchers might be confronted with the irreproducibility of their 
results, and the credibility of their field will be negatively affected. Interestingly, 
despite the risks for bias associated with small samples, high impact journals in 
psychology report relatively more studies with smaller and hence underpowered 
samples than do lower-ranked journals (Fraley & Vazire, 2014).
A widely discussed solution to reduce opportunistic use of Researcher 
Degrees of Freedom or p-hacking (and publication bias) in psychology is study 
pre-registration (Asendorpf et al., 2013; Chambers & Munafo, 2013; de Groot, 
1956/2014; Nosek et al., 2015; Nosek & Bar-Anan, 2012; Nosek et al., 2012; 
Wagenmakers et al., 2012). The idea of pre-registration is to specify all planned 
aspects of a study in advance, thereby making a clear distinction between ‘hy-
pothesis testing’ (confirmatory research) and ‘hypothesis generating’ (explorative 
research’) (Wagenmakers et al., 2012). Pre-registration thus entails stipulating the 
confirmatory hypotheses, the study design used to test these hypotheses, the 
data collection plan, the (confirmatory) analysis plan, and what will be reported 
in the manuscript prior to the execution of the study. It is important to note that 
pre-registrations do not prohibit exploratory analyses; they merely make a dis-
tinction between confirmatory and exploratory analyses, and provide the planned 
steps of the study before actually carrying out the study.
Currently, there are a number of emerging forms of pre-registration in psy-
chology. For example, researchers can register their study on the Open Science 
Framework (https://osf.io) or on the AsPredicted website (https://aspredicted.
org/) and refer to these pre-registrations in the manuscript reporting on the rele-
vant project. One of the leading psychology journals, Psychological Science, now 
actively supports and rewards pre-registration (Eich, 2014). In addition, pre-reg-
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istration can occur in the form of ‘registered reports’ (Chambers, 2013; Cham-
bers, Feredoes, Muthukumaraswamy, & Etchells, 2014; Jonas & Cesario, 2015) 
or ‘registered replication reports’ focused on replicating earlier (seminal) findings 
(Simons et al., 2014). In these pre-registered (replication) reports, the introduc-
tion and methods section of a paper are submitted and peer reviewed prior to the 
execution of the study. When these sections have been approved by the review-
ers and editor, the authors receive a so-called ‘in principal acceptance’, meaning 
that acceptance of the manuscript for publication will be conditional only on the 
pre-specified methods and analysis plan being followed, and not on the study 
outcome. This format has already been adopted by more than 35 journals (see 
https://cos.io/rr/) across different disciplinary fields.
In order for pre-registrations to be efficient in limiting or even eliminating 
opportunistic use of researcher degrees of freedom, pre-registrations must be 
specific, precise, and exhaustive (Wicherts et al., 2016, Chapter 5). By specific, we 
mean that the pre-registration is detailed in its description of all phases of the 
research process from the design of the study to what will be reported in the man-
uscript. By precise we mean that each aspect of the research plan is open to one 
single interpretation only. Finally, by exhaustive we mean that each aspect of the 
pre-registered research plan explicitly excludes the possibility of deviations from 
the pre-registered research plan. For example, a specific, precise, and exhaustive 
description of a sampling plan would state the exact procedure or number of par-
ticipants to be recruited, describe the protocol of sampling in all its details (i.e., 
including the exact number of people to be approached, the exact time frame 
and situation in which participants will be invited), list the inclusion and exclusion 
criteria for selecting participants or data points, specify how many and how ad-
ditional participants or data points will be sampled when the pre-set sample size 
is not reached, and explicitly state no other sampling procedure(s) will be used 
than those listed. A pre-registered sampling plan that simply states that at least 50 
participants will be recruited in each condition leaves room to continue recruiting 
until intermediate testing yields a significant effect and to exclude participants for 
ambiguous reasons, and allows for the exclusion of certain participants for what-
ever reason. Hence, such a poorly specified sampling plan might still create many 
options to inflate false positive rates in NHST (e.g., Wagenmakers, 2007).
As another example, we explain how a pre-registered description of a de-
pendent variable that consists of ‘we will use the Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule (PANAS)’ leaves ample room to select only those items (e.g., the nega-
tive affect items) that correlate with the independent variable for the analyses, to 
remove items from the scale that decrease the correlation with the independent 
variable, to construct the composite score in a manner that yields the most favor-
able effects (e.g., high versus low rather than continuous scores), or to examine 
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whether pairwise deletion, list wise deletion, or imputation of missing values, etc. 
yields the most favorable results. In other words, merely stating the use of a par-
ticular scale in a pre-registration fails to limit numerous remaining degrees of free-
dom in how to collect and analyze the data. In order to provide a specific, precise, 
exhaustive description of a composite measure (e.g.,. an affect scale) of a depen-
dent variable, it should explain the protocol to administer the items, the scoring 
of the items, and the procedure to construct the composite score from the items 
(arithmetic mean, weighted mean, sum, etc.). In addition, it should specify how 
deviating individual items, incorrect values, and missing values on individual items 
will be handled, and should explicitly mention that no other procedure(s) will be 
used for measuring the dependent variable. 
Finally, we emphasize that pre-registrations should indicate what will be re-
ported in the manuscript following the study. Research in the field of random-
ized controlled trials in medical science, where pre-registration has been used for 
years, suggests that there are often crucial discrepancies between the pre-reg-
istration and the article reporting the trial. For example, the primary outcome 
measures reported in articles have been found to differ from the primary out-
comes listed in the pre-registration alarmingly often (Chan & Altman, 2005; Chan, 
Hróbjartsson, Haahr, Gøtzsche, & Altman, 2004; Goldacre, 2016), and final sam-
ple sizes reported in articles have been found to not always match those in the 
pre-registrations of the same trials (Chan, Hróbjartsson, Jørgensen, Gøtzsche, & 
Altman, 2008). In order for pre-registrations to be effective, pre-registrations thus 
also need to be permanently archived and accessible (Chan, 2008), and pre-regis-
trations should be explicitly compared to studies reported in manuscripts during 
peer review. In registered reports, this is an essential part of the review process 
(Chambers, 2013). 
The currently emerging forms of pre-registration in psychology vary widely 
in the extent to which they help researchers compose a specific, precise, and ex-
haustive pre-registration. For example, the website AsPredicted facilitates a form 
of preregistration that prioritizes ease and time-saving by requiring researchers 
to briefly answer a total of eight questions about their study. These eight ques-
tions ask researchers to state the main research question, describe the key de-
pendent variable(s), state to how many and which conditions participants will be 
assigned, specify the exact analyses to test the main hypothesis, indicate whether 
and which secondary analysis will be conducted, stipulate how many observa-
tions will be collected, indicate whether there is anything else they would like to 
pre-register, and indicate whether they have already collected data. The website 
then generates a private or public PDF (depending on the author’s choice), that 
will be archived by the website, can be downloaded by the authors, and can be 
verified by reviewers.
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The Open Science Framework website features a number of different types of 
pre-registrations, ranging from formats that hardly offer any instructions to fixed 
formats instructing authors to provide a high level of detail about many aspects 
of their study. At the time of the start of the current study, three major types of 
pre-registrations were available: ‘Open-ended Registrations’, ‘Standard Pre-Data 
Collection Registrations’, and ‘Prereg Challenge Registrations’. ‘Open-ended Reg-
istrations’ are the broadest and most general version, where researchers are only 
asked “to provide a narrative summary of their project”, ‘Standard Pre-Data Col-
lection Registrations’ have the same basic format as ‘Open-ended Registrations’, 
but the difference is that here, researchers are also asked to indicate whether 
they have already collected or looked at the data before composing the pre-reg-
istration. Researchers can choose how they (permanently) archive their pre-reg-
istration on the Open Science Framework (publicly, privately, or a combination of 
both, e.g. by keeping it private until publication of the results). 
The third type, ‘Prereg Challenge Registrations’, are of a rather different for-
mat. Here, authors are asked to fill out a form containing 26 questions and to 
provide a high level of detail in answering the questions. The questions pertain 
to general information about the study (title, authors, research questions and hy-
potheses), to the sampling plan (whether existing data are used, explanation of 
existing data, data collection procedure, sample size, sample size rationale, stop-
ping rule), to the variables (manipulated variables, measured variables, indices), 
to the design plan (study type, blinding, study design, randomization), to the anal-
ysis plan (statistical models, transformations, follow-up analyses, inference crite-
ria, data exclusion, missing data, and (optional) exploratory analyses), and to the 
scripts that will be used (optional). This format was developed for and is currently 
used in the ‘Preregistration Challenge’ (or ‘Prereg Challenge’), a competition held 
by the Center of Open Science in order to promote experience and education with 
pre-registration. To be eligible for one of the 1000 prizes of $1000, participants 
must submit a fully completed ‘Prereg Challenge Registration’ form for review to 
the Center for Open Science) and publish their manuscript in one of the partici-
pating Open Access journals. 
Finally, pre-registration in the form of ‘Registered Reports’ (Chambers, 2013; 
Chambers et al., 2014; Jonas & Cesario, 2015; Nosek & Lakens, 2015) also requires 
a high level of detail, but the exact requirements depend on the journal. Jour-
nals welcoming or requiring Registered Reports, such as Comprehensive Results 
in Social Psychology, usually provide extensive instructions for submission at the 
pre-study stage (i.e. the introduction, the method section, and the analysis plan) 
and the submission at the post-study stage (i.e. the introduction, method section, 
and analysis plan approved in the pre-study stage now combined with the results 
and discussion). For example, the Journal of Comprehensive Results in Social Psy-
Pre-registration evaluation      111 
chology offers a detailed manual (see http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/authors/
rrsp-submission-guidelines.pdf) instructing authors to provide an introduction 
section “motivating the research question and a full description of the experimen-
tal aims and hypotheses”. Next, authors are instructed to write a method section 
that includes a full description of the sample characteristics (“including criteria 
for subject inclusion and exclusion, and detailed description of procedures for 
defining outliers), a description of experimental procedures (“in sufficient detail 
to allow another researcher to repeat the methodology”), the proposed analy-
sis pipeline (“including all preprocessing steps, and a precise description of all 
planned analyses, including appropriate correction for multiple comparisons”), 
and a power analysis (for studies using NHST, where “effect sizes for power analy-
sis should be justified with reference to the existing literature”), or a specification 
of the predictions of the theory so that a Bayes factor can be calculated (for stud-
ies using Bayesian hypothesis testing, indicating “what distribution will be used to 
represent the predictions of the theory and how its parameters will be specified”). 
In sum, pre-registration formats differ greatly in the extent to which they take 
the author by the hand in writing a pre-registration that is sufficiently specific, 
precise, and exhaustive. We therefore believe that the extent to which pre-regis-
trations restrict opportunistic use of researcher degrees of freedom may there-
fore largely depend on the quality of the instructions and requirements imposed 
by the medium offering the opportunity for pre-registration.  
Our own experiences with previous pre-registrations and the pre-registration 
of the current study have shown that writing a specific, precise and exhaustive 
pre-registration that truly limits all manoeuvrability with respect to confirmatory 
hypothesis testing is difficult and requires considerable time and energy. Such a 
pre-registration is lengthy and detailed, and needs to be extensively reviewed by 
all authors involved. However, we have also learned that planning every detail of 
a study ahead is eventually more efficient in that it helps reduce the number of 
unforeseen issues and errors that can occur in the design of a study, during data 
collection, or in analyses, and in that it reduces time spent writing the introduc-
tion and method sections of manuscripts. Moreover, examining our pre-registra-
tion after data collection and data analysis often confronted us with the presence 
of our own hindsight bias and tendency for motivated reasoning, which for us 
confirms the value of pre-registration in limiting our human tendency to ‘fool our-
selves’ (Nuzzo, 2015). 
In the current study, we evaluated to what extent current pre-registrations 
efficiently restricted opportunistic use of 29 out of the 34 researcher degrees of 
freedom listed in Chapter 5 (Wicherts et al., 2016) by means of a detailed scoring 
protocol. Specifically, we evaluated pre-registrations of two of the pre-registration 
formats described above: Open Science Framework ‘Standard Pre-Data Collec-
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tion Registrations’ and Open Science Framework ‘Prereg Challenge Registrations’. 
As explained above, these types of pre-registrations differ with respect to the 
amount of instructions provided and the level of detail required. Evaluating these 
two types of pre-registration could shed light on our three research questions: (i) 
whether pre-registrations that were written following more detailed and specific 
requirements (Prereg Challenge Registrations) restricted opportunistic use of re-
searchers degrees of freedom more than pre-registrations that were written fol-
lowing less detailed and less specific requirements (Standard Pre-Data Collection 
Registrations), (ii) which of the 29 researchers degrees of freedom tended to be 
covered better by the preregistrations than others, and (iii) how to create pre-reg-
istration guidelines that do adequately restrict opportunistic use of researcher 
degrees of freedom. In our study, we tested one, pre-registered confirmatory hy-
pothesis: that Prereg Challenge Registration would receive on average higher ‘re-
striction scores’ (see method section) than Standard Pre-Data Collection Registra-
tions.  The complete preregistration of our study of pre-registrations can be found 
here. Note that although our own pre-registration followed the Prereg Challenge 
Registration format, it was not entered into the Prereg Challenge competition be-
cause two of the authors of the current article are involved in the organization of 
the Prereg Challenge. We wrote our own pre-registration according to the stan-
dards we set for the ideal pre-registration (see our scoring protocol described in 
the method section) and continued revision until it received full marks from one 
of the members of the coding team (EC) who was not involved in the creation of 
the scoring protocol. 
METHOD
Researcher Degrees of Freedom Assessed
In order to evaluate the extent to which Standard Pre-Data Collection Registra-
tions (SPR) and Prereg Challenge Registrations (PCR) restricted potential oppor-
tunistic use of researcher degrees of freedom (researcher DFs), we employed the 
list of researcher DFs we presented in Chapter 5 (Wicherts et al., 2016), which 
aimed to raise awareness of the risk of bias implicit in a lot of research designs in 
psychology and other fields.  The list can be used in research methods education, 
as a tool to assess potential bias in unregistered studies, and as a checklist to 
assess the quality of preregistrations. The latter use was implemented in the cur-
rent study, where we constructed a coding protocol based directly on this list. As 
explicated in Chapter 5 (Wicherts et al., 2016), the list itself was created in a qual-
itative manner based on both the existing literature (Bakker et al., 2012; Bakker & 
Wicherts, 2014b; Chambers, 2013; Francis, 2013; John et al., 2012; Kriegeskorte 
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et al., 2009; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2011; Simmons et al., 2011; Simonsohn et al., 
2014a; Steegen et al., 2016; van Aert et al., 2016; Wagenmakers et al., 2011) and 
additional considerations.
 The items on the list are categorized into five phases of the research process: 
formulating the hypotheses, designing the study, collecting the data, analyzing 
the data, and reporting. Although the list is by no means exhaustive, it covers a 
wide range of researcher DFs that can play a role in psychological research. It is 
important to note that the list was composed with the use of NHST in mind, and 
with a particular focus on experimental study designs (although it also applies to 
non-experimental studies). In the current study, we only included 29 out of the 34 
researcher DFs from Wicherts et al. (2016) because five of the researcher DFs only 
concern the actual reporting phase of a study and therefore cannot be assessed 
based only on a pre-registration. Table 6.1 presents the list of 29 researcher DFs 
that we included in the current study. It provides the codes used in the original 
list (Chapter 5, Wicherts et al., 2016), it indicates to which other researcher DFs 
each researcher DF is related, the description of the researcher DF identical to the 
original list, and short labels describing the researcher DFs that we use later when 
describing our results. 
Table 6.1 Degrees of freedom in formulating the hypotheses, designing the study, collecting 
the data, analyzing the data, and reporting of psychological studies
Code Related Type of Researcher Degree of Freedom Label
Hypothesizing
T1 R6 Conducting explorative research without any hypothesis Hypothesis
T2 Studying a vague hypothesis that fails to specify the 
direction of the effect
Direction hypothesis
Design




D2 A10 Measuring additional variables that can later be selected 
as covariates, independent variables, mediators, or 
moderators
Additional IVs
D3 A5 Measuring the same dependent variable in several alter-
native ways
Multiple measures DV
D4 A7 Measuring additional constructs that could potentially act 
as primary outcomes
Additional constructs
D5 A12 Measuring additional variables that enable later exclusion 




D6 Failing to conduct a well-founded power analysis Power analysis
D7 C4 Failing to specify the sampling plan and allowing for 
running (multiple) small studies
Sampling plan
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Code Related Type of Researcher Degree of Freedom Label
Data collection
C1 Failing to randomly assign participants to conditions Random assignment
C2 Insufficient blinding of participants and/or experimenters Blinding
C3 Correcting, coding, or discarding data during data collec-
tion in a non-blinded manner
Data handing/collec-
tion
C4 D7 Determining the data collection stopping rule on the ba-
sis of desired results or intermediate significance testing
Stopping rule
Data Analysis
A1 Choosing between different options of dealing with 
incomplete or missing data on ad hoc grounds
Missing data
A2 Specifying pre-processing of data (e.g., cleaning, nor-
malization, smoothing, motion correction) in an ad hoc 
manner
Data pre-processing
A3 Deciding how to deal with violations of statistical assump-
tions in an ad hoc manner
Assumptions
A4 Deciding on how to deal with outliers in an ad hoc 
manner
Outliers
A5 D3 Selecting the dependent variable out of several alterna-
tive measures of the same construct
Select DV measure
A6 Trying out different ways to score the chosen primary 
dependent variable
DV scoring
A7 D4 Selecting another construct as the primary outcome Select primary out-
come 
A8 D1 Selecting independent variables out of a set of manipu-
lated independent variables
Select IV
A9 D1 Operationalizing manipulated independent variables in 




A10 D2 Choosing to include different measured variables as co-
variates, independent variables, mediators, or moderators
Include additional IVs.




A12 D5 Using alternative inclusion and exclusion criteria for 
selecting participants in analyses
In/exclusion criteria
A13 Choosing between different statistical models Statistical model
A14 Choosing the estimation method, software package, and 
computation of SEs
Method and package
A15 Choosing inference criteria (e.g., Bayes factors, alpha lev-
el, sidedness of the test, corrections for multiple testing)
Inference criteria
Reporting
R6 T1 Presenting exploratory analyses as confirmatory (HARKing) HARKing
Table 6.1 Continued
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The Scoring Protocol
For the current study, we created a protocol (see Appendix C) assessing to what 
extent a random selection of Standard Pre-Data Collection Registrations (SPR) and 
a random selection of Prereg Challenge Registrations (PCR) restricted potential 
opportunistic use of these 29 researcher DFs. The sample details are provided in 
the next section. Using the protocol, we assigned scores ranging from 0 to 3 to 
each of the 29 researcher DFs in each pre-registration in our sample. These scores 
had the following meaning: opportunistic use of the researcher DF was 0) not 
restricted at all, 1) restricted to some extent, 2) completely restricted (i.e., it was 
‘precise’), or 3) completely restricted by an explicit statement concerning the sole 
manner in which it was restricted (i.e., it was ‘exhaustive’ - an explicit statement 
that no deviation from the way it was registered would occur). As an example, we 
provide the protocol question to score researcher DF A4: ‘Deciding on how to deal 
with outliers in an ad hoc manner’. This question and its answer categories were 
as follows: 
Does the pre-registration indicate how to detect outliers and how they should be 
dealt with?
 ▪ NO not described at all   A4 = 0
 ▪ PARTIAL described but not reproducible on at least one of the following
two aspects: what objectively defines an outlier (e.g., particular 
Z value, values for median absolute deviation statistic (MAD),
interquartile range (IQR), Mahalanobis distance) and how they
are dealt with (e.g., exclusion, method of Winsorisation, type of
non-parametric test, type of robust method, bootstrapping)  A4 = 1 
 ▪ YES reproducible on both aspects (objective 
definition of outliers & method of dealing with outliers)   A4 = 2
 ▪ YES like previous AND explicitly excluding other methods of
dealing with outliers (“we will only use”)   A4 = 3 
This question was used to only score researcher DF A4, because A4 was is not 
related to other researcher DFs. As can be seen in the full protocol given in the Ap-
pendix C, scores on 13 of the researcher DFs showed some dependencies across 
different researcher DFs.  
Sample
At the start of our study (August 17, 2016), 5,829 publicly available pre-registra-
tions were listed on the pre-registrations search page on the Open Science Frame-
work. These registrations included all types of pre-registrations then available on 
the Open Science Framework. As it was not possible to view how many belonged 
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in each category without visually inspecting the individual pre-registrations, the 
Center for Open Science provided us with the URLs to the 122 public Prereg 
Challenge Registrations (PCRs) that had been submitted until August 16, 2016. 
Following the procedure described in the next section, we randomly selected a 
total of 53 PCRs and 53 SPRs. This sample size was based on our pre-registered 
power analysis conducted in GPower 3.1 for the key test of the differences in 
mean scores (outlined in the section ‘variables’ below) between the two types 
of pre-registrations using a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U-test. This power analysis 
yielded a total required sample size of 106 (53 per group) for a power of .80 to 
detect a medium effect size of Cohen’s d = 0.50. While we had no previous liter-
ature to base the estimated effect size on, we considered a medium effect size 
to be an indication of a practically relevant difference between the two types of 
pre-registrations. As pre-testing of our protocol indicated that the necessary total 
sample size of 106 already required a total of at least 212 hours of coding, time 
constraints and financial restrictions did not allow us to aim for a higher number 
than the number yielded by the power analysis. 
Our approach followed our pre-registration with the following exception: we 
started the coding phase of our study (see paragraph ‘Coding Procedure’ in the 
next section) with 53 SPRs and 53 PCRs, but during the coding phase one of the 
PCR (with pre-registration number 54) turned out to have been withdrawn by 
the authors of the pre-registration. As the coding phase could not be finalized for 
this pre-registration, we excluded this pre-registration from our data file. Our final 
sample thus consisted of 53 SPRs and 52 PCRs.
Procedure
Selection of pre-registrations
Because the two types of pre-registrations were collected from different databas-
es and because they differed in their standard features, we had slightly different 
selection procedures for each type of pre-registration. Both procedures followed 
our own pre-registration in all regards, except for an unforeseen issue discussed 
in Footnote 1. We now outline both procedures.
Standard Pre-Data Collection Registrations (SPRs) 
Because it was impossible to determine how many of the 5,829 public preregistra-
tions on the Open Science Framework were SPRs, we first selected a random set 
of 250 pre-registrations from the total of 5,829 results as a pre-selection. We did 
this by means of an R script (R version 3.2.4) that generated 250 random numbers 
between 1 and 5,829 and using these numbers to select the pre-registrations that 
corresponded to these numbers. Although the pre-registrations on the Open Sci-
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ence Framework were not numbered, the result pages were numbered and each 
contained 10 pre-registrations. We could thus use the numbering of the pages to 
locate the pre-registrations that corresponded to the generated random num-
bers. We then copied the hyperlinks of the selected pre-registrations into an Excel 
file in the order of the generated random numbers. Subsequently, we created two 
copies of these files and two coders (EC and CV) started independently at the top 
of the rows in their file and checked all 250 selected pre-registrations for eligibility 
on the basis of the selection criteria listed below. Next, the coded files of both 
coders were compared, and the first 53 pre-registrations for which both coders 
agreed on inclusion were included1. Finally, we allocated an identifying number (1 
to 53) to each of the selected registrations in the order of which they were (ran-
domly) selected by the code above.
Selection criteria for SPRs. The URLs to the preregistrations in our Excel file 
(see previous paragraph) sometimes referred to the main page of a pre-registered 
project, while in other cases they referred to sub-components of a pre-registered 
project (e.g. only to the analysis plan). The selection criteria were meant to be 
applied to the main page of a project. Thus, when the URL turned out to refer to 
a sub-component (observed by checking whether the front page of the registra-
tion contained a name before the slash, see the example in our own pre-registra-
tion), we copied the URL to the main page of the project (i.e. the URL of the page 
reached when clicking on the name before the first slash) in a new column next 
to the columns with the original URL. Then we only retained the URLs to the main 
page of each project and applied the following selection criteria, for Standard 
Pre-Data Collection Registrations:
 ▪ Only pre-registrations that were labeled as an OSF-Standard Pre-Data Collec-
tion Registration were included (the label was visible in the field ‘Registration 
Supplement’ on the main page of each pre-registration).
 ▪ Pre-registrations of replications studies were excluded. We excluded these 
because researcher DFs are typically more restricted in replications than in 
1 As a much smaller percentage of the registrations were Standard Pre-Data Collection Registrations (see selec-
tion criteria) than anticipated, this selection only yielded 31 registrations to include in our final sample. For 
this reason, we randomly selected a second sample of 250 pre-registrations with the same code used for the 
first sample of 250 pre-registrations. We repeated the described selection process once again with this second 
pre-selection of 250 pre-registrations (coders CV and MB). Because in this second sample we only had to con-
tinue until we had 22 pre-registrations that had been found eligible by both coders, it was agreed that the two 
files would be compared when both coders had found at least 30 pre-registrations eligible, rather than to con-
tinue coding all 250 pre-registrations. We considered 33 pre-registrations before we obtained the required 29. 
We added these 29 pre-registrations from the second round to the 31 pre-registrations from the first round, 
and then checked for duplicates in the total sample. We found six pre-registrations of which the hyperlink 
referred to the same project as another pre-registration’s hyperlink. We removed the occurrences of these six 
pre-registrations that were lower on the list than the one that we retained, leaving us with 54 pre-registrations. 
We then selected the first 53 out of 54 to include in our final sample.
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original studies as replication studies tend to follow the exact protocol of the 
original study. If one or more of the words ‘replication’, ‘RRR’, or ‘RPP’ were 
mentioned in the title of the pre-registration, the pre-registration was not 
considered eligible. If the title did not mention one of these words but an 
abstract (if present) or summary (if present) explicitly stated that the project 
was a replication, the study was not considered eligible either.
 ▪ Only pre-registrations written in English were included.  
 ▪ Only fully accessible preregistrations were included. We excluded preregis-
trations to which access turned out to be restricted (e.g., when clicking on 
the link to the pre-registration yielded the message ‘this action is forbidden’). 
 ▪ Only pre-registrations that contained at least one statistically testable hy-
pothesis were included. We excluded pre-registrations in which no hypothe-
ses could be tested by means of statistical analysis. 
 ▪ “Test pre-registrations” we excluded. We evaluated whether a pre-registration 
was a real pre-registration or a test case by examining the title of a pre-registra-
tion for words like ‘test’, ‘test registration’, or ‘pre-registration demonstration’. 
 ▪ Pre-registrations of pre-tests of materials and of pilot studies were excluded. 
If the title of the pre-registration contained the words ‘pre-test’ or ‘pilot’, the 
pre-registration was not considered eligible. 
 ▪ Pre-registrations that were written by any of the coders were excluded. If the 
name of one of the coders appeared on the pre-registration, the pre-registra-
tion was not considered eligible. 
 ▪ Pre-registrations that were part of the set of three pre-registrations that we 
used to test our protocol were excluded. 
Prereg Challenge Registrations (PCRs)
We checked the 122 public Prereg Challenge entries that we received from the 
Center for Open Science for eligibility in a manner almost identical to the man-
ner in which we checked the SPR for eligibility. The only difference was that we 
checked all 122 for eligibility, because the population was so much smaller than 
the population of SPR. We did however check the 122 PCR in randomized order, 
determined again by an R script (R version 3.2.4). The first 53 PCR that were con-
sidered eligible by two coders (MB and EC) were included in the sample.
Selection criteria for PCR. A number of the selection criteria for the other 
type of pre-registration (SPC) had by definition been met by public PCR because 
for entry into the Prereg Challenge they had already been reviewed by the Center 
for Open Science on the following criteria: being a Prereg Challenge Registration, 
being written in English, being fully accessible, not being a test registration, and 
containing at least one testable hypothesis. We therefore only had to apply the 
following remaining selection criteria (as stipulated in our own pre-registration):  
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 ▪ Pre-registrations of replications studies were excluded (see selection criteria 
for SPR).
 ▪ Pre-registrations of pre-tests of materials and of pilot studies were excluded 
(see selection criteria for SPR). 
 ▪ Pre-registrations that were written by any of the coders were excluded (see 
selection criteria for SPR). 
 ▪ Pre-registrations that were part of the set of three pre-registrations that we 
used to test our protocol were excluded. 
Coding Procedure
Each pre-registration was coded independently by two coders, according to a 
scheme generated by an R script (R version 3.2.4). The coders first entered the 
number of hypotheses they encountered in the pre-registration into their coding 
sheet, and then followed the protocol to score each of the 29 researcher DFs. In 
the early phase of coding, scoring one pre-registration took each coder on average 
45 to 60 minutes, but this length decreased as the coders gained more experience. 
When all coders finished their coding, the scores given to each pre-registration by 
each pair of coders were automatically compared by means of another R script 
(R version 3.2.4). We computed the percentage of scores on which the coders 
agreed using yet another R script (R version 3.2.4), and we computed an agree-
ment percentage for the number of hypotheses that the coders had counted. 
Across all pre-registrations and coding pairs, coders agreed on the number of 
hypotheses in only 14.29% of the scores given. Across SPR only, this agreement 
percentage was 15.09%, and across PCR only, this was 13.46%. The agreement 
percentages were much higher for the coding of the researcher DFs: across all 
researcher DFs, pre-registrations and all coding pairs, the same score had been 
given in 74.84% of the cases. For SPR only, the same score had been given in 
77.75% of the cases, and for PCR in 71.88%.  
In case of discrepancies on the coding of researcher DFs, the two coders dis-
cussed their coding until they agreed on a final score. As these discussions turned 
out to solve all discrepancies, it was not necessary to ask a third coder to solve 
any disagreements. We did not attempt to resolve discrepancies with respect to 
the number of hypotheses that had been counted as the specific hypotheses were 
not part of our analyses but merely served as an indication of clarity and speci-
ficity of the pre-registrations.  As the protocol instructed coders to evaluate each 
hypothesis in a pre-registration and to then assign to each researcher DF the low-
est score for each hypothesis, the scores were based on the worst pre-registered 
hypothesis in each pre-registration regardless of how many hypotheses had been 
counted.
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Variables of interest
In line with our own pre-registration, we computed two mean scores: 1) a score 
indicating to what extent a pre-registration restricted opportunistic use of re-
searcher DFs: the Registration Restriction Score (RRS), and 2) a score indicating 
to what extent each researcher DF was restricted across pre-registrations: mean 
score per researcher DF. The RSS was computed as the unweighted arithmetic 
mean of the scores (0-3) of all 29 researcher degrees of freedom in our protocol. 
As there were dependencies between some of the researcher degrees of free-
dom (see Table 6.1), some researcher DFs carried more weight than others. The 
restriction score per researcher DF was calculated as the unweighted arithmetic 
mean of the scores (0-3) across each set of (53 and 52) pre-registrations. These 
are presented in Table 6.2 as the means per researcher DF. 
Statistical analyses
To test our hypothesis that PCRs restrict the potential for opportunistic use of 
researcher DFs to a greater extent than SPRs, we compared the median RSS of 
the PCRs to the median RSS of the SPRs by means of a one-tailed two-group Wil-
coxon Rank Sum Test (i.e. equivalent to a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U test). The 
reason we pre-registered the use of a non-parametric test was that we expected 
the Pre-registration Restriction Scores to be non-normally distributed, and this 
non-parametric test is robust against non-normality while still being relatively 
powerful (Bakker & Wicherts, 2014b). We then conducted explorative follow-up 
analyses to investigate on which of the researcher degrees of freedom the two 
types of pre-registrations differed. To this end, we conducted 29 two-tailed Wil-
coxon Mann Whitney U tests to compare the median scores of the two groups 
per researcher degree of freedom. In all analyses we maintained an inference 
criterion of alpha = 0.05 (as pre-registered). 
As a measure of effect size of the differences in medians, we employed Cliff’s 
Delta (Cliff, 1993, 1996). Cliff’s Delta is a measure of effect size for comparing the 
central tendency of two distributions, say U and V (Macbeth, Razumiejczyk, & 
Ledesma, 2011), and linearly related to P(U > V), i.e. the probability that a ran-
domly drawn observation from U exceeds a randomly drawn observation from V. 
Cliff’s Delta varies from -1  to 1. We used Cliff’s Delta because it is suitable to assess 
effect size for comparing central tendency of ordinal variables, without making 
any assumptions on the distributions of the two variables, and because it is eas-
ily interpretable. Values under 0.147 are considered ‘negligible’, values between 
0.147 and 0.330 are considered ‘small’, values between 0.330 and 0.474 are con-
sidered ‘medium’, and values larger than 0.474 are considered ‘large’ (Romano, 
Kromrey, Coraggio, & Skowronek, 2006), see https://cran.r-project.org/web/pack-
ages/effsize/effsize.pdf. 
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Our final data file contained 35 columns: one column with the pre-regis-
tration number, one column with the title of the pre-registration, one column 
with the hyperlink to the pre-registration,  one column with group number (0 
for pre-registrations from the group ‘Standard Pre-Data Collection Registrations’ 
and 1 for pre-registrations from the group ‘Prereg Challenge Registrations’), two 
columns with the number of hypotheses that the coders counted in the pre-reg-
istration (one column for coder 1, and one column for coder 2), and 29 columns 
with one researcher degree of freedom each. For our analyses, we used an R 
script (R version 3.2.4), which was an elaborated version of our pre-registered 
analysis script. Besides our decision not to code pre-registration no. 54 (see sam-
ple description above), we did not exclude any data. After coding of the data, the 
data file was checked for missing values, and coders who left values missing were 
asked to code the variables they missed. Values coded as 99 indicated that the 
specific variable was not applicable in the coded registration. As we indicated in 
our pre-registration, we dealt with missing values in the following way. For our 
confirmatory analysis, we employed two-way imputation, i.e. based on the corre-
sponding row and column means. For our follow-up analyses (conducted at the 
column-level), we employed pairwise deletion of missing values. The tables in this 
manuscript were created using an R Markdown script. Please note however that 
in these tables, the researcher DF labels were added manually, and some column 
names were adapted. The R Markdown script can be used directly when loading 
the workspace of the analysis script.
RESULTS
Overall difference between Standard Pre-Data 
Collection Registrations (SPRs) and Prereg Challenge 
Registrations (PCRs)
Our first research question was whether pre-registrations that were written fol-
lowing more detailed and specific requirements (PCR) restricted opportunistic use 
of researchers degrees of freedom more than pre-registrations that were written 
following less detailed and specific requirements (SPR). In line with our pre-reg-
istered confirmatory hypothesis, Prereg Challenge Registrations received higher 
median Registration Restriction Scores (RSS): the median RRS was significantly 
higher in PCRs (Mdn = 0.81) than in SPRs (Mdn = 0.57), U = 2053, p = < .001. The 
difference was large (Cliff’s Delta = 0.49). Although RRS scores could range from 0 
to 3, the highest RRS received by SPRs was 1.05, while the highest score received 
by PCRs was 1.47. The median and maximum RRS scores in both types of pre-reg-
istrations suggest that the extent to which opportunistic use of researcher DFs 
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was restricted was overall low in both SPRs and PCRs. However, it should be taken 
into account that our protocol was rather strict. 
Differences between Standard Pre-Data Collection 
Registrations (SPR) and Prereg Challenge Registrations 
(PCR) at the level of the individual researcher DFs
As pre-registered, we conducted follow-up analyses to examine on which of the 
researcher DFs there were statistically significant differences in the distribution of 
scores between SPRs and PCRs. In Table 6.2, we report for each type of pre-reg-
istration the mean score of each researcher DF, and the distribution of the scores 
for each researcher DF. In addition, we provide for each researcher DF the results 
of the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test (equivalent to the Wilcoxon Mann Whitney U test), 
and Cliff’s Delta as a measure of effect size. Note that it can be observed from 
Table 6.2 that scores of 3 did not occur or were rare for most researcher DFs, con-
firming that the extent to which opportunistic use of researcher DFs was restrict-
ed was low in both types of pre-registration at the level of researcher DFs. Due to 
the differences in mean scores between many of the researcher DFs within each 
phase (hypothesizing, designing, data collecting, analyzing, and reporting), it is 
not feasible to compare how well the researcher DFs in each phase were restrict-
ed. What we can say, however, is that the researcher DFs pertaining to the hy-
pothesizing were relatively well restricted in both types of pre-registrations, and 
that the researcher DF pertaining to reporting was not restricted at all in either of 
the two types of pre-registrations. We address which researcher DFs tended to be 
better restricted than others while we report the differences between SPRs and 
PCRs in mean score on individual researcher DFs below.
In total, there were 15 researcher DFs on which there was no significant dif-
ference between the scores obtained by PCRs and SPRs, while 13 researcher DFs 
were significantly better restricted by PCRs than by SPRs. On eight of these 13 
researcher DFs the size of the difference was small in terms of Cliff’s Delta (0.147-
0.330), on three researcher DFs the size of the difference was medium (0.330-
0.474), and on two researcher DFs the difference in size was large (larger than 
0.474). Finally, there was one researcher DF that was better restricted by SPR than 
by PCR. We now zoom in on the researcher DFs in each of these categories.
Researcher DFs showing no differences between PCRs and SPRs
Many of the researcher DFs that failed to show a difference between the two 
types of pre-registrations were poorly restricted throughout. Researcher DFs re-
lated to HARKing were restricted by neither the PCRs nor the SPRs (D4, A7, and 
R6). That is, none of the pre-registrations in our sample explicitly specified that the 
confirmatory analysis section of the paper would not include another dependent 
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variable than the ones specified in the preregistration. These three researcher DFs 
are among the most obvious researcher DFs that pre-registrations are meant to 
restrict, and their seemingly poor restriction in the pre-registrations in our sample 
might be reason for concern. Researcher DFs pertaining to measuring additional 
variables (D2 and A10) were also poorly restricted. Although the PCR format asks 
authors to list all variables in the study, it does not ask for what purpose vari-
ables are measured that are not included in the analyses. Similarly, treating of 
data during data collection (C3) was hardly restricted by the pre-registrations and 
indeed neither format addresses this issue. Finally, two researcher DFs concerning 
the statistical model (A3 and A14) were poorly restricted. Despite the PCR format 
being rather specific about which aspects should be considered in the description 
of the statistical model, it does not mention violations of statistical assumptions, 
estimation method, or software to be used.
Researcher DFs with small differences between PCRs and SPRs.
Higher scores were obtained by PCRs than by SPRs on researcher DFs that per-
tained to the operationalization of the variables in the study: D1, D3 and A5, and 
D5 and A12. These differences indicate that the operationalization of variables 
was slightly better restricted through the PCR format, which may be due to the 
PCR format explicitly asking authors to be very specific in the description of all 
their variables, while the SPR format provides no instruction with respect to the 
description of variables. Most of these researcher DFs were relatively well restrict-
ed compared to other researcher DFs in both types of pre-registration, although 
the researcher DF pertaining to measuring the independent variable (D1) was 
generally not as well restricted as the other four. Researcher DFs that relate to 
the sampling plan and data collection stopping rule (D7 and C4) were also better 
restricted by the PCR format. Since the PCR format leaves room for authors to 
state that they will recruit a sample of ‘at least’ a certain size and that therefore 
continued sampling after intermediate testing  is not precluded might explain that 
the difference was rather small for the sampling plan and data collection stopping 
rule. Compared to other researcher DFs, these researcher DFs were moderately 
well restricted. Finally, there was a small difference on how to deal with outliers 
(A4) between the two types of preregistrations. In PCRs outliers were mentioned 
more often than in SPRs, as they are explicitly mentioned as part of the section 
‘data exclusion’ in the PCR format. However, although this researcher DF was rela-
tively more restricted than other researcher DFs, most of the PCRs did not specify 
how they would define outliers still leaving some room for defining outliers in 
different ways. 
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Researcher DFs with medium differences between PCR and SPR
There were three researcher DFs where the size of the difference in medians was me-
dium. The first of these pertained to randomization (C1). Restriction was not great in 
either set of pre-registration, but clearly better in the PCR format, which prompts au-
thors to at least mention randomization. However, if the sample of PCRs contained 
more survey studies using software such as Mturk or Qualtrics, the difference may 
also be explained by our decision to give a score of 3 when such studies stated that 
randomization would occur through the software’s randomization device. 
The second researcher DF that showed a medium difference between PCR 
and SPR concerned the operationalizing of independent variables (A9). This re-
searcher DF was well restricted in the PCR format, but only to some extent with 
the SPRs. However, we note that the mean scores on this researcher DF were 
heavily influenced by the relatively high number of pre-registrations that received 
a score of 3, particularly among PCRs. The reason for the occurrence of this un-
usually high score was that when the analysis concerned a t-test (or a non-para-
metric equivalent), we considered this researcher DF excluded by definition and 
therefore assigned a score of 3. t-tests were rather common, and may have been 
more common among PCRs. An explanation for the difference between PCRs and 
SPRs may lie in that a number of PCRs provided analysis scripts (leading to a score 
of at least 2), whereas this never occurred in SPRs. Finally, the researcher DF re-
lated to the choice of statistical model (A13) was, compared to other researcher 
DFs, relatively more restricted in both types of pre-registration, but the separate 
section dedicated to the data analyses in the PCR format may have been the cause 
of clearly better restriction in PCR than in SPR. 
Researcher DFs with large differences between PCR and SPR
There were two researcher DFs on which the difference between PCRs and SPRs 
was large. The first pertained to dealing with missing data (A1), which was not too 
well restricted in either type of pre-registration.  In the PCR format there was a 
question about dealing with missing values, prompting authors to at least men-
tion missing values, while the SPR format lacked such a prompt. However, most 
PCRs were not particularly detailed about what constituted a missing value, or 
how missing values were to be dealt with, rendering the scores on this researcher 
DF lower than other researcher DFs in the Prereg Challenge. 
The second researcher DF concerned the inference criteria (A15); in the PCR 
format, this researcher DF was moderately well restricted, whereas among SPRs, 
this researcher DF was hardly restricted at all. Again, the PCR format included a 
specific question asking authors to indicate which inference criteria they would 
use, while in the SPR format, merely asking authors to provide a summary of their 
project apparently did not induce most authors to mention inference criteria.  
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Researcher DFs that were better restricted by SPR than by PCR
Lastly, there was one researcher DF that was better restricted by SPRs than by 
PCRs. This researcher DF pertained to blinding (C2), and the difference was large. 
In a very large number of SPRs this researcher DF was coded as ‘Not Applicable’, 
whereas it was coded as 0 in the vast majority of PCRs. This difference is explained 
by the way our coding protocol was formulated. The protocol question consisted 
of two parts. First, it asked whether blinding of participants and/or experimenters 
was mentioned. In SPRs the word ‘blinding’ hardly ever appeared, resulting in 
most SPR being coded as ‘not applicable’, leaving few pre-registrations of this type 
to be coded.  Second, if blinding was mentioned, the coder checked whether the 
pre-registration described procedures to blind participants to and/or experiment-
ers to conditions. This was coded as 0 in the vast majority of PCRs because authors 
responded that blinding was not applicable or that no blinding occurred in their 
study to the question in the PCR format asking authors to describe blinding proce-
dures in their study. We decided to strictly adhere to our pre-registered protocol, 
and answer ‘yes’ to the question of whether blinding was mentioned and then al-
most always coded ‘0’, because responses such as ‘no blinding occurred’ were not 
considered to describe blinding procedures. We realize that this was a choice that 
resulted in scores that were unrepresentative of how well pre-registrations of the 
PCR type restricted this researcher DF, and that the PCR scores on this researcher 
DF should not be over-interpreted. 
DISCUSSION
In this study, we investigated whether pre-registrations that were written following 
more detailed and specific requirements (Prereg Challenge Registrations) restricted 
opportunistic use of researcher’s degrees of freedom more than pre-registrations 
that were written following less detailed and specific requirements (Standard Pre-Da-
ta Collection Registrations). As expected, PCRs generally restricted opportunistic use 
of researcher DFs better than SPRs. In addition, we examined for each researcher DF 
separately whether it was restricted better in PCRs or in SPRs. A majority of research-
er DFs were more restricted by PCRs than by SPRs, although the difference was only 
large for two researcher DFs pertaining to missing values and to inference criteria, 
which were explicitly asked in the PCR format but not in the SPR format. Finally, 
we attempted to clarify which researcher DFs were better restricted than others, 
but found no systematic overall differences between restrictions of the researcher 
DFs appearing in different phases of a research project. However, researcher DFs 
pertaining to the hypothesizing phase were generally best restricted, and those per-
taining to HARKing were worst restricted. Although our design is correlational and 
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hence cannot entirely preclude confounding factors in comparing the pre-registra-
tion formats, comparison of the two formats suggests that differences in the specific 
requests in these formats underlie most differences; in line with our hypotheses, 
more specific requests are associated with more restricted researcher DFs.
Based on these results, we argue that reminding authors of all details to be 
described in a pre-registration produces pre-registrations that are better at doing 
what they are supposed to do: protecting authors from their own biases in con-
firmatory hypothesis testing. Specific guidelines and requirements are necessary. 
Without these specific guidelines and requirements, authors are free to leave as 
many researcher DFs unrestricted as they wish, rendering the label ‘pre-regis-
tered’ meaningless.
To illustrate what it could mean in practice when pre-registrations obtain low 
scores, we provide an example. Suppose that a pre-registration receives a score 
of 0 on six out of the 15 researcher DFs concerning the data analyses (which oc-
curred quite often). If we conservatively assume that each of these researcher DFs 
is associated with two options to analyze data, this offers the researcher a total of 
2^6 = 64 ways to analyze the data of their pre-registered study. It is clear there-
fore, that many current pre-registrations in both formats are insufficiently specific 
and still allow at least some ways of p-hacking. Thus even better, more specific and 
stricter instructions are needed to help researchers produce pre-registrations that 
further lower the risk of bias in (psychological) studies. 
Although our hypothesis that PCRs restricted researcher DFs to a larger ex-
tent than SPRs, we had expected larger differences between the two types of 
pre-registrations. More specifically, we did expect the SPRs to receive low scores, 
but we (informally) expected PCRs to receive higher scores than they eventually 
did. Especially at the level of the individual researcher DFs, the scores for most of 
the PCRs were rather disappointing. On many researcher DFs, the PCR scores were 
hardly better than the SPR scores. Most often this was the case when a researcher 
DF was not explicitly addressed in the PCR format, supporting the idea that the 
quality of pre-registrations indeed depends on the format according to which it is 
written. Nonetheless, the low scores on both types of pre-registrations were also 
partly attributable to the strictness of our protocol. That is, each coded researcher 
DF could only obtain a ‘3’ if it explicitly excluded other options than those men-
tioned in the pre-registration (referring to exhaustiveness of the pre-registration). 
Because none of the pre-registrations in our sample did this explicitly, scores of ‘3’ 
were only very rarely assigned. 
One might argue that pre-registering a study in itself is a form of explicitly 
excluding researcher DFs. However, we have learned from studies on registrations 
of randomized controlled trials that ‘outcome switching’ and HARKing are rather 
common even in publications of studies that were pre-registered (Chan, 2008; 
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Chan & Altman, 2005; Chan, Hrobjartsson, et al., 2004; Chan et al., 2008; Golda-
cre, 2016). Hence, by including the exhaustiveness criterion in our protocol we as-
sessed if authors explicitly prohibited changes in their protocol when carrying out 
and reporting their study. The idea is that if a pre-registration explicitly excludes 
changes in protocol, actual changes can no longer be defended by reasons such as 
by “lack of statistical significance”, “journal space restrictions”, or “lack of clinical 
importance” (Chan, Hrobjartsson, et al., 2004)“. Moreover, it is then no longer 
possible to deny any deviations from the protocol. In the study of outcome switch-
ing mentioned earlier (Chan, Hrobjartsson, et al., 2004), 86% of authors who were 
asked whether there had been any outcome measures that were not reported in 
their published article denied the existence of such measures, despite the regis-
trations of their study providing clear evidence for these outcome measures. 
In addition to being strict, our protocol was also far from perfect. Coders 
agreed on the coding in 74% of the scores, indicating that scoring based on the 
protocol was not unambiguous. During the discussions to resolve discrepancies, 
we learned that the coders sometimes had different interpretations of the proto-
col. We tried to reach agreement on each difference of interpretation in order to 
code all pre-registrations in a consistent manner. In some cases, it proved difficult 
to apply (some parts of) the protocol. For instance, when pre-registrations per-
tained to studies in which secondary data analysis occurred, the researcher DFs 
related to data collection and some parts of the design were impossible to code. 
When pre-registrations pertained to studies in which other estimation methods 
were used, such as Bayesian statistics or point estimation, many of the questions 
in our protocol were redundant. All issues regarding the protocol were recorded 
in notes kept by the coders, and these notes will be used to improve the protocol 
for future use. Another reason for the 74% agreement was that several pre-regis-
trations were so ill structured and loosely written that it was hard to make sense 
of the planned research. For example, it was often very difficult to understand 
what the main hypotheses were, as demonstrated by the percentage of agree-
ment on the number of hypotheses in a pre-registration being shockingly low 
(around 15%). Since all coders are all psychologists trained in formulating hypoth-
eses, we interpret this finding as evidence of researchers’ difficulty and inability 
to clearly state testable hypotheses and expectations. Our interpretation is in line 
with recent findings of Hartgerink, Wicherts, & van Assen (2017), who found that 
only in 15 out of 178 gender effects reported in published studies it was clearly 
stated whether these effects were as expected or hypothesized. Similarly, Motyl 
et al. (2017) often wrongly selected statistical results as focal results (Nelson, Sim-
mons, & Simonsohn, 2017), and researchers in the Open Science Collaboration 
experienced some difficulties in specifying the main hypothesis in the 100 primary 
studies included in the Reproducibility Project Psychology (Open Science Collab-
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oration, 2015). Thus, psychological researchers should improve the formulation 
of the hypotheses in both pre-registrations as well as in their published studies.
Another potential limitation is that our findings do not provide causal evidence 
on whether pre-registering studies restrict the opportunistic use of researcher de-
grees of freedom. Direct evidence might be obtained if the same studies are ran-
domly assigned to both a ‘pre-registration’ condition and a ‘no pre-registration’ 
condition and then analyzed and reported by two different teams.
Based on our results, we can suggest a number of ways in which to improve 
pre-registration formats so that they result in pre-registrations that better restrict 
opportunistic use of researcher degrees of freedom. First, we deem it clear that 
pre-registration formats need to help authors in writing pre-registrations that are 
specific, precise, and exhaustive. It is extremely difficult to write a good pre-reg-
istration, and authors need proper guidance. We therefore deem it unlikely that 
formats as proposed by AsPredicted, which consists of eight rather broad ques-
tions, produce pre-registrations that effectively restrict opportunistic use of the 
many researcher degrees of freedom that exist in most studies. We would have 
liked to assess this empirically, but were not able to. In the first design of our own 
study, we aimed to include pre-registrations from AsPredicted too, but the hosts 
of the website declined our request to share the public pre-registrations created 
on their site. Currently, some of the AsPredicted registrations are shared on the 
Open Science Framework, but at the time of the start of this study, we had no 
(legal) means of including these pre-registrations in our study.
In addition to offering specific guidelines and requirements, pre-registrations 
will likely improve if formats offer a way for authors to number their hypotheses, 
and to detail the way in which they will test each hypothesis separately. Thus, rath-
er than having authors first list all their hypotheses and sub-hypotheses, followed 
by the design, procedure, variables, and analyses, it will be clearer to first specify 
the design of the study, and then specify for each hypothesis how this design will 
be used to test the hypothesis, which variables are measured in what manner for 
the test of this hypothesis, and how the hypothesis will be tested statistically.  Fur-
thermore, pre-registrations will benefit from peer review. The PCRs in our sample 
had been reviewed by the Center for Open Science, but only in terms of whether 
it met all entry criteria. This form of review might have made authors of PCRs take 
writing the pre-registration more seriously than authors of SPRs, which are not 
reviewed at all. Review by peers who are knowledgeable on the research topic 
of the pre-registration, as occurs in Registered Reports (Chambers, 2013, 2015; 
Chambers et al., 2014) will likely significantly improve pre-registrations. Moreover, 
when peer reviewers assess a pre-registration prior to the execution of a study, 
they can actively contribute to improving the study design at precisely the right 
moment, thereby increasing the benefit of pre-registration even further.
Pre-registration evaluation      131 
In addition to reducing the effects of opportunistic use of researcher degrees 
of freedom in the published literature, pre-registration also benefits researchers 
directly. Although writing a good pre-registration takes time and effort, it even-
tually results in a more efficient research cycle. Writing the pre-registration of 
the current study was a lengthy process, but the extensive discussions during the 
process of writing our pre-registration helped us identify many of the potential 
issues in our study. During the analysis phase, we did not have to think about 
which analysis to conduct, how to deal with missing values, or what to do with 
outliers; the analysis script was a good as ready to be used. Writing the introduc-
tory and method section of the current manuscript was considerably faster and 
more straightforward than in our previous manuscripts reporting about un-regis-
tered studies or badly-registered studies. In addition, pre-registrations teach you 
a lot about all the issues you did not or could not foresee. As in our own pre-reg-
istration of the current study, there are always issues that were not anticipated, 
or which appear to have been a poor decision in hindsight. However, deviations 
from pre-registrations are not forbidden, as long as we are open and transparent 
about them. Pre-registrations are meant to reduce opportunistic use of research-
er degrees of freedom, not to eliminate researcher degrees of freedom from re-
search altogether. Authors of pre-registered studies are free to conduct as many 
(pre-registered or non pre-registered) exploratory analyses as they see fit and can 
even make changes to their confirmatory analyses, as long as they openly report 
(and discuss) these changes, and rightly distinguish exploratory analyses from the 
truly confirmatory analyses. These, and many other benefits of pre-registration 
(Wagenmakers & Dutilh, 2016) renders pre-registration a choice that does not 
tie your hands, but guides your hands towards more trustworthy and replicable 
results.
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Recent studies have highlighted that not all published findings in the scientific lit-
erature are trustworthy (e.g., Baker, 2016; Open Science Collaboration, 2015; Io-
annidis, 2005), suggesting that currently implemented control mechanisms such 
as high standards for the reporting of research methods and results, peer review, 
and replication, are not sufficient.  In psychology in particular, solutions are sought 
to deal with poor reproducibility and substandard replicability of research results 
(e.g. Munafò et al., 2017) . These problems are believed to be due to bias resulting 
from failure to publish all relevant research findings (publication bias, Dwan et al., 
2008; Ioannidis, Munafo, Fusar-Poli, Nosek, & David, 2014), common errors in the 
reporting of statistical results (e.g.,, Nuijten et al., 2016), and flexibility in the way 
data are analyzed (Simmons et al., 2011; Wagenmakers et al., 2011). In this dis-
sertation project I considered these problems from the perspective that the scien-
tific enterprise must better recognize the human fallibility of scientists (Mahoney, 
1976, 1979). First, I studied perceptions of the characteristics of scientists. Then I 
examined the prevalence of statistical reporting errors, and whether collaboration 
on statistical analyses might reduce these errors. Finally, I presented an overview 
of many potential biases in hypothesizing, designing, collecting, analyzing, and 
reporting of psychological experiments, and evaluated the promising method of 
pre-registration as a way to deal with these biases.
Perception of the characteristics of scientists
In Chapter 2 we aimed to learn to what extent the human fallibility of scientists is 
currently recognized. Specifically, we studied the degree to which scientists and 
lay people believe in the storybook image of the scientist: the image that scien-
tists are more objective, rational, open-minded, intelligent, honest and communal 
than other human beings. In four surveys among highly-educated lay people and 
scientists, we found that in both groups, belief in this storybook image of the 
scientist was strong. Moreover, scientists perceived larger differences between 
scientists and other professionals than lay people did.  In addition, we found in-
dications that scientists may be prone to the human tendency to attribute higher 
levels of desirable traits to people in one’s own group than to people in other 
groups.  We concluded that scientists do not readily recognize their own fallibility 
and may believe that other scientists are more fallible than themselves. 
The survey methodology we employed in Chapter 2 was subject to a number 
of limitations that are typical for (online) surveys: a low response rate and poten-
tial selection bias may have limited the generalizability of our findings. In addition, 
our sample of highly-educated lay people from the United States may not have 
been fully representative of the population of highly-educated lay people. Our 
research designs also presented a number of limitations. First, as objective data 
on higher levels of objectivity, rationality, open-mindedness, intelligence, integri-
136      Chapter 7
ty or communality among scientists is lacking, we cannot exclude the possibility 
that scientists and lay people are indeed correct in their positive perceptions of 
scientists. Second, our method of studying whether scientists recognize their own 
fallibility was rather indirect. A valuable avenue for future research may therefore 
lie in studies that compare the actual levels of objectivity, rationality, open-mind-
edness, integrity, intelligence, and communality that scientists and other profes-
sionals display. One may also more directly study how scientists value imposed 
system and policy changes: by conducting surveys or structured interviews asking 
scientists (1) how they perceive their own fallibility and that of fellow scientists, 
(2) to what extent they regard human fallibility to be a problem in science, and (3) 
whether they feel that solutions to better deal with human fallibility are needed. 
We deem it important that scientists acknowledge their own fallibility, because 
such self-reflection is the first line of defense against potential human error aggra-
vated by confirmation bias, hindsight bias, motivated reasoning, and other human 
cognitive biases that could well play a negative role in the scientific process.
Human error in psychological science
In Chapters 3 and 4 we zoomed in on psychological science and focused on human 
error in the use of null hypothesis significance testing (NHST), and considered a 
potential best practice of collaboration on statistical analysis that might help re-
duce the likelihood of these errors
In Chapter 3, we surveyed authors of 697 empirical articles published in six 
flagship psychology journals to investigate whether the authors had worked alone 
on the analysis or whether they had worked together in a so-called ‘co-pilot mod-
el of statistical analysis’ (Wicherts, 2011) in the first or only study reported in the 
article. We examined this by asking how many of the authors of the article had 
been involved in various aspects of the data analysis and the reporting of the 
results. Despite the fact that more than 99% of the articles had multiple authors, 
in the majority of these articles (around 60 -75 %), only one author had been in-
volved in conducting the analyses, writing down the sample details, and writing 
up the results. Moreover, in the majority of articles, only one author had access 
to the data at the time we conducted our survey (about a year after publication). 
This suggests that co-piloting or shared responsibility for the statistical analyses, 
is uncommon in psychology. We also documented errors in the statistical results 
reported in the 697 articles by means of the automated procedure ‘statcheck’. 
As in previous research, we found alarmingly high error rates: overall, 63% of the 
articles contained at least one statistical reporting error, and 20% of the articles 
contained at least one p-value that was erroneous to such a degree that it may 
have affected decisions about statistical significance. The probability that a given 
p-value was inconsistent was over 10%.  Although we expected co-piloting to low-
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er error rates, we failed to find an association between co-piloting and statistical 
reporting errors in the first or only study in the articles.
Potential limitations of the study reported in Chapter 3 arose because of its 
use of an (online) survey: the survey may have suffered from response bias, with 
authors of articles with more errors being less likely to respond than authors of 
articles with less errors. In addition, our survey required authors to remember au-
thor contributions for an article that had been published at least one year earlier, 
lowering the probability that the answers were accurate. In addition, our choice 
to include only those statistical results reported in the first or only study in the ar-
ticles rendered the total number of statistical results to be associated with co-pi-
loting practices to be relatively low. These limitations were dealt with in the study 
reported in Chapter 4, where we employed a larger set of articles and used a 
different method to determine whether co-piloting had occurred in these articles. 
In Chapter 4, we scanned the full population of psychology articles ever pub-
lished in the multidisciplinary Open Access journal PLOS ONE (14,946) for statis-
tical reporting errors, again using statcheck. To measure whether co-piloting had 
occurred in these articles, we made use of the author contribution section of the 
articles stating whom of the authors had been responsible for the data analyses. 
Here, we found error prevalences that were highly similar to those established in 
Chapter 3, but the percentage of articles in which co-piloting occurred according 
to these author contribution sections was considerably higher than according to 
our survey in Chapter 3: 76.4% versus 39.7%.  Despite having more statistical pow-
er and despite using a method that was not subject to the limitations of survey 
methodology, we again failed to find a relationship between a reduced likelihood 
of statistical reporting errors and collaboration on the statistical analyses. 
Even though the study reported in Chapter 4 addressed a number of lim-
itations of the study reported in Chapter 3, there was another set of potential 
limitations in the study reported in Chapter 4. First, the contribution disclosure 
forms used for the author contribution sections in published articles may not al-
ways yield a reliable picture of actual author contributions (Ilakovac et al., 2007). 
Second, we used the number of authors responsible for all analyses in the articles 
as a measure of co-piloting, while in the study reported in Chapter 3, we used the 
number of authors responsible for the first or only study reported in the article as 
a measure of co-piloting. The strategy in Chapter 4 allowed us to examine many 
more articles than our strategy in Chapter 3, but had the disadvantage that mea-
suring the number of authors responsible for all analyses reported in a complete 
article could not tell us how many authors had been responsible for the analyses 
of each of the individual studies within one article. 
Then there were a number of limitations that applied to both studies report-
ed in Chapters 3 and 4. The discrepancy between the two methods of measuring 
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the extent to which co-piloting had been employed suggests that we should be 
concerned about the validity of both our co-piloting measures. Neither of the 
measures may have truly captured what we consider co-piloting: that the statisti-
cal analyses are conducted independently by at least two co-authors, stipulating 
double-checks of the analyses and the reported results, open discussions on ana-
lytic decisions, and improved data documentation that facilitates later verification 
of the analytical results by (independent) peers (Wicherts, 2011). Given the many 
indicators for the presence of error and the potential for biases in statistical analy-
ses, more research into how researchers work when analyzing their data is clearly 
warranted. In addition, statistical reporting errors may not be the type of errors 
that are reduced by the co-pilot model. The use of null hypothesis significance 
testing (NHST) itself is prone to error (e.g. Huxley, 1986) and misinterpretation 
(e.g. Hoekstra, Finch, Kiers, & Johnson, 2006), and it may only be serious meth-
odological and analytical flaws that co-piloting (or collaboration with methodolo-
gists; Sijtsma (2015)) helps avoid.  We focused on NHST because it is a dominant 
approach in psychology and other fields (Krueger, 2001), but it would be interest-
ing to consider errors and biases with other inferential approaches such as use of 
confidence intervals (Cumming, 2014) or Bayesian statistics (e.g. Kruschke, 2015; 
Wagenmakers, 2007).
The high prevalence of statistical reporting errors suggests that the accuracy 
of published results cannot be taken for granted, and that further research study-
ing solutions is warranted. Here, we propose several ways to deal with human er-
ror in (psychological) research and suggest how the effectiveness of the proposed 
practices might be studies in future research. First, we suggest leaving detection 
of statistical reporting error to statcheck (Epskamp & Nuijten, 2015), which can be 
applied prior to and during peer review. Since currently statcheck can only detect 
statistical results reported in APA format, we both recommend more widespread 
APA reporting across journals, and consistent use of APA reporting in each article 
rather than the use of uninformative reports such as ‘p < .05’ or merely the sole 
p-values. Another way to reduce human error in reporting of statistical results is 
to compose manuscripts using programs in which scripts can be written that au-
tomatically insert all statistical results into a text file, such as R Markdown. Third, 
we maintain that shared responsibility for the statistical analysis, as inherent to 
co-authorship, comprises the obligation to critically examine all results reported 
in a manuscript, the raw data files, and the analysis scripts before submission, to 
document and archive the data in such a way that independent peers can verify 
the results reported in the published article, and to archive the data in a manner 
that ensures that all co-authors retain access to the data after publication of the 
manuscript. This kind of workflow is facilitated by platforms such as the Open Sci-
ence Framework (https://osf.io), and we highly recommend its use. 
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Fourth, we propose that in order to reduce the likelihood of methodological 
and statistical flaws, authors consult with a methodologist and/or statistician pri-
or to conducting their study and analyzing the data (Sijtsma, 2015; Sijtsma et al., 
2015). Finally, we recommend making as many of the analytical decisions as possi-
ble before the analyses are conducted or even before the study takes through the 
use of pre-registration (de Groot, 1956/2014; Wagenmakers et al., 2012). Think-
ing through all potential pitfalls in the design and the analyses and collaboratively 
formulating an analysis plan may help reduce methodological and analytical error 
through fostering open discourse among co-authors. In addition, pre-registration 
is meant to reduce bias due to opportunistic use of the many researcher degrees 
of freedom that researchers have in conducting psychological research, as was 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. The effectiveness of these potential best practic-
es could be studied by comparing error rates in articles in which these practices 
were and were not used. Randomized experiments would be ideal, as they would 
preclude the possible alternative explanation that researchers who already em-
ploy these practices are also those researchers who tend to make less (or more) 
reporting errors.
Human bias in psychological science
Psychological data can often be analyzed in many different ways. The often arbi-
trary choices that researchers face in analyzing their data are called researcher 
degrees of freedom (Simmons et al., 2011). Researchers might be tempted to use 
these researcher degrees of freedom in an opportunistic manner in their pursuit 
of statistical significance (often called p-hacking), which is understandable from 
the perspective that scientists are prone to human cognitive biases. However, op-
portunistic use of researcher degrees of freedom leads to biased inferences, dis-
semination of results that potentially constitute false positives, and inflated effect 
size estimates of genuine effects. Together, this lowers not only the reproducibility 
of analytical results, but also the likelihood that results can be replicated in new 
samples of the same population. Therefore, it is important to deal with researcher 
degrees of freedom effectively. 
In Chapter 5, we created a list of researcher degrees of freedom that psy-
chological scientists have in formulating their hypotheses, designing their exper-
iment, collecting their data, analyzing their results, and reporting their results. 
The list is not exhaustive and was compiled with the use of NHST in experiments 
in mind, but several of the researcher degrees of freedom are applicable to other 
inferential techniques and designs. Future work pertaining to our checklist might 
include adaptions for studies using other frameworks and designs, and the devel-
opment of similar lists for use in different disciplinary fields. In its current shape 
it can be used to assess the level of potential bias in published research and as a 
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tool in research methods education. Its most interesting use however is to apply 
it as a checklist to evaluate whether pre-registrations are sufficiently specific, pre-
cise, and exhaustive to effectively restrict opportunistic use of research degrees 
of freedom. The list may be used by authors of pre-registration, reviewers of both 
pre-registrations as well as registered reports.
In Chapter 6, we assessed the extent to which current pre-registrations re-
stricted opportunistic use of the researcher degrees of freedom on the list pre-
sented in Chapter 5. Specifically, we employed a scoring protocol to compare two 
types of pre-registration formats currently available for psychological research 
that involve different levels of guidelines and requirements. As expected (and 
following our own pre-registration), we found that pre-registrations that were 
written following an elaborate set of guidelines and requirements restricted op-
portunistic use of researcher degrees of freedom considerably better than basic 
pre-registrations that were written following a limited set of guidelines and re-
quirements. However, neither of the types of pre-registrations were sufficiently 
specific, precise, and exhaustive to deal with all researcher degrees of freedom 
listed in Chapter 5. This led us to conclude that better instructions, specific ques-
tions, and stricter requirements are necessary in order for pre-registrations to do 
what they are supposed to do, namely protect authors from their own biases in 
confirmatory hypothesis testing. 
We concede that pre-registration is no easy task, and that not all issues in 
a study can be foreseen. We therefore argue that deviations from the pre-reg-
istered approach should not be forbidden, as long as they are transparently re-
ported. Deviations can be judged by peer reviewers and readers on the degree 
to which they are defensible and could have created potential biases. Although 
strictly speaking, any deviation from the pre-registration yields an exploration, 
the degree to which such an exploration is data driven (thereby creating potential 
bias) should be discussed openly. For instance, in Chapter 4, we described how 
we deviated from our pre-registered analysis plan after realizing that one of the 
dependent variables was very difficult to measure. However, we believe that as 
long as such unforeseen issues are transparently reported, they serve to increase 
understanding of the conducted research and the reported results, to guide fu-
ture research, and to illustrate that studies are not always as organized and clean 
as many research articles (unjustifiably) appear to suggest (Giner-Sorolla, 2012; 
Nosek & Bar-Anan, 2012).
Potential limitations of the study reported in Chapter 6 include that our find-
ings do not provide causal evidence on whether pre-registering studies restrict 
the opportunistic use of researcher degrees of freedom. Direct evidence might 
be obtained if the same studies are randomly assigned to both a ‘pre-registration’ 
condition and a ‘no pre-registration’ condition, and the data are analyzed and 
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reported by two different teams. Additionally, the protocol used to evaluate the 
pre-registration was rather strict. In addition, our protocol turned out not to be 
completely suitable for statistical frameworks other than NHST, and for studies 
using existing data. In the near future, we will improve our protocol so that it can 
be used in further evaluations of pre-registrations, and for designing pre-regis-
tered studies and writing registered reports. For example, other types of pre-reg-
istration formats, such as registered reports (Chambers, 2013) might be evalu-
ated using our improved protocol, and authors of pre-registrations themselves 
might benefit from using our protocol as a checklist guiding the creation of their 
pre-registration. Finally, we hope to be able to examine the future articles thast 
will report the eventual pre-registered studies in our sample, and compare these 
to the pre-registrations to see whether any deviations from the pre-registrations 
have occurred.
Dealing with our human fallibility
As an anonymous science Nobel Prize Laureate who participated in one of the 
studies in Chapter 2 proclaimed, “Scientists are human, and so sometimes do 
not behave as they should as scientists.”. By demonstrating how (psychological) 
science is prone to error and bias and by studying best practices I hope to help 
researchers break existing taboos on errors and bias that hamper open discussion 
about the way we (should) conduct our research. An honest reflection on research 
practices requires us to accept the fact that we as scientists are human and not 
immune to human fallibility. We can only deal with our fallibility and strengthen 
science effectively if we acknowledge the role of human factors and (continue to) 
study ways to reduce errors and bias in research. 
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTARY 
MATERIALS OF CHAPTER 2
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS AND SAMPLE SIZE 
DETERMINATION
Study 1
We planned to conduct a total of six ANOVAs (one for each ideal scientist feature) 
and to therefore use a Bonferroni-corrected family-wise alpha of 0.0083333 in 
each analysis. A priori power computations* yielded a required total sample size 
of 531 respondents (n = 133 per group) to obtain a power of .80 to detect a small 
to medium effect (f = .175).  To be on the safe side, we aimed for 150 people per 
condition.
Study 2
We planned to conduct two different sets of analyses: one where we compared 
the pooled means of the non-scientist professions to the means of the scientist 
profession (2 x 2 mixed design), and one where we compared the means of all 
different professions. We decided to only carry out the former set of analyses, 
but to include graphs with the means for the separate professions in the supple-
mental materials. The reasons for this decision were that the first set of analyses 
would yield more informative results with respect to our research question, and 
that the second set of analyses would have required a very large number of con-
trasted to be tested while these contrasts were not meaningful with respect to 
our research question itself. The nine non-scientists professions together formed 
a reliable scale on each of the six characteristics (Chonbach’s alphas ranging from 
.81 to .88, see Table S3), providing support for the assumption that these pro-
fessions together measure the construct ‘highly-educated professions’. With our 
Bonferroni-corrected alpha of 0.0083333, we needed 124* respondents (n = 62 
per group) to obtain a power of .80 to detect a small to moderate effect (f= .175). 
To be on the safe side, we aimed for 75 participants per group.
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Study 3
We planned to conduct a total of six ANOVAs (one for each ideal scientist feature) 
and to therefore use a Bonferroni-corrected family-wise alpha of 0.0083333 in 
each analysis. A priori power computations1* yielded a required total sample size 
of 762 respondents (n = 85 per group) to obtain a power of .80 to detect a small 
to medium effect (f = .175).
Study 4
We planned to conduct a total of six ANOVAs (one for each ideal scientist feature) 
and to therefore use a Bonferroni-corrected family-wise alpha of 0.0083333 in 
each analysis. A priori power computations* yielded a required total sample size 
of 531 respondents (n = 133 per group) to obtain a power of .80 to detect a small 
to medium effect (f = .175). 
* Power analysis was carried out in G*Power 1.3.6;
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STUDY REGISTRATION AND OUTLIER HANDLING
We registered our studies at the Open Science Framework. The registered studies 
are described in this article in the following order: ‘Study A’ (= Study 1), ‘Study D’ 
(= Study 2), ‘Study B’ (= Study 3), ‘Study C’ (= Study 4).   The registration of this 
series of studies can be found through https://osf.io/z3xt6/.
In line with Bakker and Wicherts (Bakker & Wicherts, 2014b) and Tukey 
(1977) we regarded data-points that lie 2 Inter Quartile Ranges (IQR) outside the 
lower and upper quartiles as outliers. The scripts provided on the Open Science 
Framework can easily be adapted to conduct the analyses without the removal 
of any outliers or the removal of outliers that lie 1.5 Inter Quartile Ranges (IQR) 
outside the lower and upper quartiles. 
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SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES
Note: Results are presented by respondent group: Asian scientists, European scientists, and American sci-
entists.
Figure S1 Attributions of Objectivity, Rationality, Open-mindedness, Intelligence, Integrity, and 
Communality to the typical highly-educated person versus the typical scientist by world part.
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Note: Results are presented by respondent group. 
Figure S2 Attributions of Objectivity, Rationality, Open-mindedness, Intelligence, Integrity, and 
Communality to people with various professions.
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Note: Results are presented by respondent group: Asian scientists, European scientists, and American sci-
entists.
Figure S3 Attributions of Objectivity, Rationality, Open-mindedness, Intelligence, Integrity, and 
Communality to people with highly-educated profession versus people with the profession of 
scientist by world part.
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SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES
Table S1 Sample details Study 1. 

















American Educated 312 49.2 13.8 23 - 84 46 100* 99.37
American Scientists 331 49.0 11.4 26 - 77 34 ** **
Asian Scientists 117 41.8 9.3 27 - 66 17 ** **
European Scientists 304 43.6 10.5 26 - 75 29 ** **
Total Scientists 752 10.58 8.50
Total 1064
Nobel Prize Laureates*** 34 75.3 12.7 45 - 93 0 18.95 17.89
Note: *Qualtrics sample: paid survey panel members. **response rates cannot be computed for the world 
parts separately because we did not know scientists’ location beforehand. The response rate is based on the 
total number of responses from scientists from all over the world, divided by the total number of e-mails 
sent to scientists from all over the world (for details see https://osf.io/3nepx/). Nobel Prize Laureates were 
not included in the analyses.
Table S2 Scale reliabilities Study 1.
Scale Cronbach’s alpha 95% CI
Objectivity .73 .66 ; .81
Rationality .76 .68 ; .83
Open-mindedness .77 .70 ; .85
Intelligence .73 .65 ; .81
Integrity .87 .81 ; .93
Communality .79 .72 ; .86
Note: Based on the data of the American Educated and American scientist respondents only. 95% CI = 95% 
confidence interval. 
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Table S3 Correlation tables Study 1: correlations between the characteristics of the ideal sci-
entist, by Target.
A highly-educated person
Feature 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Objectivity 1
2. Rationality .57*** 1
3. Open-mindedness .70*** .62*** 1
4. Intelligence .41*** .40*** .34*** 1
5. Integrity .63*** .52*** .60*** .40*** 1
6. Communality .67*** .42*** .56*** .42*** .68*** 1
A scientist
1. Objectivity 1
2. Rationality .50*** 1
3. Open-mindedness .67*** .60*** 1
4. Intelligence .30*** .27*** .23*** 1
5. Integrity .57*** .54*** .68*** .10 1
6. Communality .69*** .43*** .63*** .27*** .61*** 1
Overall
1. Objectivity 1
2. Rationality .56*** 1
3. Open-mindedness .70*** .62*** 1
4. Intelligence .39*** .38*** .31*** 1
5. Integrity .63*** .58*** .64*** .31*** 1
6. Communality .70*** .46*** .61*** .37*** .67*** 1
Note: Based on the data of the American Educated and American scientist respondents only.*significant 
at α = .05, **significant at α = .01, ***significant at α = .001. All p-values are adjusted for multiple testing.
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Table S5 Sample details Study 2.














American Educated 75 46.3 14.7 22-83 47% 100* 75.70*
American Scientists 111 49.9 12.4 27-85 20% ** **
Asian Scientists 20 45.5 12.3 26 - 69 15% ** **
European Scientists 67 44.6 10.6 28 - 75 25% ** **
Total Scientists 198 10.97 6.76
Total 273
Note: *Qualtrics sample: paid survey panel members. **response rates cannot be computed for the world 
parts separately because we did not know scientists’ location beforehand. The response rate is based on the 
total number of responses from scientists from all over the world, divided by the total number of e-mails 
sent to scientists from all over the world (for details see https://osf.io/3nepx/). 
Table S6 Scale reliabilities Study 2.
Scale Cronbach’s alpha 95% CI
Objectivity .81 .74 ; .87
Rationality .83 .77 ; .89
Open-mindedness .83 .77 ; .89
Intelligence .88 .83 ; .93
Integrity .84 .78 ; .90
Competitiveness .81 .74 ; .87
Note: Based on the data of the American Educated and American scientist respondents only. 95% CI = 95% 
confidence interval. 
Table S7 Correlation tables Study 2: correlations between the characteristics of the ideal sci-
entist, by profession category.
Highly-educated professions
Feature 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Objectivity 1
2. Rationality .73*** 1
3. Open-mindedness .75*** .68*** 1
4. Intelligence .75*** .72*** .74*** 1
5. Integrity .71*** .71*** .68*** .72*** 1
6. Communality .48*** .49*** .49*** .54*** .38*** 1
Profession of scientist
1. Objectivity 1
2. Rationality .60*** 1
3. Open-mindedness .47*** .39*** 1
4. Intelligence .48*** .47*** .21* 1
5. Integrity .57*** .49*** .33*** .46*** 1
6. Communality .10 .12 .28*** .13 .09 1
Note: Based on the data of the American Educated and American scientist respondents only.*significant 
at α = .05, **significant at α = .01, ***significant at α = .001. All p-values are adjusted for multiple testing.
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Table S9 Sample details Study 3.














Early-career scientists 515 35.2 5.8 26 - 941 33% * *
Established scientists 903 51.9 9.2 35 - 90 22% * *
Total 1418 10.55 5.97
Note: 1Probably erroneous maximum age: one person selected the first answer option on the list, which 
translates to age = 94. *Response rates cannot be computed for the two respondent groups separately be-
cause we did not know scientists’ career level beforehand. The response rate is based on the total number 
of responses divided by the total number of e-mails sent (for details see https://osf.io/3nepx/).
Table S10 Scale reliabilities Study 3.
Scale Cronbach’s alpha 95% CI
Objectivity .63 .57 ; .69
Rationality .74 .69 ; .79
Open-mindedness .67 .61 ; .73
Intelligence .70 .65 ; .75
Integrity .82 .77 ; .86
Communality .63 .57 ; .69
Note: 95% CI = 95% confidence interval. 
Table S11 Correlation tables Study 3: correlations between the characteristics of the ideal sci-
entist, by respondent group.
Early-career scientists
Feature 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Objectivity 1
2. Rationality .52*** 1
3. Open-mindedness .61*** .49*** 1
4. Intelligence .24*** .31*** .16*** 1
5. Integrity .57*** .53*** .58*** .24*** 1
6. Communality .54*** .29*** .46*** .18*** .55*** 1
Established scientists
1. Objectivity 1
2. Rationality .52*** 1
3. Open-mindedness .61*** .57*** 1
4. Intelligence .35*** .44*** .29*** 1
5. Integrity .54*** .54*** .58*** .21*** 1
6. Communality .55*** .36*** .49*** .25*** .53*** 1
Overall
1. Objectivity 1
2. Rationality .52*** 1
3. Open-mindedness .61*** .54*** 1
4. Intelligence .32*** .39*** .25*** 1
5. Integrity .56*** .54*** .58*** .23*** 1
6. Communality .55*** .33*** .48*** .23*** .55*** 1
Note: *significant at α = .05, **significant at α = .01, ***significant at α = .001. All p-values are adjusted for 
multiple testing.
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Table S13 Sample details Study 4.











Male scientists 711 45.1 11.9 25 - 86 * *
Female scientists 286 41.8 10.3 24 - 77 * *
Total 1418 11.99 7.62
Note: *Response rates cannot be computed for the two respondent groups separately because we did not 
know scientists’ gender beforehand. The response rate is based on the total number of responses by the 
total number of e-mails sent (for details see https://osf.io/3nepx/).
Table S15 Correlation tables Study 4: correlations between the characteristics of the ideal sci-
entist, by Respondent group.
Male scientists
Feature 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Objectivity 1
2. Rationality .65*** 1
3. Open-mindedness .65*** .65*** 1
4. Intelligence .37*** .44*** .35*** 1
5. Integrity .60*** .65*** .58*** .36*** 1
6. Communality .55*** .40*** .47*** .29*** .57*** 1
Female scientists
1. Objectivity 1
2. Rationality .59*** 1
3. Open-mindedness .62*** .60*** 1
4. Intelligence .43*** .49*** .44*** 1
5. Integrity .66*** .65*** .60*** .57*** 1
6. Communality .50*** .41*** .50*** .43*** .60*** 1
Overall
1. Objectivity 1
2. Rationality .63*** 1
3. Open-mindedness .64*** .63*** 1
4. Intelligence .39*** .45*** .37*** 1
5. Integrity .62*** .65*** .58*** .42*** 1
6. Communality .54*** .40*** .48*** .33*** .58*** 1
Note: *significant at α = .05, **significant at α = .01, ***significant at α = .001. All p-values are adjusted for 
multiple testing.
Table S14 Scale reliabilities Study 4.
Scale Cronbach’s Alpha 95% CI
Objectivity .62 .55 ; .69
Rationality .80 .75 ; .86
Open-mindedness .70 .63 ; .76
Intelligence .64 .57 ; .71
Integrity .80 .75 ; .86
Communality .61 .54 ; .68
Note: 95% CI = 95% confidence interval. 
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MATERIALS
In studies 1, 3 and 4, the following answering options were provided:
 □ Strongly Disagree
 □ Disagree
 □ Somewhat Disagree
 □ Neither Agree nor Disagree
 □ Somewhat Agree
 □ Agree
 □ Strongly Agree
Statements used in studies 1, 3, and 4
Study 1
Scientist condition 
Below, you will read a series of statements about the typical scientist. By ‘scien-
tist’, we mean a person who is trained in a science and whose job involves doing 
scientific research or solving scientific problems. For each statement, please indi-
cate to what extent you agree or disagree. Important: please base your answers 
on how true you believe each statement is, so the statements do not refer to how 
you think scientists should behave.
1. A scientist is capable of suppressing personal biases in the interest of objec-
tive inquiry (Objectivity).
2. A scientist assesses relevant information without prejudicial distortions (Ob-
jectivity).
3. A scientist exhibits little emotionality with respect to his/her beliefs (Objectivity).
4. A scientist has excellent problem-solving skills (Rationality).
5. A scientist can readily discriminate between illogical and logical reasoning 
(Rationality).
6. A scientist is logical in his/her professional problem solving (Rationality).
7. A scientist suspends judgment when faced with insufficient or ambiguous 
information (Open-mindedness).
8. A scientist is generally willing to acknowledge evidence that goes against his/
her beliefs (Open-mindedness).
9. A scientist is willing to change his/her beliefs when confronted with contrary 
evidence (Open-mindedness).
10. Standard measures of intelligence are a good predictor of the performance 
of a scientist (Intelligence).
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11. Superior intelligence is a prerequisite for a successful career of a scientist 
(Intelligence).
12. A scientist has a very high IQ score (Intelligence).
13. A scientist conducts his/her work with integrity (Integrity).
14. A scientist does not engage in unethical behavior to advance his/her career 
(Integrity).
15. A scientist does not commit fraud in his/her work (Integrity).
16. A scientist does not withhold information from his/her colleagues to protect 
his/her own interests (Communality).
17. A scientist exhibits cooperative rather than competitive behavior (Communality)
18. A scientist is not interested in personal fame or recognition (Communality).
Highly-educated condition
Below, you will read a series of statements about the typical highly-educated per-
son.  By ‘a highly-educated person’, we mean a person who obtained a Bachelor’s 
Degree or a Master’s Degree or a Professional Degree and whose job requires 
this high level of education. For each statement, please indicate to what extent 
you agree or disagree. Important: please base your answers on how true you be-
lieve each statement is, so the statements do not refer to how you think highly-ed-
ucated people should behave. 
1. A highly-educated person is capable of suppressing personal biases in the 
interest of objective inquiry (Objectivity).
2. A highly-educated person assesses relevant information without prejudicial 
distortions (Objectivity).
3. A highly-educated person exhibits little emotionality with respect to his/her 
beliefs (Objectivity).
4. A highly-educated person has excellent problem-solving skills (Rationality).
5. A highly-educated person can readily discriminate between illogical and log-
ical reasoning (Rationality).
6. A highly-educated person is logical in his/her professional problem solving 
(Rationality).
7. A highly-educated person suspends judgment when faced with insufficient or 
ambiguous information (Open-mindedness).
8. A highly-educated person is generally willing to acknowledge evidence that 
goes against his/her beliefs (Open-mindedness).
9. A highly-educated person is willing to change his/her beliefs when confront-
ed with contrary evidence (Open-mindedness).
10. Standard measures of intelligence are a good predictor of the performance 
of a highly-educated person (Intelligence).
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11. Superior intelligence is a prerequisite for a successful career of a highly-edu-
cated person (Intelligence).
12. A highly-educated person has a very high IQ score (Intelligence).
13. A highly-educated person conducts his/her work with integrity (Integrity).
14. A highly-educated person does not engage in unethical behavior to advance 
his/her career (Integrity).
15. A highly-educated person does not commit fraud in his/her work (Integrity).
16. A highly-educated person does not withhold information from his/her col-
leagues to protect his/her own interests (Communality).
17. A highly-educated person exhibits cooperative rather than competitive be-
havior (Communality).




Below, you will read a series of statements about the typical PhD-student. By 
‘PhD-student’, we mean a graduate student at an academic institution who is con-
ducting scientific research for his/her doctoral dissertation. For each statement, 
please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree.  Important: please base your 
answers on how true you believe each statement is, so the statements do not re-
fer to how you think PhD-students should behave. 
1. A PhD-student is capable of suppressing personal biases in the interest of 
objective inquiry (Objectivity).
2. A PhD-student assesses relevant information without prejudicial distortions 
(Objectivity).
3. A PhD-student exhibits little emotionality with respect to his/her beliefs (Ob-
jectivity).
4. A PhD-student has excellent problem-solving skills (Rationality).
5. A PhD-student can readily discriminate between illogical and logical reason-
ing (Rationality).
6. A PhD-student is logical in his/her professional problem solving (Rationality).
7. A PhD-student suspends judgment when faced with insufficient or ambigu-
ous information (Open-mindedness).
8. A PhD-student is generally willing to acknowledge evidence that goes against 
his/her beliefs (Open-mindedness).
9. A PhD-student is willing to change his/her beliefs when confronted with con-
trary evidence (Open-mindedness).
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10. Standard measures of intelligence are a good predictor of the performance 
of a PhD-student (Intelligence).
11. Superior intelligence is a prerequisite for a successful career of a PhD-student 
(Intelligence).
12. A PhD-student has a very high IQ score (Intelligence).
13. A PhD-student conducts his/her work with integrity (Integrity).
14. A PhD-student does not engage in unethical behavior to advance his/her ca-
reer (Integrity).
15. A PhD-student does not commit fraud in his/her work (Integrity).
16. A PhD-student does not withhold information from his/her colleagues to pro-
tect his/her own interests (Communality).
17. A PhD-student exhibits cooperative rather than competitive behavior (Com-
munality).
18. A PhD-student is not interested in personal fame or recognition (Communality).
Early-career scientist condition
Below, you will read a series of statements about the typical early-career scien-
tist. By ‘early-career scientist’, we mean a post-doctoral academic who obtained 
their PhD less than 10 years ago, and does not yet have tenure at a university or 
other academic institution.   For each statement, please indicate to what extent 
you agree or disagree. Important: please base your answers on how true you be-
lieve each statement is, so the statements do not refer to how you think early-ca-
reer scientists should behave. 
1. An early-career scientist is capable of suppressing personal biases in the in-
terest of objective inquiry (Objectivity).
2. An early-career scientist assesses relevant information without prejudicial 
distortions (Objectivity).
3. An early-career scientist exhibits little emotionality with respect to his/her 
beliefs (Objectivity).
4. An early-career scientist has excellent problem-solving skills (Rationality).
5. An early-career scientist can readily discriminate between illogical and logical 
reasoning (Rationality).
6. An early-career scientist is logical in his/her professional problem solving (Ra-
tionality)
7. An early-career scientist suspends judgment when faced with insufficient or 
ambiguous information (Open-mindedness).
8. An early-career scientist is generally willing to acknowledge evidence that 
goes against his/her beliefs (Open-mindedness).
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9. An early-career scientist is willing to change his/her beliefs when confronted 
with contrary evidence (Open-mindedness).
10. Standard measures of intelligence are a good predictor of the performance 
of an early-career scientist (Intelligence).
11. Superior intelligence is a prerequisite for a successful career of an early-ca-
reer scientist (Intelligence).
12. An early-career scientist has a very high IQ score (Intelligence).
13. An early-career scientist conducts his/her work with integrity (Integrity).
14. An early-career scientist does not engage in unethical behavior to advance 
his/her career (Integrity).
15. An early-career scientist does not commit fraud in his/her work (Integrity).
16. An early-career scientist does not withhold information from his/her col-
leagues to protect his/her own interests (Communality).
17. An early-career scientist exhibits cooperative rather than competitive behav-
ior (Communality).
18. An early-career scientist is not interested in personal fame or recognition 
(Communality).
Established scientist condition
Below, you will read a series of statements about the typical established scientist. 
By ‘established scientist’, we mean a scientist who obtained their PhD more than 
10 years ago, and has tenure at a university or other academic institution. For 
each statement, please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree. Important: 
please base your answers on how true you believe each statement is, so the state-
ments do not refer to how you think established scientists should behave. 
1. An established scientist is capable of suppressing personal biases in the inter-
est of objective inquiry (Objectivity).
2. An established scientist assesses relevant information without prejudicial dis-
tortions (Objectivity).
3. An established scientist exhibits little emotionality with respect to his/her 
beliefs (Objectivity).
4. An established scientist has excellent problem-solving skills (Rationality).
5. An established scientist can readily discriminate between illogical and logical 
reasoning (Rationality).
6. An established scientist is logical in his/her professional problem solving (Ra-
tionality).
7. An established scientist suspends judgment when faced with insufficient or 
ambiguous information (Open-mindedness).
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8. An established scientist is generally willing to acknowledge evidence that 
goes against his/her beliefs (Open-mindedness).
9. An established scientist is willing to change his/her beliefs when confronted 
with contrary evidence (Open-mindedness).
10. Standard measures of intelligence are a good predictor of the performance 
of an established scientist (Intelligence).
11. Superior intelligence is a prerequisite for a successful career of an established 
scientist (Intelligence).
12. An established scientist has a very high IQ score (Intelligence).
13. An established scientist conducts his/her work with integrity (Integrity).
14. An established scientist does not engage in unethical behavior to advance 
his/her career (Integrity).
15. An established scientist does not commit fraud in his/her work (Integrity).
16. An established scientist does not withhold information from his/her col-
leagues to protect his/her own interests (Communality).
17. An established scientist exhibits cooperative rather than competitive behav-
ior (Communality).




Below, you will read a series of statements about the typical male scientist. For 
each statement, please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree. Important: 
please base your answers on how true you believe each statement is, so the state-
ments do not refer to how you think male scientists should behave.
1. A male scientist is capable of suppressing personal biases in the interest of 
objective inquiry (Objectivity).
2. A male scientist assesses relevant information without prejudicial distortions 
(Objectivity).
3. A male scientist exhibits little emotionality with respect to his beliefs (Objec-
tivity).
4. A male scientist has excellent problem-solving skills (Rationality).
5. A male scientist can readily discriminate between illogical and logical reason-
ing (Rationality).
6. A male scientist is logical in his professional problem solving (Rationality).
7. A male scientist suspends judgment when faced with insufficient or ambigu-
ous information (Open-mindedness).
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8. A male scientist is generally willing to acknowledge evidence that goes against 
his beliefs (Open-mindedness).
9. A male scientist is willing to change his beliefs when confronted with contrary 
evidence (Open-mindedness).
10. Standard measures of intelligence are a good predictor of the performance 
of a male scientist (Intelligence).
11. Superior intelligence is a prerequisite for a successful career of a male scien-
tist (Intelligence).
12. A male scientist has a very high IQ score (Intelligence).
13. A male scientist conducts his work with integrity (Integrity).
14. A male scientist does not engage in unethical behavior to advance his career 
(Integrity).
15. A male scientist does not commit fraud in his work (Integrity).
16. A male scientist does not withhold information from his/her colleagues to 
protect his own interests (Communality).
17. A male scientist exhibits cooperative rather than competitive behavior (Com-
munality).
18. A male scientist is not interested in personal fame or recognition (Commu-
nality).
Female scientist condition
Below, you will read a series of statements about the typical female scientist. For 
each statement, please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree. Important: 
please base your answers on how true you believe each statement is, so the state-
ments do not refer to how you think female scientists should behave.
1. A female scientist is capable of suppressing personal biases in the interest of 
objective inquiry (Objectivity).
2. A female scientist assesses relevant information without prejudicial distor-
tions (Objectivity).
3. A female scientist exhibits little emotionality with respect to her beliefs (Ob-
jectivity).
4. A female scientist has excellent problem-solving skills (Rationality).
5. A female scientist can readily discriminate between illogical and logical rea-
soning (Rationality).
6. A female scientist is logical in her professional problem solving (Rationality).
7. A female scientist suspends judgment when faced with insufficient or ambig-
uous information (Open-mindedness).
8. A female scientist is generally willing to acknowledge evidence that goes 
against her beliefs (Open-mindedness).
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9. A female scientist is willing to change her beliefs when confronted with con-
trary evidence (Open-mindedness).
10. Standard measures of intelligence are a good predictor of the performance 
of a female scientist (Intelligence).
11. Superior intelligence is a prerequisite for a successful career of a female sci-
entist (Intelligence).
12. A female scientist has a very high IQ score (Intelligence).
13. A female scientist conducts her work with integrity (Integrity).
14. A female scientist does not engage in unethical behavior to advance her ca-
reer (Integrity).
15. A female scientist does not commit fraud in her work (Integrity).
16. A female scientist does not withhold information from her colleagues to pro-
tect her own interests (Communality).
17. A female scientist exhibits cooperative rather than competitive behavior 
(Communality).
18. A female scientist is not interested in personal fame or recognition (Commu-
nality).
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D2 = ?
2-tailed
(α = .10) ^ (α Prep < .10) ^  (Preal ≥ .10) 
/
(α = .10) ^ (α Prep ≥ .10) ^  (Preal < .10)
Study 1
E1 = 0 ^ E2 = 0
D1 = ?
α = .10 / α = .01  
‘marginal*’ / 
‘significant*’ 
(α = .10) ^ (α Prep < .10) ^  (Preal ≥ .10) 
/
(α = .10) ^ (α Prep ≥ .10) ^  (Preal < .10)
α = .10 / α = .01  
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‘significant*’ 
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Stop
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Before applying tree, decide for all tests in paper if they are 1-tailed (TwoTail = 0) or 2-tailed 
(TwoTail = 1) by looking for*tail* / *side* /direction* in each article
APPENDIX B: SUPPLEMENTARY 
MATERIALS OF CHAPTER 3
Note: S1 = study 1, E1 = one-sided error, E2 = two-sided error, D1 = one-tailed decision error, D2 = two-tailed 
decision error, Prep = reported p-value, Preal = computed/real p-value.
Figure S1 Manual check of decision errors part 1. 
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article text
E1 = 0 ^ E2 = 0
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Note: S1 = study 1, E1 = one-sided error, E2 = two-sided error, Prep = reported p-value, Pcomp = computed/real 
p-value
Figure S2 Manual check of decision errors part 2.
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APPENDIX C: SUPPLEMENTARY 
MATERIALS OF CHAPTER 6
PROTOCOL SCORING PREREGISTRATIONS
Hypotheses
Q1. Is at least one hypothesis specified such that it is clear what are the inde-
pendent and dependent variables? From the text it should be clear what will be 
tested (at the level of the preregistration).
 ▪ NO   T1 = all DFs = 0
 ▪ YES  T1 = R6 = 2
 ▪ YES, and the text specifies that this is/ these are the only
hypotheses tested in the confirmatory part of the analyses  T1 = R6 = 3
If the answer was YES, fill out the number of specified hypotheses in the column 
‘Nr_hyp_C_1’ or ‘Nr_hyp_C_2’ (depending on whether you’re coder 1 or coder 2 
for this pre-registration). Please look at columns C and D to check this!
For all hypotheses, answer the following questions for each analysis mentioned in 
the pre-registration. If multiple hypotheses are described in the pre-registration, 
then your evaluation of a researcher df will be the minimum of the evaluations for 
each hypothesis in that pre-registration. 
Q2. Is the direction of the hypothesis specified?
 ▪ NO   T2 = 0
 ▪ YES  T2 = 2
 ▪ YES, and the text specifies the sidedness of the statistical test
(if one-tailed, then the direction needs to be specified)  T2 = 3
Design
Q3a. Does the design include manipulated variables? Note: independent variables 
in within-subjects designs are also considered manipulated variables)
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 ▪ NO   D1=A8=A9 = 99(NA)
  + go to Q5
 ▪ YES  Go to Q3b
Q3b. Does the text explicitly exclude the possibility that at least one of the ma-
nipulated variables specified in the hypothesis will be omitted in the test of the 
hypothesis reported in the confirmatory analysis section? 
 ▪ NO   D1 = A8 = 0
 ▪ YES   D1 = A8 = 3
Q4. Does the text specify exactly how the manipulated variable will be used in the 
analysis to test the hypothesis (is it reproducible how each of the variables will be 
treated in the analysis, i.e. what are the values of the independent variable in the 
analysis)?
 ▪ NO   D1 = A9 = 0
 ▪ YES  D1 = min(A8, 2);
  A9 = 2
 ▪ YES, and the text specifies the manipulated variable will not be
used in another way (combination or splitting of conditions) 
in analyses to test the hypothesis in the confirmatory
analysis section  D1 = min(A8, 3);
  A9 = 3
Q5. Does the text explicitly exclude the possibility that at least one other variable 
(e.g. a covariate) is included in the analysis testing the hypothesis reported in the 
confirmatory analysis section?
 ▪ NO   D2 = A10 = 0
 ▪ YES  D2 = A10 = 3
Q6. Does the text specify exactly which measurement instrument (test, scale, 
question set, physical measurement) will be used as the main outcome variable?
 ▪ NO, it is not specified how the outcome variable is 
measured   D3=A5=A6=0
 ▪ YES the measurement instrument is specified   D3=A5=2
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 ▪ YES, and states that this is the only measurement 
instrument to be used in the analyses D3=A5=3
Q7. Does the text explicitly specify that the confirmatory analysis section of the 
paper will not include another dependent variable than the ones specified in all 
hypotheses of the preregistration? (answer at the level of the paper)
 ▪ NO   D4 = A7 = R6 = 0
 ▪ YES   D4 = A7 = 3;
  R6 = min(T1, 3)
Q8. Does the pre-registration indicate inclusion and exclusion criteria in selecting 
data points used in the analysis?
 ▪ NO not described at all   D5 = A12 = 0
 ▪ PARTIAL mentioned, but inclusion and exclusion criteria are
insufficiently reproducible because of a lack of objective criteria or
operationalization of the inclusion and exclusion of data (e.g., not specific 
on what it means for a participant to not participate seriously, 
what “awareness of the study purposes” means, what scores on
the selection variable are used to (de)select participants or data points, 
which clinical criteria are used)   D5 = A12 = 1
 ▪ YES inclusion and exclusion criteria are objective and 
reproducible  D5 = A12 = 2
 ▪ YES like 2 & explicitly excluding other reasons for inclusion and
exclusion (“we will only use” or including statement “we will use
data from all participants”)  D5 = A12 = 3
Q9. Is a power analysis reported?
 ▪ NO   D6 = 0
 ▪ YES but power level used for the power analysis < .8   D6 = 1
 ▪ YES the effect size estimate used for the power analysis is 
based on ((a representative preliminary study or meta-analytical
results OR (set at medium or smaller)) AND (at the same time the 
power analysis is used to make a sample size decision)  D6 = 2 
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 ▪ YES like previous AND the text indicates no other power analysis
will be included in the paper than this one  D6 = 3
Q10. (1) Is the exact number or range of participants given (not a minimum) AND at 
the same time (2) is the protocol of sampling described in all its details [i.e. (2a) exact 
number of people that will be approached is given, AND (2b) how (exact time frame 
and situation in which participants will be invited, e.g., all visitors of shop X in week Z 
are invited to participate in our experiment), AND (2c) inclusion and exclusion crite-
ria for selecting participants or data points, AND (2d) how many and how additional 
participants or data points are sampled when pre-set sample size is not reached?
 ▪ NO   D7 = C4 = 0
 ▪ YES partly but at most 1 of 2 (exact number/range or protocol)   D7 = C4 = 1
 ▪ YES   D7 = C4 = 2
 ▪ YES and text states paper will not deviate from the sampling plan D7 = C4 = 3
Collecting data
Q11a. Is the design of the study experimental, i.e. does it involve randomization 
of participants across conditions, or, in a within subjects design, does it involve 
randomization of task or question order?
 ▪ NO   C1= 99 (= NA)
  + go to Q12a
 ▪ YES  Go to Q11b
Q11b. Is specified how randomization is implemented?
 ▪ NO   C1 = 0
 ▪ YES text describes randomization procedure    C1 = 1
 ▪ YES text describes randomization procedure, AND at the 
same time the randomization procedure seems to work 
(i.e. randomization procedure cannot result in dependencies
in the data, e.g. all participants who arrive early are in one 
condition and the participants who arrive later are in the 
other condition)   C1 = 2
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 ▪ YES like previous and the text indicates the implemented 
randomization for the paper will not be different from the
preregistration  C1 = 3
Q12a. Is blinding of participants and/or experimenters mentioned?
 ▪ NO   C2= 99 (NA)
  + go to Q13
 ▪ YES  Go to Q12b
Q12b. Does the pre-registration describe procedures to blind participants to and/
or experimenters to conditions?
 ▪ NO   C2 = 0
 ▪ YES describes procedures to blind participants and/or blind
experimenters, but
not in a detailed and reproducible manner  C2 = 1
 ▪ YES provides detailed AND reproducible protocol for blinding 
participants and/or experimenters  C2 = 2
 ▪ YES like previous AND assures no other blinding procedures are
used (i.e. study will not deviate from the protocols of the 
experiment concerning knowledge of subjects and experimenters
on participation of subjects in conditions, and (possible) contact 
between subjects and experimenter)  C2 = 3
Q13. Does the pre-registration include protocols concerning coding of data, dis-
carding of cases, or correction of scores during data collection?
 ▪ NO   C3 = 0
 ▪ PARTIAL  text provides protocol but not for all three issues  C3 = 1
 ▪ YES   text provides reproducible protocol for all three issues  C3 = 2
 ▪ YES like previous AND text indicates that experiment will not 
deviate from the protocol concerning these three issues  C3 = 3
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Analyses
Answer all remaining questions for each analysis mentioned in the pre-registra-
tion concerning the hypothesis. If multiple analyses are run to test the same hy-
pothesis, then your evaluation of a researcher df will be the minimum of the eval-
uations for each analysis of that same hypothesis.
Q14. Does the pre-registration indicate how the study deals with incomplete or 
missing data?
 ▪ NO not described at all   A1 = 0
 ▪ PARTIAL described but not entirely reproducible on at 
least one aspect: criterion to drop cases because of missingness
(definition of missing case), procedure (pairwise deletion, listwise
deletion, imputation, full information methods, intention to treat),
or method to check for randomness of missingness (or selective
missingness)   A1 = 1
 ▪ YES reproducible on all three aspects (criterion, 
procedure, check for randomness)  A1 = 2
 ▪ YES like previous AND explicitly excluding other ways of dealing 
with incomplete or missing data  (“we will only use”)   A1 = 3
Q15a. Does the study involve data collection methods such as EEG, MRI, MEG, 
(molecular) genetic measures, physiological measures, hormonal measures, 
blood readings, coded behaviour of participants of observational studies, or other 
data-intensive measures requiring pre-processing of the data?
 ▪ NO   A2= 99 (NA)
  + go to Q16
 ▪ YES  Go to Q15b
Q15b. Does the pre-registration offer a protocol for pre-processing the data (e.g., 
cleaned, normalized, smoothed, corrected for motion and other artifacts)?
 ▪ NO not described at all   A2 = 0
 ▪ YES detailed protocol offered   A2 = 2
 ▪ YES like previous AND explicitly excluding other methods of
pre-processing (“we will only use”)   A2 = 3
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Q16. Does the pre-registration indicate how to test for violations of statistical as-
sumptions and what to do with possible violations?
 ▪ NO not described at all   A3 = 0
 ▪ PARTIAL described but not reproducible on at least one of the following
three aspects: which assumptions are checked (e.g., normality,
homoscedascity, linearity, homogeneity of variances, sphericity),
how these assumptions are checked (e.g., type of test like
Levene’s test, alpha level etc.), and what is to be done in cases 
of violations (e.g., transformations, non-parametric tests, etc.)   A3 = 1
 ▪ YES reproducible on all three aspects (type of 
assumptions, checks of assumptions, dealing with violations)  A3 = 2
 ▪ YES like previous AND explicitly excluding other methods of
dealing with model violations (“we will only use”)   A3 = 3
Q17. Does the pre-registration indicate how to detect outliers and how they 
should be dealt with?
 ▪ NO not described at all   A4 = 0
 ▪ PARTIAL described but not reproducible on at least one of the following
two aspects: what objectively defines an outlier (e.g., particular 
Z value, values for median absolute deviation statistic (MAD),
interquartile range (IQR), Mahalanobis distance) and how they
are dealt with (e.g., exclusion, method of Winsorisation, type of
non-parametric test, type of robust method, bootstrapping)  A4 = 1 
 ▪ YES reproducible on both aspects (objective 
definition of outliers & method of dealing with outliers)   A4 = 2
 ▪ YES like previous AND explicitly excluding other methods of
dealing with outliers (“we will only use”)    A4 = 3
In case the text clearly specifies how the outcome variable is measured, we distin-
guish between a non-composite (one measurement Y, go to Q18a) and a compos-
ite (several measurements or items are combined to one scale or measurement 
[using a sum or linear combination, or SEM] for the outcome variable Y, go to 
Q18b).
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Q18a. Non-composite. Is protocol Z to measure outcome variable Y using instru-
ment A described (i.e., the exact procedure of measurement, including a list of 
conditions that are controlled while measuring, list and range of potential values)?
 ▪ NO description provided  A6 = 0
 ▪ PARTIAL description given but on one of the aspects not 
reproducible (procedure, conditions, list/range of values)  A6 = 1
 ▪ YES reproducible on all aspects  A6 = 2
 ▪ YES reproducible on all aspects, and promise not to deviate   A6 = 3
Q18b. Composite. The text describes protocol Z to measure each element of the 
composite [protocol], the procedure how to construct the composite from its el-
ements (arithmetic mean, weighted mean, sum, other) [dealing index], and how 
is dealt with
(i) possible deviating individual items [dealing items];
(ii) possibly changing / combining values of individual items [dealing values];
(iii) scores of individuals who have at least one missing [dealing missings].
 ▪ NO description provided (e.g., only scale is mentioned)   A6 = 0
 ▪ PARTIAL, at least one, but not all of the following aspects is missing:
[dealing values], [dealing items], [dealing index], [protocol],
[dealing missings]  A6 = 1
 ▪ YES incudes all 5 aspects and is thereby reproducible   A6 = 2
 ▪ YES like previous AND promise not to use other scores  A6 = 3
Answer Q19 for each IV in each analysis of the same hypothesis. If multiple IVs 
are involved in the analysis/es of the same hypothesis, then your answer to Q19 
will be the minimum of the answers for each IV involved in the analysis/es of that 
same hypothesis.
Q19a. Does the design include non-manipulated independent variables?
 ▪ NO   A11= 99 (NA)
  + go to Q20
 ▪ YES  Go to Q19b
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Q19b. Does the text clearly specify which measurement instrument (test, scale, 
question set, physical measurement) will be used as the non-manipulated inde-
pendent variable?
 ▪ NO, it is not specified how the non-manipulated independent 
variable(s) is or are measured  A11 = 0
  + go to Q20
In case the text clearly specifies how the IV is measured, we distinguish between a 
non-composite (one measurement X, go to Q19c) and a composite (several mea-
surements or items are combined to one scale or measurement [using a sum or 
linear combination, or SEM] for the IV, go to Q19d).
Q19c. Non-composite. Is protocol Z to measure IV X using instrument A described 
(i.e., the exact procedure of measurement, including a list of conditions that are 
controlled while measuring, list and range of potential values)?
 ▪ NO description provided  A11 = 0
 ▪ PARTIAL description given but on one of the aspects not 
reproducible (procedure, conditions, list/range of values)  A11 = 1
 ▪ YES description reproducible on all aspects   A11 = 2
 ▪ YES like previous AND promise not to deviate   A11 = 3
Q19d. Composite. The text describes protocol Z to measure each element of the com-
posite [protocol], the procedure how to construct the composite from its elements 
(arithmetic mean, weighted mean, sum, other) [dealing index], and how is dealt with
(i) possible deviating individual items [dealing items];
(ii) possibly changing / combining values of individual items [dealing values];
(iii) scores of individuals who have at least one missing [dealing missings].
 ▪ NO description provided (e.g., only scale is mentioned)   A11 = 0
 ▪ PARTIAL, at least one of the following aspects is missing:
 [dealing values], [dealing items], [dealing index], 
[dealing missings]  A11 = 1
 ▪ YES incudes all 5 aspects and is thereby reproducible  A11 = 2
YES like previous AND promise not to use other scores  A11 = 3
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Q20. Does the pre-registration specify the statistical model(s) that will be used to 
test the hypothesis (e.g., MANOVA, logistic regression, linear regression, multilev-
el regression, loglinear analysis, SEM)?
 ▪ NO not described at all  A13 = 0
 ▪ PARTIAL type of model is mentioned but descriptions fails to
explicate all relevant predictors/factors (including covariates and
interaction terms) and the manner in which these are used in 
analysis (e.g., mean centered, SEM model specification 
including potential residual covariances)  A13 = 1
 ▪ YES full statistical model is presented and thereby reproducible   A13 = 2
 ▪ YES like previous AND explicitly excluding other models to be
used (“we will only use”)  A13 = 3
Q21a. Does the pre-registration indicate details of the estimation technique used 
to estimate the statistical model and to compute standard errors?
 ▪ NO not described at all  A14 = 0
 ▪ PARTIAL estimation technique is mentioned in general terms
(e.g., maximum likelihood) and no mention is made of potential
use of robust SEs or any other correction to the model fit 
measures or SEs (e.g., Satorra Bentler correction)  A14 = 1
 ▪ YES script is provided and/or specific estimation technique is
described in detail (e.g., restricted maximum likelihood,
specification of generalized linear model estimation, weighted 
least squares, mean and variance adjusted weighted least 
squares, partial least squares, robust standard errors) including
the manner in which standard errors are computed, thereby
the estimation is reproducible   A14 = 2
 ▪ YES like previous AND explicitly excluding other corrections to
be used (“we will only use”)   A14 = 3
Q21b. Does the pre-registration specify which statistical software package and 
version is used for running the analyses?
 ▪ NO not described at all  A14 = 0
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 ▪ PARTIAL mentioned in general terms (e.g., analyses to be run
in SPSS, R, SAS, LISREL) but without mentioning version
number and/or without specific package (in R) or add-on 
syntax (if applicable)   min(A14 =1, Q21a)
 ▪ YES mentions software package, version code, and specific 
package/syntax (if applicable), thereby the power-analysis is 
reproducible  min(A14 =2, Q21a)
 ▪ YES like previous AND explicitly excluding use of other software
or packages (“we will only use”)   min(A14 =3, Q21a)
Q22. Does the pre-registration indicate the inference criteria (e.g., Bayes factors, 
Alpha level, sidedness of the test, corrections for multiple testing)?
 ▪ NO not described at all  A15 = 0
 ▪ PARTIAL mentions one of the criteria (e.g., overall Alpha level),
but not all. For instance, it fails to report the sidedness of the 
test or possible corrections for multiple testing  A15 = 1
 ▪ YES mentions all inference criteria, including Alpha level/Bayes
factor thresholds, corrections for multiple testing, sidedness 
of the test, thereby the inference criteria are reproducible   A15 = 2
 ▪ YES like previous AND explicitly excluding use of additional 
inference criteria (“we will only use”)   A15 = 3
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DANKWOORD
Toen ik vijf jaar geleden aan mijn promotietraject begon had ik niet voor mogelijk 
gehouden dat dit zo’n bijzondere tijd zou worden. Zonder de mensen die ik hier 
wil bedanken was mijn proefschrift niet tot stand gekomen en had ik niet zulke 
mooie herinneringen aan mijn periode als promovendus gehad. 
Allereerst wil ik mijn promotoren Prof. Jelte Wicherts en Prof. Marcel van 
Assen bedanken. Jullie waren ieder op jullie eigen manier fantastische begeleiders 
die mij hebben laten groeien als onderzoeker en als persoon. Jelte, meteen vanaf 
het begin gaf je mij de vrijheid waar ik behoefte aan had, terwijl je er tegelijkertijd 
ook direct was als ik je nodig had. Hoe druk je het ook had, je stelde altijd mijn 
belangen voorop en kwam onmiddellijk als een soort ridder voor mij op als er ook 
maar iets was dat mij in de weg stond. Met je ongelooflijke drive, kennis, enthou-
siasme, en humor gaf je me vleugels. Wanneer er echter iets te veel ideeën uit 
mijn hoofd kwamen vliegen, trok je me weer met beide benen op de grond. Zeer 
veel dank voor alles!
Marcel, als een vader heb je altijd over mijn welzijn gewaakt. In het begin 
moest ik even wennen aan je feedback-stijl en je directheid, maar al gauw ging dat 
goed. Je was altijd buitengewoon behulpzaam. Als ik dacht met een ingewikkeld 
statistisch probleem te zitten, begreep je al na drie woorden wat ik niet begreep 
en tekende je de oplossing meteen helder op papier. Sowieso geloof jij niet in 
problemen; je joeg elke beer die ik op de weg zag direct het bos in. Dankzij jouw 
relativeringsvermogen heb ik geleerd onderscheid te maken tussen wat meer en 
minder belangrijk is, en dat niet alleen in de wetenschap, maar ook in het leven in 
de breedste zin. Ook had ik nooit gedacht dat er in de wetenschap zo ontzettend 
hard en veel te lachen viel! Enorm veel dank voor alles. 
Ook zou ik graag de leden van mijn leescommissie willen bedanken. Prof. Lex 
Bouter, Prof. Klaas Sijtsma, Prof. Eric-Jan Wagenmakers, en Dr. Rink Hoekstra, veel 
dank voor de tijd en moeite die jullie hebben genomen om mijn proefschrift te 
lezen en om naar Tilburg te komen om deel te nemen aan de discussie van mijn 
proefschrift. Dr. Simine Vazire, thank you for the time and effort you invested in 
reading my dissertation, and for traveling all the way from the USA to join the dis-
cussion of my dissertation. Prof. Franca Agnoli, La ringrazio per il tempo e lo sforzo 
che ha investito nel leggere la mia tesi, e per viaggiare dall’Italia a partecipare alla 
discussione della mia tesi. 
Dan onze onderzoeksgroep! Vijf jaar geleden begonnen we met z’n vieren, 
maar na een paar jaar waren we al met z’n negenen en hadden we zelfs een offi-
ciële naam: the Meta-Research Center at Tilburg University. Michèle Nuijten, Pau-
lette Flore, Robbie van Aert, Chris Hartgerink, Hilde Augusteijn, en Marjan Bakker, 
samen waren wij het (t)error team, (on)geleid door Jelte en Marcel. Heel veel 
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dank voor jullie bijdragen aan mijn artikelen en het schieten op de conceptversies 
ervan, voor het sparren over onze ideeën, en voor onze serieuze en hilarische 
discussies. Ik zal onze tweewekelijkse leesclub enorm missen: de bijpraatronde 
(Marcel’s anekdotes!), en het (op de energie van een heel pak koekjes) bekri-
tiseren van alle artikelen die er nu weer waren verschenen. Wat hebben we veel 
meegemaakt en veel gelachen. Een hoogtepunt was de APS conferentie in San 
Francisco in 2014 (Bob’s party!), en de road trip die Michèle, Paulette, Robbie 
en ik na afloop door het westen van de Verenigde Staten maakten. Watervallen 
en confidence intervallen in Yosemite! Een ander hoogtepunt was Chicago 2016, 
waar we allemaal bij waren. We waren onderdeel van de meta-research invasie bij 
APS, en we ontdekten het beste sushi-restaurant van de wereld (toch, Robbie?). 
Het feit dat ik me zo thuis voelde in onze groep heeft zeer veel bijgedragen aan 
het plezier dat ik heb beleefd aan mijn promotietraject. Dank hiervoor, en voor 
alle mooie herinneringen.
Ook buiten onze onderzoeksgroep zijn er mensen die een belangrijke bij-
drage aan mijn proefschrift hebben geleverd. Ik wil de reviewers van mijn artike-
len bedanken voor hun constructieve commentaren, en de student-assistenten 
voor hun harde werk. Linda Dominguez-Alvarez, Elise Crompvoets, en How Hwee 
Ong, jullie hebben geweldig werk verricht, veel dank hiervoor. 
Ook mijn kamergenoten wil ik in het bijzonder bedanken. Robert Hillen, Pau-
lette Flore, en Michèle Nuijten, ruim vier jaar zaten we samen. Vier jaar waarin 
we alles deelden, van publicatie-extase tot liefdesverdriet tot bruiloft. Onze kamer 
in P toverden we om tot een lounge room met pooltafel, basketbalspel, een ver-
stopte nespresso-tap, en een mooi uitzicht op George. Elke maandagochtend 
brachten we elkaar op de hoogte van elkaars leven, om daarna weer hard te gaan 
‘knallen’. Bedankt voor een geweldige tijd! Ik mis jullie nu al. 
Onze afdelingssecretaresse Marieke Timmermans mag ook niet ontbreken in 
mijn dankwoord. Marieke, je was altijd bereid om te helpen met alles, zelfs nadat 
ik al weg was uit Tilburg. Bedankt voor alles! Ik blijf graag over je vakanties naar 
het Verenigd Koninkrijk horen. Ook wil ik hier alle andere collega’s en oud-colle-
ga’s van MTO noemen: veel dank voor de fijne sfeer in het departement!
Dan mijn paranimfen Marlous Agterberg en Anna Hoogenboom. Lieve Lous 
en Annina, het is al meer dan 22 jaar geleden dat we daar samen bij Latijn naar 
meneer Prins zaten te luisteren, en sinds die tijd horen wij gewoon bij elkaar. Dank 
dat jullie er altijd zijn, en altijd zijn gebleven. Jullie hebben me altijd in alles ges-
teund, en ook nu weer staan jullie (letterlijk) achter mij. Zonder jullie steun en be-
grip, en zonder de energie die ik kreeg van de gesprekken, etentjes, en koffietjes 
met jullie, was mijn boekje er nooit gekomen.
Mijn alleroudste en dierbare vriendin Marjolein van Zoelen wil ik ook in het 
bijzonder bedanken. Lieve Mar, onze jeugd in de Badhuislaan heeft mij meer dan 
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wat dan ook gevormd. Je bent een essentieel onderdeel van mijn leven, en mijn 
grote voorbeeld in wilskracht en doorzettingsvermogen. Met jouw humor en lev-
enshouding laat je zien dat alles mogelijk is. 
Mijn psychologievriendinnen Maaike Weber, Astrid Jehle, Floor de Groot, en 
Anna van der Horst moeten hier uiteraard ook genoemd worden. Lieve Maaike, 
toen ik jou leerde kennen tijdens de Bachelor begon ik mijn studie pas echt gezel-
lig te vinden. Jij hebt mij het Amsterdamse studentenleven in getrokken, en hebt 
ervoor gezorgd dat ik ook in Amsterdam kon komen wonen. Ik ben zo blij dat we 
nog steeds veel contact hebben! Lieve Anna, Astrid, en Floor, wie had kunnen 
denken dat er uit een programma als Lisrel zo’n mooie vriendschap zou komen? 
Samen hebben we ons door de Research Master heen geslagen. Ik weet niet of ik 
het zonder jullie volgehouden zou hebben! Heel veel dank dat jullie er zijn.
Aan mijn ouders heb ik wat betreft het behalen van mijn doctoraat misschien 
wel het meest te danken. Mijn lieve papa en mama, zonder jullie onuitputtelijke 
steun en geduld was dit proefschrift er nooit gekomen. Altijd hebben jullie mij de 
vrijheid gegeven om geheel mijn eigen keuzes te maken. Dat ik deze vrijheid zo 
optimaal zou gebruiken hadden jullie misschien niet helemaal voorzien, maar ik 
ben er ontzettend dankbaar voor. Jullie gunden mij mijn wilde jaren in Australië, 
en steunden daarna mijn keuze om paarden te gaan bestuderen in Wales. Toen 
ik uiteindelijk tot inzicht kwam dat dit het toch niet zou worden, bleven jullie mij 
herkansingen bieden. Mijn hart bleek uiteindelijk bij de psychologie te liggen, iets 
wat jullie misschien stiekem altijd al wisten. Papa, vroeger vertelde ik stoer aan 
mijn vriendinnen dat mijn vader ‘statisticus’ was, ook al had ik geen idee wat dat 
was. Wie had ooit gedacht dat ik uiteindelijk zou promoveren in de Methodologie 
en Statistiek? 
De andere twee leden van ons gezin hebben ook indirect veel bijgedragen. 
Lieve broer en zus, wat is het toch heerlijk om jullie in mijn leven te hebben. Met 
jullie kan ik over alles praten, we begrijpen elkaar compleet. Juist in drukke peri-
odes geniet ik er altijd extra van om tijd met jullie door te brengen; bij jullie kom 
ik meteen tot rust en kan ik daarna weer de hele wereld aan! 
Als laatste wil ik mijn fantastische echtgenoot en dochter bedanken. Lieve 
Sven, jouw steun is cruciaal geweest voor de totstandkoming van mijn proefschrift. 
Als eindeloos geduldige R-goeroe heb je mij door de steile learning curve van het 
programmeren gesleept, terwijl ik daar niet altijd even lief bij bleef. Het was echter 
niet alleen je praktische steun die zo waardevol was. Gedurende de hele vijf jaar 
wist je me altijd op de juiste momenten te motiveren, en op de juiste momenten 
te helpen bepaalde zaken te relativeren. Op de momenten dat ik twijfelde of ik het 
allemaal wel kon, deed jij me weer in mezelf geloven. De uiteindelijke afronding 
van mijn project was niet mogelijk geweest als jij niet op zo’n geweldige manier 
ons gezinnetje en huishouden draaiende had gehouden in de weken waarin ik dag 
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en nacht aan het werk was. Ik kan niet uitdrukken hoe dankbaar ik voor je ben. 
Lieve Nina, wat ben ik blij dat je er bent. Jij hebt mijn PhD-periode tot de meeste 
bijzondere tijd van mijn leven gemaakt, en mij geleerd waar het leven om draait. 
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